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1  Introduction 
KPMG, and its Consortium members, have been retained to undertake an economic assessment 
of the way in which geostationary orbit and spectrum resources (GSOSR) are allocated and used 
in International Telecommunications Union's (ITU) Region 1 (covering Europe, the former Soviet 
Union and Africa).  The objectives of this study are as follows : 
•  to develop a set of principles, based in particular on economic theory relating to 
resource management, that will facilitate the optimal allocation of scarce orbit 
and spectrum resources, 
•  based on these principles and as far as possible incorporating the main technical, 
legal, political and other considerations, to develop principles for managing the 
allocation and utilisation of orbit and spectrum resources. 
In particular, the principles that are developed will  need to take into account the current and 
potential requirements not only of  Europe but also of  the developing countries (LDCs), especially 
in Africa. 
Currently  there  are  few  or  no  explicit  economic  regulations  impacting  the  allocation  or 
assignment of GSOSR at the international or national levels in  Europe.  This does  not mean, 
however, that there are no resulting economic impacts.  Indeed the technical and administrative 
regulations  tend  to  interfere  with  and  distort  market  forces,  thus  "leading  to  economic 
inefficiencies developing in the market. 
In this report there is discussion of the key issues emerging from interviews conducted with a 
range of operators, regulators and representative bodies involved in the satellite communications 
industry, as  well as  input from our economic, legal and technical experts.  The structure of the 
remainder of this report will be as  follows: 
•  Review of literature.  Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature that deals 
with the regulation of the GSOSR and of analogous resources. 
•  Technological trends.  Chapter 3 considers the technological context of the use 
to  which  GSOSR  is  put.  This  provides  an  essential  backdrop  to  later 
considerations of regulatory and economic issues. 
•  Overview of the existing regulatory situation.  Chapter 4 places the rest of the 
analysis in  the context of the ITU  and national level  regulations that currently 
impact the allocation and use of GSOSR. 
•  Shortcomings  of existing  regulations.  Chapter  5  assesses  the  problems 
associated  with  the  existing  regulations  and  regulatory  structures  from  an 
economic perspective. 
•  Options for regulatory change.  Chapter 6 describes the optionS for regulatory 
changes which formed the basis of our interview programme. 
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•  Synthesis of key points from the US and European interviews.  Chapter 7 
discusses· the main points raised as a result of the interview programme.  The 
views  from  the US  and  Europe are presented separately because there is  an 
interesting difference in emphasis that reflects different regulatory, geo-political 
and economic conditions. 
•  Regulatory scenarios.  Based  on the analysis  in  the preceding  sections,  in 
Chapter  8 we  develop  four  scenarios of regulatory  change and  analyse their 
potential  economic  and  welfare  effects.  We  include  an  assessment  of the 
practical difficulties associated with introducing change. 
•  Model overview.  Chapter 9 outlines the methodology developed to analyse the 
quantitative scale of  economic impact associated with each scenario.  It describes 
how  the model  has  been estimated,  the parameters  that can be varied  when 
analysing the regulatory scenarios and the resulting outputs. 
•  Model results and implications.  Chapter 10 presents Qte full assessment of  the 
quantitative and qualitative implica~ions of regulatory changes. 
•  Policy  implications.  The final  chapter summarises  the  consequences  of the 
analysis for the future formulation of policy towards the regulation of GSOSR. 
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2  Review  of  Literature  and  Regulatory  Systems 
Analogous Industries 
.  In 
2.1  Review  of  Economic  Analysis  of the  Satellite  Indust_ry  and  its 
Regulation 
2 .1.1  Introduction 
A survey of  the literature on satellite economics was carried out with the objective of identifying 
previous work on the economic valuation and allocation of orbit/frequency resources and other 
methodologies that might be applied to this topic.  The research accessed the following sources 
of information: 
•  telecommunications, satellite and economic policy journals, 
•  books and government publications, 
•  other consultancy studies, 
•  articles in the trade press. 
A full  bibliography is  provided in  Appendix  1.  However, a review such as  this one can only 
scratch the surface of the literature, highlighting the main issues and previous work relevant to 
this study.  · 
The following sections highlight some of the specific points arising from this survey relating to 
modelling of satellite markets in general, specific methodologies, possible policy and regulatory 
scenarios  and  issues.  A wide  range of relevant  literature exists,  dealing explicitly  with  the 
satellite. industry or with other sectors and situations that can be viewed as analogous.  However, 
coverage of economic theory and  its practical application to satellite issues is relative! y recent. 
To a great extent this reflects the development of the industry itself, which has only recently 
begun to take into account economic theory and  market forces,  having previously been driven 
primarily by technical and  political factors. 
2.1.2  Background 
A number of issues were identified that apply to almost any modelling approach. 
One of  the key problems lies in the definition of the "product" that is being modelled.  Satellite 
orbit slots and frequencies can be regarded as multidimensional.  Each observed point comprises 
a combination of an orbit position and a frequency.  However, the orbit and frequency resources 
have no  value in  isolation.  They only have value when  combined  to provide what  may  be 
referred to as a "transmission opportunity" in space.  As such it is appropriate to regard the orbit 
and frequency resource from which transmissions can take place as a single unit. 
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Levin ( 1988) suggests that the appropriate market, that can be considered as a proxy for the orbit 
and frequency resource, is for "transponders in orbit".  He argues that the orbit slots themselves 
are not a marketable end product.  An orbit slot per se has no  value until there is a satellite in 
it.  Even then,  the marketable end  product is  not the satellite itself but the services that  it 
supports.  Snow (1988) in his economic assessment of lntelsat, developed a cost function using 
circuits as the output variable.  Circuits are suitable when considering predominantly telephone 
services.  Given the range of services (fV as  well  as  telephony) that are considered  in  this 
analysis, circuits would not be an appropriate unit of examination for the current study. 
Transponders, or a standardised 'transponder equivalent', would seem, therefore, to be the most 
practical proxy for  the orbit and  frequency transmission opportunity.  Consideration must be 
given,  however,  to  the services delivere4 via the transponders, especially when transponders 
delivering different services are not easily substitutable for each other.  It would seem that in the 
short to medium term transponders are li~ely to become more service specific.  Technological 
developments will permit greater efficiency in the use of both the orbit and frequency resource 
for specific applications.  Technological change will also improve the quality of  transmission that 
is possible for a given service application.  In the longer term,  integra~ion of services in digital 
multimedia  transmissions  is  likely  to  reverse  the  trend  and  increase  the  substitutability  of 
transponders. 
2.1.3  Alternative modelling methodologies 
Snow  (1990)  highlights  a number of difficulties  with  using  economic analysis  in  the  area of 
satellite regulation as follows: 
•  political and econometric difficulties with marginal costs and demand sensitive 
pricing, 
•  external price effects (externalities), 
•  missing or inaccurate data, 
•  political and socio-cultural considerations, 
•  the difficulty of arriving at a single indicator of social welfare. 
Levin (1988) in a  slightly different context, sets out the modelling problem.  He emphasises the 
difference  between  the  existing  system  of regulation  which  allocates  GSOSR  according  to 
technical and administrative criteria and one determined by economic theory.  The former has 
a rigid,  tightly packed  allotment  plan  while the latter envisages  a  loosely packed  plan  with 
transferability of assignments.  This can be shown to be more efficient: 
·1he task is simply to estimate and compare the economic losses in foregone outputs due 
to the vacancies left for flexibility, and the greater net value that results from transferring 
assignments from lower to higher valued uses and users. " 
Thus Levin stresses the centrality of  both flexibility and transferability of  the right to use GSOSR 
to an economically efficient regulatory system. 
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Snow (1988) used a number of quantitative techniques to investigate specific aspects of  Intelsat's 
operations.  These comprised: 
•  development of a cost function  (based  on an assumed  functional  form)  for  a 
hypothetical  Intelsat  signatory,  to  evaluate  whether  lntelsat  is  a  natural 
monopoly, 
•  utility analysis to assess the potential loss in welfare arising from loss in potential 
connections (the network effect) as new entrants divert customers from Intelsat, 
•  probability  analysis,  to  assess  the  implications  for  satellite  replacement  and 
breakdown coverage of new entrants. 
The analysis found that Intelsat benefited from efficiencies of multiple product output (EMPO). 
This lead to a recommendation for a shift in lntelsat's pricing policy away from average cost 
pricing and towards more demand sensitive pricing mechanisms, in order to sustain the benefits 
from these efficiencies, which can be eroded by competition from smaller new entrants. 
Snow (1990)  identified a number of possible general  methodologies for evaluating lntelsat as 
follows: 
•  functionalist  theory,  which  emphasises  the  development  of  international 
cooperation in the context of the institutional framework in which it takes place, 
•  cooperation  and  social  economy,  the  former  views  political  and  economic 
cooperation  as  superior  to  the  market  place  while  the  latter  envisions  state 
involvement as necessary in cases of market failure, 
•  political economy of  deregulation, which explicitly takes political considerations 
into account, 
•  collective or  public goods model, which views the frequency spectrum as a public 
good (due to  indivisibility and non-excludability), 
•  neoclassical economics,  the  optimisation of key  economic  variables,  such  as 
consumer welfare, subject to constraints. 
In our discussions with Professor Snow it has been agreed that for the purposes of this study the 
neoclassical  approach  is  the  most  appropriate  method  of analysis  as  it  provides  quantified 
estimates of welfare gains associated with different regulatory options.  It is an approach which 
is  based on well  accepted  economic principles and conforms well  with the objectives of this 
study.  The considerations associated with the other methodologies should be borne very firmly 
in  mind  when  considering  in  practice  how  regulatory  modifications  might  be  formulated, 
implemented and monitored. 
In the summary of  his article, Frieden (1992) promises to explore "how international competition 
can enhance consumer welfare."  The analysis was qualitative, discussing the implications of the 
following different types of market entry behaviour: 
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•  provocateur/trendsetter, the pioneer, visibly challenging the status quo, 
•  low pro.filer,  a later entrant, after policy battles have been concluded, 
•  innovator,  customer oriented, providing new or improved services to different 
markets, 
•  regional marketer/niche player, focusing on a specific region or service, 
•  opportunist/extortionist,  exploits  the  current  regulatory  framework  (  eg  for 
LDCs). 
While this type of analysis may  be of general interest,  and can be used, as  Frieden does,  to 
categorise recent market developments in satellites, from the point of  view of  policy analysis the 
focus is too much at the micro level and there is little potential for carrying out a quantitative 
assessment of policy options. 
Macauley (1989) focused on the value of particular orbit slots by estimating the welfare costs of 
locational and operating inefficiencies that arise as a result of  the current "first come first served" 
orbital assignment mechanism.  This was done by modelling the value of orbit locations and 
combining  this  with  a  model  that  estimates  the  impact  of substituting  for  more  efficient 
technologies.  The analysis drew on models of  monocentric spatial locations that are used in land 
economics to show how land values (and therefore the capital intensity of land use) increase the 
closer you get to the central business district.  Macauley argued that if producers faced incentives 
to use the "prime" orbit locations more efficiently, then welfare gains may accrue.  Based on the 
analysis of two  regions,  Central/South America and  the Caribbean,  and  the Pacific Rim,  she 
found potential cost savings of $30 to $40m.  While these are small compared to the size of the 
world telecommunications sector, "they are large compared with the telecommunications sector 
in a developing country or with the budget for communication satellite R&D in the US".  Again, 
this type of approach  is  useful  for  looking at specific issues  (such as  the value of a particular 
orbit slot).  However,  it is  difficult to  extend  it  to  address  more general,  multi-dimensional, 
regulatory changes. 
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2.1.4  Policy and regulatory scenarios 
General 
A wide range of policy options and scenarios were identified.  Although the general thrust was 
for a deregulation of the market, there was considerable difference in focus.  Verhoef ( 1992) set 
out the current thinking of  the Commission.  Snow (1988, 1992) was particularly concerned with 
the implications of diluting Intelsat's monopoly position. 
More general deregulation scenarios were investigated by Levin (1988).  He looked at recent 
developments in the satellite industry and through a number of  case studies highlighted the ways 
in  which  m~ket forces  are being  introduced  "through the back door".  He proposes three 
possible  mechanisms  for  increasing  the  market  orient;3tion  and  flexibility  of the  existing 
regulatory framework, with specific reference to the potential benefit to LDCs, as follows: 
•  bond posting, users from developed countries would post  .a bond for use of LDC 
allotments, to be forfeited if  they do not vacate the slot within a specified period, 
•  leasing out of frequencies and orbit slots.  This would require a more flexible 
definition of  orbit/spectrum rights. The current, narrowly defined, system means 
that there are few alternative uses for particular allocations, 
•  economic coordination, the equalisation of  incumbents and new entrants through 
cross payments and penalties. 
Levin (1991) subsequently argued that it may be possible to establish a market to trade in rights 
to use orbital slots and associated frequencies.  · 
Scarcity of  orbit and spectrum 
The existence of scarcity of orbit slots and spectrum, and  the extent to which this may be an 
artificial  result  of the  current  regulatory  framework,  is  a  subject  of considerable  debate. 
Elsewhere (see Section 7)  we report the views obtained in the US  and  Europe as  part of the 
interview  programme.  However,  scarcity  is  also  addressed  in  the  literature.  As  with  the 
interview programme, the views expressed are mixed.  In particular, there is considerable debate 
as  to  whether new  technology  will  alleviate the  problem or whether  new  uses  for  orbit and 
spectrum will continue to develop and exacerbate the problem.  What is generally agreed is that 
one of the main causes of scarcity lies with the current regulatory system, at both national and 
international level.  As indicated below, however, there are wide differences of opinion over 
what needs to be done. 
Even if the general scarcity such as that experienced in the US during the late 1970s and early 
1980s has been relieved, demand can still exceed supply in particular geographical locations/orbit 
slots/frequency bands  (see,  for  example,  the competing claims by  potential  LEO operators). 
Those who believe that scarcity is a function of inappropriate regulation argue that the shortages 
are more apparent than  real  and  would  disappear  if the resources  were priced  and  allocated 
according to economic principles. 
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The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (1992) reviews the current position in the US.  It notes 
that while technological· advances are increasing capacity, they also lead to new services that 
compete for orbit and spectrum, such as digital audio radio and improved television broadcasts. 
It also notes that most of the desirable frequencies between 3KHz and 300 GHz have already 
been allocated to specific uses, and those below 2 GHz that have the best technical characteristics 
are already tightly packed.  Motorola (1991) estimates that by the year 2000 an additional 317 
MHz of spectrum will be required for wireless communications and the CBO refers to one study 
that calculated the cost to the US economy of delays in allocating frequencies to cellular phone 
services at $86 billion. 
Also in the US,  an article in Business Week (1990) argues that spectrum overcrowding is still 
increasing, as new wider technologies such as cellular phones and pagers increase in popularity. 
The article views the current overcrowding as  being due to a combination of pressure from 
entrenched interests and an inflexible regulatory system.  It reports the ITU as stating that during 
the 1980s alone as many new frequency assignments were recorded as in the previous 80 years. 
In the US, there were 500,000 applications for cellular radio licences between 1984 and  1988 
alone (Benzani and Kalman,  1992). 
Matheson (1993) argues on the side of technology increasing capacity.  He believes that the 
flexibility of the spectrum, the new, more efficient technologies currently coming on line, and 
shifts in the way that spectrum is used (for example the use of fibre optic cable for bulk voice 
transmissions and the reduced demand for military applications as a result of  the peace dividend) 
all  mean that scarcity "is not inevitable and could actually ease in the .future".  In order to take 
advantage of these developments, the allocation process will need to become more flexible and 
market  oriented.  Gilder  (1991)  also  argues  that,  if allowed,  technological  innovation  will 
overcome any spectrum scarcity, citing the example of Motorola's LAN that operates at 18 GHz. 
He argues that auctioning spectrum that is  currently not allocated "would end, overnight, the 
notion that spectrum is a scarce natural resource".  · 
The situation outside the US is also unclear.  At an international level, Intelsat (1992) argues that 
according to its forecasts there will be a spectrum shortage in the Atlantic Ocean Region after 
2008.  Intelsat appears to believe that this is at least partly a result of inflexible regulation, as its 
proposals to alleviate the situation comprise: 
•  elimination of some Radio Regulation footnote constraints in the C band, 
•  increased flexibility as regards planned BSS and FSS spectrum in the Ku band, 
•  systems  combining  fixed  and  mobile  applications  (such  as  SNG)  being 
accommodated in the higher frequencies of the Ka band. 
The consultants Booz Allen (Collins, 1992) hold the opposite view.  They found that, for the UK, 
the supply of spectrum "can  reasonably be expected to  exceed the demand on all  reasonable 
forecasts over the next two decades".  This is primarily expected to result from technological 
improvements, and Collins uses this to argue that as there is no real scarcity, at least in Europe, 
spectrum auctions are unnecessary. 
In  Europe,  the ERO (1993)  is  studying the usage of spectrum under the  Detailed  Spectrum 
Investigation programme.  It h3:5  found that "there is no shortage of spectrum bands above 3.4 
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GHz".  Below this band, "where competition in the provision of public telecommunications has 
been introduced, in highly populated areas, there do~  appear to be problems in ensuring that 
spectrum  is  available for  new  networks  in key  geographical  areas  where radio  systems  are 
required to link major conurbations.  Means must therefore be found to ensure that sufficient 
radio capacity is available to enable new entrants in the telecommunications business to compete 
effectively and fairly with established PTOs."  However, the ERO's recommendations focus on 
the traditional  technical  approach to allocation,  via increased frequency  sharing~ particularly 
between civil and defence users, and improved co-ordination within Europe.  Little attention is 
given  to  economic  or market  based  allocation  mechanisms  except  to  note  that  the costs  of 
improved spectrum management should be ·reflected in licence fees and charges. 
In their summary of the economics of frequency allocation, Benzani and Kalman (1992) suggest 
that scarcity is present in particular bands and geographical areas and that this is set to increase, 
attributable to three factors: 
•  rapid technical progress that has dramatically reduced the cost of  radio equipment 
and terminals while improving their performance.  While -it is becoming cheaper 
for  existing  services  to  be  sent  over the  spectrum  rather  than  terrestrially, 
technical  progress  is  also  developing  new  satellite applications.  The author 
indicate that over one third of major new IT applications for the year 2000 are 
expected to use the spectrum in some way, 
•  rapidly expanding demand for radiocommunication services.  For example, the 
number of  subscribers to cellular radio systems grew by an average of over 20% 
a year between 1986 and  1991, 
•  deregulation in telecommunications services markets, allowing increased private 
competition to established PTO monopoly.  Without acCompanying liberalisation 
in the upstream markets (eg. in the regulation of  orbit and frequency) this has led 
to  considerable bottlenecks.  The authors  argue strongly (and  this  is  echoed 
elsewhere in the literature) that the existing regulatory procedures serve to stifle 
innovation and therefore waste resources. 
Alternative Allocation and Assignment Mechanisms 
In the context of the US  regulatory framework,  the NTIA (1991) discussed alternative market-
based  spectrum  allocation/assignment systems.  The  report  discussed  a  number  of options, 
including: 
•  competitive bidding through some son of  auction process.  This could be by way 
of a  "Vickrey  Auction"  where  the  highest  bidder  wins  but  pays  the second 
highest price, 
•  setting of fees.  This would be "less appealing" to the NTIA than the market 
based approach.  The level of fees could be set in a number of ways: 
' 
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to cover administrative costs, 
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to encourage efficient use of the spectrum, 
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as a percentage of gross revenue. 
There have recently been some significant moves towards economic pricing mechanisms that set 
charges closer to the "true" cost to society (or "opportunity cost") of using the orbit/frequency 
resource,  most notably in New  Zealand,  Australia and  the US.  In  practical terms, however, 
implementation of such  mechanisms  has  so  far  been extremely limited.  The main  basis  for 
setting charges remains the fixed licence fee approach.  In addition, in a number of countries the 
fee charged is not even related to administration costs.  Coopers and Lybrand (1993) highlight 
the main arguments for the market pricing approach: 
•  it would lead to more efficient use of spectrum through encouraging: 
applications to shift to other delivery mechanisms, 
use of more efficient technology; 
•  it would generate income to governments that could be used to further promote 
efficient spectrum use. 
In  addition,  NERA's (1988) report for the Government of New  Zealand argued that a market 
based allocation system: 
•  decentralises decisions on the use of spectrum to the users, who have the best 
information,  . 
•  encourages transfer of spectrum to higher value uses, promoting flexibility. 
The report also recognises that where negotiating costs are high, these benefits could be reduced. 
However, the report of the German Expert Committee looking at spectrum reform notes that (in 
Europe at least) the need for international co-operation and co-ordination limits the scope for 
using market pricing. 
CBO (1992) compares the two main allocation mechanisms currently used in the US with auctions 
in terms of efficiency, fairness and revenue.  Their table is reproduced below. 
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I  Method  I  Efficiencl  I  Fairness  I  Revenues  I 
Comparative  Might not assign the  Can ensure a  Revenues limited to 
Hearing  licence directly to the  specific distribution  licence application 
user who values it most.  of licences.  Legal  fees.  Total FCC fees 
Secondary markets  and administrative  for 1991  were $46.6 
allow licence sales to  costs of the process  million, including 
the users who value  give larger fmancial  renewals and fees for 
them most.  Consumes  interests an  lotteries.  New I  icence 
substantial private  advantage.  fees range from $35 to 
resources in licence- $70,000. 
seeking activity and  Comparative hearing 
inflicts high  fee for a new 
administrative and delay  applicant for land-
costs on society.  mobile services was 
$6,160 in  1991. 
Lottery  A random process  Allows all applicants  Lottery revenues are 
unlikely to assign the  equal opportunity if  included in totals 
licence direct! y to the  they can pay the  noted above.  Fees for 
user who values it most.  application fee.  By  specific lotteries can 
Secondary markets  awarding licences to  be substantial.  The 
allow licence sales to  applicants who do  digital electronic 
the users who value  not intend to  message service 
them most.  Less prone  provide services,  lottery, the 220-222 
to delay than hearings,  grants lottery  MHz filing of 1991, 
less prompt than  winners a windfall  drew 60,000 
auctions.  not shared by the  applicants and total 
public.  fees of $4.4 million. 
Auction  Is likely to assign the  Gives taxpayers a  CBO estimates an 
licence directly to the  share of spectrum  auction of 50 MHz of 
user who values it most.  rents.  Can be  spectrum for two 
Should assign licences  structured to  additional land-mobile 
more quickly and at a  accommodate small  licences could 
lower cost to society  bidders.  generate between $1.3 
than alternatives.  billion and $5.7 
billion in fiscal  years 
1993 through  1995. 
Source: Congressional Budget Office 
CBO (1992) estimated that auctioning two licences, each of 25 MHz, to advanced land mobile 
services could raise $1.3 billion to $5.7 billion.  The report summarises the main arguments for 
and against spectrum auctions as follows: 
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For: 
•  economic efficiency: the licence goes to the user who values it most.  They can 
be administratively easier, have lower transaction costs and be quicker than other 
options, 
•  fairness:  licences often bestow monopolistic powers to the holders.  Auctions 
allow  the  Government  to  cream  off monopoly  profit,  reducing  the  level  of  -
windfall gains. 
Against: 
•  public goods: auctioning may inhibit the provision of essential services such as 
public safety and defence, 
•  focus  on revenue:  using auctions  merely  to generate revenue can act against 
economic efficiency as Government has an incentive to limit competition in order 
to  increase the value of the licence being auctioned and therefore its revenue 
take, 
•  market  failure  in  the  telecommunications  sector:  the  existence of widespread 
market  failure  means  that  conventional  economics  assumptions  break  down, 
which could negate the potential benefits. 
The recent focus on auctions as a means of allocation/assignment has led to considerable interest 
and literature on the subject, although little of this is backed up by empirical analysis.  NERA 
(1988) recommended a system of tradeable spectrum property rights "wherever there is  good 
reason to  consider that the result and  efficiency  gains  will  be significantly greater than  any 
potential  increase in  administration,  transaction and  enforcement costs".  In particular,  they 
recommended  that for  New  Zealand, spectrum should be distributed by  (Vickrey) sealed  bid 
auctions, with a hand over period of up to three years in cases where there are existing users. 
During  that  time  existing  users  were  to  pay  annual  licence  fees  that  could  either  cover 
administration  costs  or reflect  the opportunity  co~t of the  spectrum.  However,  Coopers  & 
Lybrand (1993) note that the system has failed to achieve expected levels of revenue.  In a large 
part this can be attributed to political pressure from incumbents, which extended their rights from 
three years to 20 and achieved annual licence fees at a more favourable (ie lower) rate than had 
originally been intended. 
In the US new legislation provides for the reassignment of some frequencies currently reserved 
for Federal Government use.  This is to be done through competitive bidding, as the procedures 
currently used (lotteries and comparative bearings) "can be expensive and time consuming, can 
strain the limited resources of the Federal Communications Commission, and can result in  an 
inefficient distribution of spectrum and an unjustified windfall to speculators" (US Government, 
1993a). 
The costs and benefits of  auctions are also discussed in Macauley (1984), Hazlett (1992), Collins 
(1992) and US Government (1993b) among others. 
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Levin (1990)  explicitly models the costs of being a latecomer to the industry.  Although this 
analysis was in  the context of  the LDCs, it could also be applied to new entrants in a deregulated 
market.  He modelled a cost function (where output was defined in terms of "transponder years") 
and  found  that  latecomers  were  handicapped  by  less  convenient  frequencies,  higher  power 
requirements, a need for new equipment (losing out on economies of  scale), high R&D costs and 
increased cost of coordination with existing operators. 
Jussawalla and Tehranian (1993) argue that LDCs can benefit from their latecomer status, by 
"leapfrogging"  the  developed  world  in  accessing  the  most  advanced  technology  (see  also 
Abramovitz (1986)) developed in the West.  They cite among others the examples of  India, Brazil  · 
and  Mexico, which are using satellite technology to improve domestic telecommunications, as 
well as AsiaSat, which "provides a host of  developing nations with advanced satellite technology 
at an affordable price."  The latter in particular is an example of investments made by developed 
countries to enable them to access LDC markets.  This is part of a growing trend made possible 
in part by falling costs of technology and by the increasingly global nature of communications 
markets.  Such developments are in  line with modern economic theories of investment which 
suggest that new investment will take place so long as  its market value exceeds its cost. 
2.1.5  Conclusions 
The general conclusions from the survey are as follows: 
•  the original terms of reference for this study emphasised the innovative nature 
of the task.  This is reflected in the sparsity of  the literature in this area.  Little 
work  has  been  carried  out  on  the  economic  evaluation  of orbit/spectrum, 
although a number of studies have focused on specific·· aspects.  The techniques 
used also tend to vary considerably, generally being developed to address specific 
problems (such as market entry when there is a natural monopoly, or the value 
of a particular orbit slot), 
•  very  little quantitative analysis was  identified.  This  is  true even of the most 
recent literature.  The modelling approaches adopted a variety of  methodologies, 
including comparative utility analysis, probability analysis,  estimation of cost 
functions and more pragmatic market forecasting.  None of  these are considered 
to  be directly  applicable to  the current problem,  although  similar  techniques 
might  be applied  in specific areas such as  preparing market forecasts.  Other 
sources that promised· to investigate the impact on consumer welfare of market 
deregulation  were  largely  qualitative,  describing  alternative  "models"  and 
discussing their likely implications for the industry, 
•  all the literature emphasised the rapid change in technology that characterises the 
industry.  The main developments are described in Section 3 below.  However, 
a key implication for modelling purposes is the need for careful specification of 
the baseline case against which alternative policy scenarios will be evaluated, 
•  the satellite industry  _is  extremely complex.  In  addition  to  the technological 
change highlighted above, there are market failures,  such as the high level of 
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concentration  in  the  provision  of transponder  capacity,  the  participation  of 
competirors  (the PTOs) as  shareholders  in the main  providers of transponder 
capacity, and the degree of  technical regulation and government ownership.  This 
is reflected in the wide range of possible deregulatory scenarios that have been 
covered in the literature.  In order to ensure that the results of this study are 
properly  focused,  the  scenarios  to  be  considered  will  need  to:  be  clearly 
specified; avoid complex combinations of regulatory change (which are difficult 
to  model  and  for  which  it  will  be hard to disentangle the welfare effects);  be 
relevant to  the current policy debate;  and be limited to a manageable number. 
A number of general possibilities are identified in the literature.  However, the 
final  specification  will  need  to  take  cognisance  of the  existing  regulatory 
initiatives being promoted by the Commission and other such as  the European 
Radiocommunications Office (ERO), 
Overall, the analysis of the literature suggests that the approach adopted will need ·to be based 
on sound economic concepts, straightforward to model and bear in mind likely data limitations. 
2.2  National Satellite Regulations - Some Examples 
2.2.1  Introduction 
This section briefly reviews the current system of regulation at national level for  a sample of 
countries, focusing on access to the space segment for the provision of satellite services.  More 
detail on the international regulatory framework for provision of space segment is provided in 
Section 4 and on regulation of particular services (radio, telecoms, etc) in Section 2.3. 
Western Europe 
•  CIT  Research  (1992)  describe  the  regulatory  situation  in  Europe.  Their 
summary table is reproduced below.  Overall, Germany, France and the UK are 
viewed  as  being the most  liberal,  with  the  Netherlands  "not far  behind".  In 
other  countries  the  PTO  has  monopoly  rights  to  the  provision  of satellite 
services; 
•  selection  of operators  is  most  commonly  on  a first  come first  served  basis, 
although methods vary according to  type of service.  For most member states, 
the process by which decisions are made is not in the public domain; 
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National Regulations for Satellite Communications 
Receive Only  One-way  Two-way 
Terminals  Services  Services 
--
Germany  PL  PD  .PD 
France  PL  PL  PL 
UK  P- PL  PL 
Italy  M  M  M 
Spain  PL  M•  M• 
Portugal  PL  ~  ~ 
Sweden  PL  PL  PL 
Norway  PL  M  M 
Denmark  PL  M  M 
Finland  PL  M  M 
Netherlands  PL  PL
3  PL
3 
Belgium  PL  M•  M• 
Luxembourg  PL  M  M 
Switzerland  PL  M  M 
Austria  M  M  M 
Greece  PL  M  M 
Ireland  PL  Ms  M 
M  Monopoly of telecommunications organisation 
P- Private supply without licensing, type approval or coordination 
PD  Private supply subject to a declaration to the national regulatory authority 
PL  Private supply subject to licensing, type approval or coordination 
Notes: 
1  Legislation is pending that will grant licences on the basis of an administrative 
authorisation. 
2  Satellite links are not permitted for private installations.  However, if CPRM is 
not able to provide leased circuits that offer the same standard of service, 
exceptions to this rule are made. 
3  Anyone can now apply for a licence for fiXed  services but this is subject to 
interim rules and  will  not become law until  1993. 
4  Exclusive rights are due to expire at the end of 1992.  The licensing procedure 
will then consist of a declaration to the Belgian NRA. 
S  Telecom Eireann has exclusive rights in the provision of national services and is 
licensed to provide international services.  However, competition in the provision 
of national or international services is not precluded by legislation. 
Source : Reproduced from  Communications and lnfonnation Technology  (CIT) Research Ltd 
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•  UK:  there is  increasing  deregulation  in  telecommunications  markets.  Seven 
companies (Specialised Satellite Service Operators (SSSOs)) have been licensed 
to provide satellite communications services (in addition to BT and  Mercury). 
Licences  were granted  for  12  years.  While the licensee may  make  its  own 
arrangements  for  accessing  "separate  systems",  Intel sat  and  Eutelsat  space 
segment can only be accessed via BT, the Signatory.  The SSSO licence was 
replaced  with  a  broader  Satellite  Class  licence  in  1991,  which  allows  any 
operator to provide any kind of satellite link not connected to the PSTN.  Two 
licences permitting limited international telecommunications were issued in 1992; 
•  Germany: relatively deregulated.  Germany allows a private company to install, 
operate  and  own  a  two-way  VSA T  network.  Licences  to  provide  satellite 
services are obtained from the_ Ministry.  Space segment capacity can now be 
obtained  from  other (ie,  foreign)  Signatories than  DBP Telekom.  Four EC 
Member States - Germany, the UK, France and the Netherlands -·now permit 
Eutelsat space segment to be provided in their territories by the signatories of all 
four countries.  By April 1992 there were 26 operators licensed to provide one 
and  two  way  satellite  communications  services.  "Private voice"  links  and 
connections to the PSTN are evaluated on a case by case basis as to whether they 
threaten the DBT monopoly.  Twelve such licences had been granted by April 
1992; 
•  Luxembourg:  at  least  in  the  case  of  SES-Astra,  international  satellite 
broadcasting  is  encouraged,  but  telecommunications  services  remain  a  PTT 
monopoly.  Private  up linking  of voice,  data  and  video  is  subject  to  prior 
approval.  Luxembourg PTT owns the uplinks to Intelsat, Eutelsat, PANAMSAT 
and DFS-KOPERNIKUS; 
•  France: there is a move to relating costs of telecommunications services to  the 
actual cost of service provision.  France opposed the liberalisation of the market 
for terminal equipment.  Previously only France Telecom was allowed to provide 
uplink  services  on  voice,  data  or  video,  although  it  could  licence  private 
operators  (it did  this  for  VSAT  services).  Subsequently the Directorate for 
General  Regulation  has  issued  1  0-year  licences  to  a  number of operators  to 
provide two way VSA T services. 
•  generally regarded the most liberal (regulatory system) in the world.  There is 
an elaborate consultation process.  FCC (responsible for commercial services) 
undertakes  extensive  public  notice  and  comment  proceedings  to  determine 
allocations  and  assignments  under  a public  interest standard  and  has  private 
sector advisory committees on specific issues. 
•  licences to provide certain services (radio paging, cellular) are allocated either 
by comparative hearings or lotteries.  Current legislation allowing reassignment 
of some federal  spectrum to commercial use, stipulates auctions. 
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•  licensing  systems  are very  open.  Domestic  earth  station  licences  are only 
necessary  if owners  wish  to  ensure protection  from  interference.  Domestic 
uplink authorisation is  routine,  based on technical  characteristics.  However, 
foreign ownership of certain types of licences (eg radio) is restricted; 
New Zealand 
•  broad property rights to spectrum are allowed.  20 year licences  are sold by 
auction,  although  revenues  from  those  auctions  that  have  taken  place 
(broadcasting  and  mobile  communications)  were  lower  than  expected. 
Incumbents have 20 year grandfather rights and low administration fees.  Some 
spectrum  remains  reserved  for  non-commercial  uses,  eg,  aeronautical, 
navigation, astronomy. The regulator consults widely with broadcasters, network 
operators and telecommunications service providers; 
•  as a result of the 1989 Radiocommunications Act: 
•  Government can create nationwide property (known as  "management") 
rights for spectrum; 
•  these can be transferred to private ownership; 
•  licences are tradeable, technically specific but not purpose specific; 
•  existing systems are "grand  fathered"; 
•  licensing is via sealed-bid, second price public tender; 
•  no  specific due diligence provisions,  but existing anti-trust legislation 
may be invoked to prevent "hoarding"; 
•  all  types of antennae (television and data receive-only, interactive VSA  Ts and 
major  uplinks)  can  be privately  owned  and  operated  for  both  domestic  and 
international services, with no foreign ownership restrictions. 
· Australia 
•  1992 Radiocommunications Act introduces a radical market system, creating new 
property rights over spectrum and providing for auctions of  concessions on parts 
of the spectrum; 
•  the  regulator  consults  with  user  groups,  manufacturers  associations  and 
manufacturers themselves arid other Commonwealth Government departments; 
•  prior  to  1992  based  on the  1991  Telecommunications  Act,  any  person  or 
company (there are no foreign ownership restrictions) could own a receive only 
or  two  way  earth  station  and  operate  a  domestic  or  international  service, 
provided that they comply with the Service Providers Class Licence.  Licence 
fees were based on the usage of transponders by that service. 
Canada 
•  some licences are awarded on a first come first served basis.  Where the number 
of licences needs. to be limited, an "administrative comparative" approach is used 
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2.2.2 
which comprises a public invitation to tender.  Selection criteria are developed 
on a case by case basis and tenders are evaluated by the regulator.  The regulator 
consults widely with the industry,  user groups, manufacturers, the public and 
within government; 
•  Telesat  Canada  is  the  monopoly  operator  of the  domestic  space  segment, 
Teleglobe  Canada  has  a  monopoly  on overseas  satellite services.  There  is 
competition between service suppliers for domestic satellite communications; 
•  no licence is needed for receive only earth stations for television or data, but no 
protection from  interference is  provided.  Two way VSA  Ts must be licensed 
(only available to Canadian citizens or companies incorporated in Canada) and 
services must conform to published technical and safety standards. 
•  licences are awarded on a first come first served basis. , Charges are designed to 
cover administration costs; 
•  TVRO  (and  reportedly  data  receive  only)  earth  stations  can  be  owned  and 
operated by any individual.  Users of satellite networks are not allowed to own 




all  types of domestic service are general  I  y liberalised but international services 
are restricted to  licensed international carriers; 
the regulator holds consultations with the Radio Regulatory Council, a "group 
of experts". 
Current developments and future trends 
The OECD's Committee for Information, Computer-and Communications Policy has an ongoing 
research programme into the economics of frequency allocation.  An Issues Paper (OECD 1992) 
highlights the key policy issues for its member countries, and notes that "while there is general 
agreement that  the practice of "first come first  served"  cannot be sustained  ... there is  little 
consensus on what allocatory methods should replace it". 
The paper demonstrates that economic theory is beginning to have a greater role in the satellite 
communications policy debate and provides an  indication of the direction of current thinking. 
However, it also illustrates the wide divergence that exists between different countries on a range 
of fundamental  issues, which suggests that there is  a long way  to go before such policies are 
widely accepted and implemented.  OECD members generally agree that: 
•  the spectrum has considerable market value, 
•  spectrum  management  should  be  separated  from  the  operation  of services 
provided over it, 
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•  nations should co-ordinate spectrum management policies, 
•  the spectrum plans should be reviewed regularly, with open consultation. 
However, there is only partial agreement as to whether: 
•  spectrum management should be administered on a cost recovery basis, 
•  the price of spectrum should reflect true market value, 
•  policies should cover spectrum allocation and its recovery. 
Other areas. that are still under discussion include: 
•  incumbents should be compensated if required to give up or shift spectrum use, 
•  spectrum should be assigned by competitive bidding, 
•  licences should be tradeable, 
•  licences should have renewable time limits. 
2.3  Review of Analogous Regulatory Environments 
2. 3. 1  Introduction 
In this section we outline the regulatory frameworks in place for a number of industries in which 
a variety of methods are used to allocate scarce resources.  In some industries pricing is used in 
order to  reach  a market equilibrium whereas  in others the price mechanism is  not used at  all. 
There is a number of  approaches to allocating resources, some of  which have differing objectives, 
ranging from economic efficiency through to equity.  Ownership and transferability of  ownership 
of rights  to  produce,  or rights  of access  to  a  service are also  important.  For example,  a 
government may own a resource and then allocate it for free on a first come first served basis 
(like the National  Health Service in the UK or motorways  in  Germany), or it may  give the 
resource to the highest bidder (as in the franchise monopolies for regional terrestrial television 
in the UK).  In broad terms the approaches include: 
•  no  regulation - the market is  left to  its  own devices.  If the market is  freely 
competitive and  there  is  no  market  failure  then  the outcome  gives  rise to  a 
market clearing price which is economically efficient.  No consideration is given 
to equity, 
•  regulation  - this  can  range  from  regulation of the structure of the  market 
(number of players) through to the conduct of  the players (pricing principles) in 
the market or a combination of both. 
We now consider some of the regulatory frameworks in operation in a variety of industries. 
2.3.2  Roads 
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In the UK ~d  Germany, most roads are publicly owned and typically prices are not charged for 
road  use.  There  are s-ome  restrictions  on the types  of vehicles  allowed  on  certain  roads, 
however.  Depending on demand for use, congestion results on some roads.  Clearly, this is 
costly to road users in terms of time wasted and also maintenance costs are high.  Some argue, 
particularly in heavily congested areas such as city centres, that the pricing mechanism ought to 
be introduced or, in some cases, that cars should be prohibited. 
2.3.3  Independent Radio 
The Radio  Authority  regulates  Independent  Radio  (IR)  on AM  and  FM  in  the  UK.  IR  is 
composed of Independent Local Radio (ILR) and Independent National Radio (INR).  Licences 
to broadcast are awarded as follows: 
•  ILR - licences  are advertised by the Radio Authority.  Applicants submit an 
application  which  contains  details  of programming,  technical  specifications 
including population coverage and a business plan.  The licence for each locality 
is awarded on the basis of  the proposed programming and technical competence. 
No cash bid for the licence is charged but an annual payment to the Treasury is 
required.  Licence duration is  8 years, and 
•  INR - as  for ILR except coverage is national and the licence is  awarded to the 
highest bidder. 
In  both  cases  the companies that own the rights to broadcast can be taken  over (if they  are 
tradeable companies), ie. ownership can be transferred on the stock exchange.  However, once 
the  right  to  broadcast  is  given,  it  is  owned  by  the  incumbent  for  eight  years.  There are 
restrictions on the number of ILRs and INRs one company can own. 
In France in the mid-80s, there were virtually no restrictions on radio licences.  For a time, there 
was a period where there was lots of overlaying (and hence interference) of local stations.  The 
industry  is  now  regulated and  the problemS have been alleviated.  Nevertheless, there is  as  a 
consequence a large number of radio stations. 
2.3.4  Terrestrial Television 
In  the  UK,  the  Independent  Television  Commission  (ITC)  awards  regional  franchises  to 
companies to provide regional television broadcasting (Channel 3).  Once awarded, the duration 
of the franchises  is  ten years - essentially a monopoly in regional television.  Take-overs are 
allowed after the first year of operation.  There are two stages to the process:  a strict quality 
threshold is  to  be crossed firstly,  followed  by a cash bid.  The franchises are awarded to  the 
highest bidder.  A percentage of revenue is paid as a fee in addition to the cash bid.  There are 
restrictions  on  the  number  of C3  franchises  one  company  can  own  and  on  cross-media 
(newspapers, for example) ownership. 
ChannelS (one station with national coverage) licences have been advertised (same lines as C3), 
although the lTC is currently reconsidering Channel 5 and no franchise has been awarded as yet. 
Little interest was shown in CS owing to the high costs associated with ownership of the right 
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to  broadcast.  The main cost to  the broadcaster was  the cost of re-tuning video  recorders. 
Furthermore, consumers  would  have had  to purchase special  aerials to receive the channel. 
Given the competition from existing terrestrial television and the growing penetration of many 
satellite channels, C5 was perceived to be a high risk venture.  The ITC has thus put the concept 
on hold and is  rumoured to be investigating the availability of alternative frequencies with no 
technical cost penalties for the broadcaster. 
In France, Canal Plus was given a monopoly right to supply pay terrestrial television in exchange 
for certain obligations to invest in French films. 
2.3.5  Cable TV 
Cable TV licences applications in the UK are awarded on an area basis which is defined in terms 
of  thousands of  population.  Applications are judged on the basis of  quality, household coverage, 
financial backing and business plan.  No cash bid is required.  Once the licence is awarded, the 
successful company has a monopoly on cabling in the area. 
2.3.6  Airport Landing Slots 
Peak and off-peak pricing is  used to charge for European airport landing slots, with the peak 
price being around three times the off-peak price.  However, the right .to  these slots is largely 
determined by grandfather rights, that is those who have historically enjoyed the right, continue 
to  do  so,  with  transfers  happening  only  when  companies  are taken  over.  Airports  have  a 
scheduling committee (comprising the airlines) which deals with re-scheduling twice a year.  If 
a  slot  becomes  available  then  who  ever  asks  for  it  gets  it.  Priority  is  given,  however,  to 
grandfather rights.  The right to take-off and land is independent of  the origin and destination of 
the flight.  There is no trading of  airport landing slots.  This contrasts with the US where landing 
slots are traded. 
2. 3. 7  Airline Routes 
Airline routes between countries are regulated by bilateral agreements, so called airline services 
agreements (ASAs).  The AS As are agreed by governments in relation to number of seats/flights 
per week ..  A government will nominate one or more airline for a route subject to airworthiness, 
quality and so on.  Once set, these routes last indefinitely.  In order to· have the right to fly  an 
existing route, a company would have to take over the incumbent.  Within countries routes are 
determined according to  individual domestic policy.  AS As specify: 
•  the airlines to fly on the route, 
•  the capacity each airline will offer, 
•  the capacity third party airlines will offer. 
Domestic routes were deregulated in the US  in the late 1970s and in the UK during the 1980s. 
The UK negotiated ~ relatively liberal ASA with Benelux and limited pro-competitive agreements 
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with  Germany  and  Switzerland.  At  that  time,  those countries  which  were most  hostile to 
deregulation were Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece.  Council regulation (EEC) No 
3976/87 exempts  certain air. transport practices from the application of EC competition law 
(ground handling services, computer reservation systems, joint  planning/co-ordination of  capacity, 
revenue sharing, tariff consultations and slot allocations at airports).  The long-term aim of  the 
EC, however, is open competition in airline transport services.  Member states are in the process 
of deregulating the industry. 
Note that whilst one of the aims of airline regulation, to curb the abuse of market power,  is 
applicable in the US and the UK; in other countries this typically has not been the case.  Indeed, 
the regulatory regime in operation has aimed to protect the finances of the domestic (typically 
state-owned) airline rather than the interests of the consumer.  Ironically, despite deregulation, 
owing to the high fixed  costs, uncertain running costs and the "grandfather" approach to slot 
allocation,  deregulation has not in general led to a sustained .competitive environment in the 
relevant air transport markets.  These areas are under review by the Commission. -
2.3.8  Utilities 
In the UK, the utilities (gas, electricity, telecommunications and water industries) are privatised. 
Where feasible and desirable competition has been introduced (eg in generation of electricity and 
non-local  telephone  calls)  and  where  there  are  natural  monopoly  characteristics,  conduct 
regulation (of prices and quality of service) prevails. 
Whilst the characteristics of  the industries do differ, there is a number of  common features within 
the regulatory regimes: 
2.3.9 
•  price control and quality of service regulation are used to curb monopoly power 
and  protect  consumers  - where  possible  competitive  market  behaviour  is 
mimicked, 
•  the utilities  are obliged  to  supply  all  who  have a reasonable demand  for  the 
service, 
•  licences to supply the services are for long periods (25  years), and 
•  regulators aim for tariffs that are related to costs . 
Radiocommunications 
In the UK, the Radiocommunications Agency (RA)  is  responsible for most civil radio matters. 
It  seeks  to  ensure  that  the  radio  frequency  spectrum  is  used  in  ways  which  maximises  its 
contribution to social and economic welfare, while having regard to the safety of life factors. 
Licences  are  charged  for  on  an  annual  renewable  basis,  and  are  designed  to  cover  the 
administrative cost of  radio regulation, rather than the actual cost incurred in issuing a particular 
licence. 
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2.3.10  Summary of Relevant Issue 
The above discussion has indicated a wide variety of market and non-market mechanisms which 
are used in resource allocation in a range of  industries.  Issues raised in this discussion which are 
relevant to considering regulatory options applicable to the regulation of GSOSR include: 
•  what sort of mechanism should be used to assign orbits and frequencies?  If  price 
is used, should it be set with rights to the resource determined on a first-come-
first-served basis, or should rights be determined via some bidding process? 
•  to what extent, and in what manner should the behaviour of  holders of  the rights 
to use orbit and spectrum resources be regulated? 
•  what should be the duration of spectrum and orbit rights? 
•  once a right to use GSOSR is conferred, should it be transferable? 
The regulatory scenarios developed in this study represent approaches to introducing some notion 
of economic  efficiency  into  the  management  of GSOSR.  · They  are  intended  to  suggest 
alternatives  to  the existing first-come-first-served  and  "equitable"  planned basis  for resource 
management. 
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3  Technology Trends 
3 .1  Introduction 
This  summary  is  intended  as  an  introduction  to  the  history  and  development  of satellite 
technologies. It places particular emphasis on the impact of  these technologies on the key physical 
resources used in satellite communications; the orbital slots into which satellites are placed, and-
the  radio  frequencies  (and  associated  baD:dwidths)  by  means  of which  they  communicate. 
However, it is  important to note the link between the two, since a communications satellite is 
inextricably linked with a set of radio frequencies, and can thus be regarded as a single resource. 
The key technologies and the trends in those technologies (both current and future) are discussed, 
focusing on satellite orbits, signal processing techniques,  intelligent satellites and  broadband 
services.  The effects of these technologies on the orbit and frequency resources will also be 
assessed.  A fuller discussion of these issues is to be found in Appendix 2. 
3.2  History 
The worldwide satellite communications infrastructure was originally developed by lntelsat during 
the 1960s, and provided a limited number of telephony and TV channels.  Communication was 
entirely between PTOs (the signatories to  Intelsat),  with  national distribution by the relevant 
PTO.  Satellites increased in number and sophistication during the 1970s, and spectrum efficiency 
was improved by the use of "dual polarisation".  It became possible to· lease a transponder from 
Intelsat and this allowed private networks to be created,  though country distribution was still 
typically carried out by the PTOs. 
The 1980s saw an exponential rise in the use of satellites and the range of services supported, 
notably for domestic US applications but also internationally.  Data services were developed, and 
earth stations were increasingly located on customers' premises.  The rise of regional systems, 
such as  Eutelsat and  Arabsat, increased pressure on both orbital slots and  the radio spectrum. 
Inmarsat became operational in 1982, and now offers a range of mobile communication services. 
Satellite TV broadcast direct to  home  (TV -DTH) services  and  business/VSA  T  services also 
proliferated during the mid to late 1980s. 
The 1990s are likely to see the rise of  low- and mid-earth orbit (LEO and MEO) satellites, which 
will decrease the pressure on orbital. slots in the geosynchronous orbit, but which will only serve 
to increase the pressure on the RF sp.ectrum. 
3  .3  Resources 
There  are  two  physical  resources  which  limit  the  worldwide  capacity  for  satellite 
communications.  These are : 
•  the potential orbits for satellites 
•  the frequencies used to communicate with the satellites, the available range of 
which is limited by technology (the techniq':les for exploiting higher and higher 
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frequencies  require constant development) and physics (only cenain frequency 
ranges penetrate the eanh  's ionosphere). 
The dominant orbit for  communications satellites has  always  been the geosynchronous orbit 
(GSO), a unique ring located some 35,000km above the Equator.  This orbit allows a satellite 
to  remain apparently motionless relative to any point on the Earth's surface.  Technological 
constraints  have  meant  that satellites  in this orbit cannot be placed  less  than  2 •  apan, thus 
severely limiting the potential number of orbital slots.  This is particularly the case in popular 
positions, such as those best suited to  servin~ the US and Western Europe. 
This situation may soon be eased by the growing trend towards the use of  LEO and MEO orbits, 
in which the coverage of a single GEO satellite is provided by a constellation of many satellites 
(which, since they are not geosynchronous, are best suited to polar and near-polar coverage). 
Although the pressure on the orbit resource will be eased by the use of  LEO/MEO satellites, this 
will  not  affect the problem of the crowded RF spectrum.  Satellite communications uses  the 
microwave frequencies, from 0.9 Ghz upwards.  However, not all frequencies above 0.9 Ghz are 
available, since the earth's ionosphere is impenetrable at many frequencies.  There are a number 
of windows,  and  these  windows  (bands)  are named  and  divided  between  civil  and  military 
satellite communications.  The bands used in civil satellite communications are: 
•  L band ( 1 - 2 Ghz), which is used for mobile services; 
•  S band (2 - 4 GHz), which is used for mobile services and for telemetric control 
of the satellite itself 
•  C band (4- 6 GHz), which is used for general  teleco~munications services; 
•  Ku  band  (1 0  - 14  GHz),  which  is  used  for  both  general  and  broadcast 
telecommunications services; 
•  Ka band (20- 30 GHz), which is used for general telecommunications services. 
Exploitation of higher frequencies  is  the subject of research.  As  frequencies  increase,  so the 
signals are increasingly subject to fade,  so that the exploitation of higher frequencies  is  highly 
dependent on the development of fade countermeasures (FCMs). 
The allocation of frequency  bands  to  services is  carried out by World Administrative Radio 
Conferences (W  ARC).  W  ARC  '92 allocated bandwidth to LEO/MEO mobile satellite services 
(such as  Motorola's proposed Iridium system) and to satellite sound broadcasting. 
RF signals must be modulated if they are to carry data.  The two principal modulation schemes 
currently in use are variations on Phase Shift Keying (PSK): 
•  Binary  PSK  (BPSK)  offers  the best  resilience  to  phase  noise  but  is  not  as 
spectrally efficient,  as  it offers lower transmission speeds,  as  other schemes. 
Quadraphase PSK (QPSK) offers double the spectral efficiency of BPSK but is 
more sensitive to phase variations and additive noise.  Consequently, it is more 
difficult and expensfve to implement. 
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More spectrally-efficient modulation schemes are now .being developed, in particular for use in 
broadband transmission ·and for mobile communication with LEO/MEO satellites. 
Older, analogue technology (both on board satellites and in earth stations) does not make efficient 
use of  the portion of  the spectrum allocated for a particular transponder.  This is being addressed 
by means of Digital Signal Processing (DSP) techniques which will allow better performance and 
a degree of flexibility in changes between modulation schemes. 
Finally, a large proportion of the RF spectrum has been allocated to users who do not make full 
use of it; in particular the blocks set aside for military use are not always efficiently used. 
3.4  Technologies 
The principal satellite communications services and selected key characteristics, are as follows: 
•  Telephony services,  which are likely to become more prevalent because of a 
number of technical advances: 
DSP techniques and  VLSI  implementation will reduce the cost of the 
earth stations; 
digital compression techniques reduce the bandwidth required from what 
was once 64 kb/s to (currently) 16 kb/s, with a.potential reduction to 2.4 
kb/s for mobile communications; 
digital speech interpolation (DSI) further reduces the bandwidth required 
for the transmission of speech by  removing the redundancy,  the gaps, 
from the speech.  · 
Taken together,  these factors  have the potential to make satellite telephony a 
viable option.  The proposed LEO/MEO personal telephony networks, such as 
Motorola's Iridium, will all use a handheld earth station.  This is  in contrast to 
the current telephony networks, which require a much bulkier earth station, so 
that their mobility is limited. 
•  the well-developed terrestrial  telephony  infrastructure in developed  countries 
clearly limits the potential of satellite telephony, so that its principal application 
in  those countries  is  in rural  development.  Another potential  use of satellite 
telephony  is in links with areas where the terrestrial  infrastructure is  far  less 
developed, such as links with Eastern Europe or Africa.  However, these limited 
uses  meant  that  Europe  and  Japan,  with  their  limited  rural  development 
opportunities, were opposed to the allocation of bands to  LEO/MEO satellite 
telephony systems at W  ARC '92, 
•  Direct  to  home  (DTH)  - or Direct  Broadcast  Satellite (DBS)  - television 
services,  which  currently  generate  more  than  half  of  European  satellite 
communications revenue.  These services have seen a phenomenal growth since 
the  beginning  of the  1980s,  and  although  some  observers  hold  that  their 
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dominance is set to decline (to about a third of  the total European revenues), they 
will still grow significantly over the ~ext ten years, 
•  the  Multiplexed  Analogue  Component  (MAC)  system  has  been  introduced 
experimentally as  a  replacement for the older PAL  system.  There are two 
European variations of the system, D-MAC and 02-MAC (which uses half the 
bandwidth of D-MAC, with some sacrifice of  picture quality).  Although D- and 
02-MAC have some digital  characteristics  (notably digital  sound  and  digital 
data), they do not offer digital TV, as the signal is still transmitted using FM. 
Although "pure" digital television is not yet available via satellites, SES-Astra 
is  planning  to  introduce  a  180-channel  television  satellite,  using  digital 
compression techniques, during the mid-1990s, 
•  although pure digital TV via satellite is likely to. be commercially available by 
2000, it is debatable what impact it will have; since most TV transmissions are 
either to  cable heads  (for  distribution via  cable)  or direct to  home,  existing 
standards (PAL, D-MAC) will be preserved for a significant time to come, and 
it is likely that initial users of  digital TV will be limited to specialised uses, such 
as  satellite news  gathering (SNG),  video  conferencing,  distance learning and 
business television, 
•  the  introduction  of  digital  radio  broadcasting,  using  the  Digital  Audio 
Broadcasting  (DAB)  standard, is  likely to  be slowed  by the same problem of 
existing standards.  Thus the digitisation of television and radio broadcasting is 
unlikely to  have a significant effect on relieving pressure on the RF spectrum 
over the next ten years, 
•  data;  business services have been available since the· early  1980s,  using Very 
Small  Aperture  Terminals  (VSA Ts)  for  both  one-way  and  two-way  data 
communications.  Although the resources dedicated to business services comprise 
a small proportion of the total at the moment, this sector is poised to experience 
the greatest growth over the next  t~n years, 
•  broadband services, currently under development, are an important target.  They 
will allow the integration of  telephony, TV and data into a single, digital service, 
thus  achieving  the  emerging  objective  of multi-service  support  by  a  single 
transponder, 
•  broadband services will require support for the A  TM and SDH protocols, which 
will require significant development in the areas of modulation and coding. 
The evolution  of new  satellite  services  has  been  supported  by  a  number  of technological 
developments: 
•  earth  stations  have  undergone  major  advances,  particularly  the  RF  portion. 
However, in bands above Ku band, there has been very little development, which 
clearly needs to be redressed if the higher frequency bands are to be exploited 
in the future, 
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circuits  to  be carried  within  the same  bandwidth  by  means  of compression 
techniques, 
•  Access  Schemes,  which  allow  multiple  users  to  access  the  same  satellite 
transponder,  in  particular the development  of co~rdination and  networking 
techniques for constellations of LEO/MEO satellites. 
3.5  Future Trends 
There are a number of technological trends which will have an influence on orbit and frequency 
resources, principally in the following areas: 
•  digital signal processing (DSP) makes efficient use of  the RF spectrum allocated, 
thus making available significantly greater potential bandwidth at a  stroke, 
•  the use of LEO/MEO satellites will greatly reduce tbe pressure on the orbits 
resource, but will only serve to  increase pressure on the RF spectrum, 
•  new  modulation  techniques  currently  under  development  will  considerably 
improve spectral efficiency, in terms of  the bandwidth required to carry a certain 
throughput of data, 
•  on-board processing (OBP) will allow satellites to exist in a higher interference 
environment, so that they can be placed in closer orbits (allowing GEO satellites, 
for example,  to  be placed closer than 2 •  apart), thus increasing the potential 
number of satellites and therefore the pressure on the RF spectrum, 
•  inter-satellite links (ISLs) will allow communication between satellites, thereby 
reducing the number of satellites necessary and so easing the pressure on the RF 
spectrum.  ISLs,  which will  also rely on developments in OBP, are likely to 
have most impact on LEO and MEO satellites. 
The main technological development is, of course, digitisation of transmission for RF services 
(e.g.: DAB and digital HDTV) leading to a convergence of  telecommunications, broadcasting and 
other  services.  Such  convergence  would  be supported  by  means  of broadband  A  TM/SDH 
protocols, though the full bandwidth required to support A  TM is not expected to be available for 
at least ten years. 
This convergence calls into question the concepts of  separate service categories applied in current 
regulatory frameworks.  Often technology evolution and market-led developments combine to 
demolish these artificial barriers, the classic example being the use of the FSS bands for DTH 
satellite TV broadcasting and the consequent convergence of the FSS and BSS service types. 
There are some limitations to this convergence.  Satellite transponders that come into service over 
the next ten years will-offer increasing OBP capabilities, so that increasingly .complex personal 
telephony  and  business/data services can be supported with  ease.  However, the use of such 
sophisticated transponders is not justified for TV  -DTH and DBS services, and so they are likely 
to  remain separate, leading (in the short/medium term only) to specialised transponders; some 
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specialised for TV, others for integrated (broadband) services.  In the longer term, with increased 
market penetration of  digital TV services and sets and their consequent integration with personal 
telephony and business/data services, the use of sophisticated transponders for TV will become 
justified since the TV signal will require only a fraction of the (integrated) bandwidth. 
Therefore, the convergence of  TV and, to a lesser extent (due to the lower capital investment in 
equipment) radio with other satellite services is likely to be well behind  the technical capability, 
and is not likely in the next ten years. 
3.6  Summary 
It can be seen that there is increasing pressure on both orbit and frequency resources.  Although 
exploitation of LEO/MEO orbits will decrease the orbital slot pressure, the problem of scarcity 
of RF spectrum is  not going to  go away;  it can, however, be eased by suitable application of 
technology such as: 
•  DSP techniques which will allow efficient use of the RE spectrum, 
•  allocated digital compression which will increase the number of circuits that can 
be carried within a certain physical bandwidth, 
•  new  modulation  techniques  which  will  further  increase  spectral  efficiency, 
making broadband technologies such as  A  TM and SOH feasible. 
Against such technological developments can be set the growing importance and acceptance of 
standards.  This  is  likely  to  slow  down  the  introduction  of innovative  technology.  The 
convergence of satellite services, using broadband technologies and the digitisation of TV and 
radio,  may  eventually  greatly  simplify  the  Radio  Regulations  by  removing  the  distinctions 
between services.  However, this is a long term aim, since it is unlikely that broadcast TV will 
converge in the next ten years.  Until it does, the best that can be hoped for is the convergence 
into two types of service; TV and the rest.  The one exception to this is the "occasional" user 
of  TV, such as  SNG, which will go digital in the short term (since there is no existing standards 
base which must be supported), and so can converge with the other digital services. 
In addition there is the development of LEO and MEO systems which whilst relieving pressure 
on orbit slots, is unlikely to relieve pressure on the spectrum. 
Increasing pressure on GSOR is  being affected by a number of technological factors.  Most of 
the pertinent new technologies are expected to be in use in the late 1990s-2000. 
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4  Existing  Regulatory  Environment  for  Assigning 
GSOSR 
4.1  Introduction 
The existing system for regulatory access to, and use of, GSOSR involves procedures which are 
predominantly administrative and technical in nature, rather than economic.  Just because there 
is no economic rationale behind the regulations, however, does not mean there is an absence of 
economic effect.  Indeed, the lack of consideration of economic factors not surprisingly leads to 
economic inefficiencies and  market distortions.  The nature of the economic inefficiencies are 
considered later in this report, as are optional modifications to the existing regulatory system that 
should improve the economic efficiency of accessing and using GSOSR.  Before covering such 
issues  it  is  important  to  outline the  nature  of,  and  key  issues  associated  with  the  current 
regulatory regime. 
Consistent with  basic principles. of public international law, the assignment of internationally 
allocated  bands  to  specific  systems  is  a role played by  national  administrations.  Generally 
speaking, the main  constraint on accessing GSOSR is not the availability of orbital  "parking 
slots" in the GSO, but rather the requirement that national assignment of  internationally allocated 
bands of satellite spectrum shall not interfere with the operation of previously implemented or 
registered systems.  An overview of regulatory institutions and procedures affecting the use of 
GSOSR is given in Figure 4.1.  Each of the regulatory procedures iC:Ientified  in  Figure 4.1  is 
elaborated on in this section. 
Most observers have generally concluded that the available GSOSR is steadily diminishing in 
concert with growing demand, and it is hypothesized that prospective deregulation of European 
satellite  communications  portends  a  new  explosion  of pent-up  demand  for  access  to  such 
resources.  The economics of GSOSR access are influenced at least as much by regulation as by 
the laws of physics.  But very few  existing legal  arrangements or policy trends, such as  sub-
regional  systems planning,  suggest specific possibilities for a European approach to relieving 
pressure on GSOSR.  In the absence of extremely favourable impacts of relevant technological 
developments, existing pressure on GSOSR is  likely to become worse before it gets better. 
In  the  following  sections  there  is  more  detailed  examination  of the  main  regulatory  issues 
impacting access  to,  and  use of, the GSOSR.  Section 4.2 examines legal  and  policy matters 
limiting the supply of GSOSR to Europe.  Existing "supply-side" constraints are examined at the 
level of public international law of satellite communications as  well as  from the standpoint of 
national and Community law and policy.  Section 4.3 looks at the European GSOSR "demand-
side"  issues  from the standpoint of public international law as  well  as  from  the standpoint of 
national and European Community law.  Section 4.4 provides concluding remarks. 
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4.2  The supply· side 
4.2.1  The ITU GSOSR Regime 
The primary legal regime governing GSOSR is the treaty-based ITU regime, which is legislated 
by competent international Administrative Radio Conference and administered under the auspices 
of  the IFRB.  The extremely complicated details of  this regime have previously been documented 
for the Commission in some detail
1
•  For present purposes it is best to provide a summary of  the 
principle characteristics of  the regime.  The main sub-regimes of interest are those governing the 
Unplanned FSS, the Planned BSS, and the flexibly Planned FSS. 
4.2.2  Unplanned FSS 
A step by step guide to gaining access to GSOSR covered by the unplanned FSS  regime is 
summaris·ed in Figure 4.2. 
Under  applicable ITU  Radio  Regulations,  a  co~ntry is  free  to  coordinate an  assignment  of 
spectrum for implementation of a satellite network making use of the entire allocated band from 
a particular orbital location or set of locations.  The only serious constraint on registering such 
an  assignment  is  successful  coordination  with other countries  whose spectrum use  might  be 
affected by the new assignment. 
A country may publish its intention to implement an assignment as much as six years prior to an 
intended first use of.  the assignment.  All other administrations· which may be affected by the 
proposed assignment are then notified of this  "advance publication",  and· potential I  y affected 
administrations may request coordination, which the proposing administration thereby becomes 
obliged to undertake. 
After an  interim period of coordination with affected national  administrations,  with a view to 
resolving  any  issues  of spectrum  interference  in  respect  of prior  notified  or  registered 
assignments, the proposing country may  notify its intended use for  registration in  the IFRB's 
Master Registry.  The country then has an additional three years to  implement the new system. 
Protection from interfering systems commences provisionally once a newly proposed assignment 
has  been  advance  published  to  IFRB.  Unconditional  protection  commences  once,  having 
coordinated  a  new  system,  a  country  has  the  assignment  registered  in  the  IFRB's  Master 
Registry.  Hence a· national  assignment of GSOSR is  actually protectable for a period of nine 
years prior to bringing a system into use.  Moreover, in order to protect the assignment once 
these nine years have elapsed,  it  is  unnecessary to  bring  into  use the full  system which was 
See, for example, Soci~te Europoonne des Satellites, Review of  the Fixed Satellite Service 
in Europe (CEC Contract 45031 Final Report, 1991); especially Chapter 3.  Possibly the 
best detailed  review of the overall  ITU GSOSR regime,  as  it has  evolved up to and 
including the landmark W  ARC-QRB  88 Conference,  is  provided  in  Milton L Smith, 
International  Regulation  of Satellite  Communication  (Kluwer  Academic  Publishers, 
Dordrecht, The Netherlands,  1990). 
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originally coordinated and notified.  A nominal implementation of  spectrum assigned to the space 
segment use will suffice to protect the entire assignment. 
Once a registered assignment is implemented, it survives at least for the lifetime of the satellite, 
and  may be extended  indefinitely thereafter so long as the technical parameters of the system 
remain substantially consistent with the registered assignment.  Accordingly, there is ultimately 
no firm limit to the duration of a successfully coordinated national assignment in the Unplanned 
FSS. 
Although modified in certain interesting respects by the 1988 W  ARC-ORB Conference, the basic 
ITU regime governing GSOSR access for implementing ("Unplanned") FSS remains substantially 
the same as the customary "first-come, first served" regime which had evolved up to that point. 
This  regime  is  explicitly  intended  to  result in  efficient use of GSOSR,  and  is  structured to 
accommodate all users based on the substantive principle of technical non-interference and the 
procedural norm of  voluntary coordination.  It is believed that no satellite system has ever failed 
to be accommodated based on the operation of the classical Unplanned FSS regime. 
Consistent with basic principles of public international law, the assignment of internationally 
allocated FSS bands to specific systems is a role played by national administrations.  This does 
not, however, preclude collaborative international systems - such as the major ISOs, operating 
in accordance with appropriate intergovernmental agreements - from being coordinated within 
the framework of the Unplanned FSS. 
Generally speaking, and particularly under the Unplanned FSS regime, the main constraint on 
allocating GSOSR  is  not the availability of orbital "parking slots"  in the GSO, but rather the 
requirement that national assignment of  internationally allocated bands of  satellite spectrum shall 
not interfere with the operation of previously implemented or registered systems.  In this regard 
it must be noted that there is no firm limit to the duration of a successfully coordinated national 
assignment in the Unplanned FSS. 
WARC-ORB  88  introduced various  "simplified procedures"  into the Unplanned FSS  regime, 
among which at  least two are noteworthy for present purposes.  First, express provision was 
made for the device of  using multilateral meetings for coordination of  proposed systems.  Second, 
simplified coordination of an entire satellite network has been introduced based on the concept 
of a "typical" earth station. 
4.2.3  Planned BSS 
The Planned  BSS  regime  legislated  by W  ARC  1977  in  effect  allocated  particular  bands  of 
spectrum for the exclusive use of each Region  1 administration.  Subject to some exceptions 
generally not pertinent to Europe, under this  regime each country was allotted a specific BSS 
orbital position from which to serve its national territory using pre-specified bands. 
Under the BSS Plan applicable to Europe, a national assignment reflecting an intended use of a 
BSS  allotment must be notified to the IFRB at least three months (and up to three years) prior 
to bringing a system into use.  The assignment will be registered unless it fails to conform with 
the Plat1.  Since the right to make a conforming BSS assignment is protected in advance under 
the 1977 Plan, registration of such an assignment is relatively straightforward. 
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Subject to the standard norm of non-interference with prior notified or registered uses, under so-
called "Plan modification" procedures provided for in the 1977 Plan, it is possible to coordinate 
uses of BSS spectrum which deviate from the rigid orbit/spectrum allotments nominally provided 
for  each  country.  However,  a minimum of flexibility  is  provided  for  in  Region  1,  and  all 
countries which might be affected by a BSS Plan modification must accede, through coordination, 
to any specific proposal which differs from the 1977 national allotments. 
The 1977  BSS  Plan had a  nominal  lifetime of fifteen  years  (from  1979),  and  has  yet to  be 
terminated by a competent subsequent W  ARC.  It is unclear the extent to which any such W  ARC 
might extend the duration of  protection· afforded to assignments made in accordance with the 1977 
Plan. 
As is well known, rapid advances in satellite technology-both space segment (eg. medium-power 
FSS) and earth segment (ie. low-cost, highly sensitive but physically small TVROs) - have made 
the technical assumptions of  theW  ARC 77 BSS planning parameters obsolescent, with the result 
that few systems are likely to be implemented.  This is especially significant for Europe in that 
GSOSR have been reserved for every European country.  As a result,,GSOSR which might be 
used for European FSS has been wastefully reserved to non-existent BSS at the level of public 
international law. 
4 .2.4  Planned FSS 
The 1988 W  ARC set aside 800 MHz of FSS spectrum with a view to assuring every country the 
ability to implement domestic FSS.  Prior unplanned FSS assignments within this band, which 
antedated the coming into being of the Planned FSS regime, are effectively "grandfathered" for 
the twenty-year duration of the Plan. 
Although the Planned FSS, like the Planned BSS, involved vesting in advance national rights to 
make assignments, there were significant departures from the rigid allotment approach reflected 
in the  1977  BSS  Plan.  Flexibility has been introduced  into  the allotments made in the FSS 
planned band on the basis of two principles.  First, systems may be implemented in accordance 
with  more generalised  technical  parameters.  Sec<;>nd,  instead  of allotting  a specific  orbital 
location to each country, the Planned FSS regime allots a nominal orbital location within a 20° 
"predetermined arc" of the geostationary orbit; assignments may be made involving any orbital 
"slot" within plus or minus 20° of the nominal position designated in the Plan. 
With a view to expediting coordination issues which might arise as between intended assignments 
in accordance with the FSS Plan and prior Unplanned FSS assignments in the Planned FSS band, 
the 1988 W  ARC provided for so-called "improved procedures"  including a new mechanism of 
multilateral planning meetings  ("MPM")  ..  However MPM participation is  voluntary, and the 
efficacy of this approach remains unclear.  In the absence of an MPM solution to a proposed 
Planned  FSS  assignment,  the  more  customary  coordination  procedure  available  under  the 
Unplanned FSS will apply. 
Like the W  ARC 77  BSS regime, the W  ARC-ORB 88 regime for the planned FSS reflects the 
concerns of GSOSR "have-not" countries that global planning is necessary in order to guarantee 
every country an equitable reservation of GSOSR.  However the planning principles elaborated 
for the Planned FSS are quite flexible when compared with the rigid allotments previously arrived 
at for the BSS. 
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4.2.5  ITU Allocations to Specific Service Categories 
Bandwidth reserved for the Planned BSS and Planned FSS in ITU Region 1, including Europe, 
is very substantial; and by virtue of these two allotment plans is generally unavailable for use in 
Unplanned FSS, the only category of GSOSR naturally suited to pan-European applications. 
The allocations for Region  1 C- and Ku-band downlinks are illustrative.  In the C-band, 300 
MHz of a total of 1100 MHz for FSS downlinks is allocated to Planned FSS.  In the Ku-band-, 
which is considered the most commercially versatile and attractive FSS band, 500 MHz of  a total 
of 1250 MHz for FSS downlinks is allocated to Planned FSS.  Hence over a third of total FSS 
downlinking resource in these two key bands is tied up in Planned domestic FSS allotments. 
Moreover, an additional 800 MHz of Ku-band spectrum is allocated to BSS downlinks in Region 
1,  preempting the use of the resource for FSS applications.  In other words, in Region 1 Ku-
band, some 1300 MHz are tied up in the combination of  Planned FSS and Planned BSS domestic 
allotments for downlinks; with only 750 MHz of  Ku-band spectrum available for Unplanned FSS 
downlinks. 
Although some 3500 MHz of additional Region 1 FSS spectrum is allocated to downlinks in the 
Ku-band  (with  none  allocated  to  planned  bands),  the  use  of the  Ku-band  for  commercial 
applications is at an early stage globally. 
4.2.6  National and Community Law and Policy Affecting the Supply of GSOSR 
Under public international  law  as  well  as  Community law,  the sole authorities  competent to 
licence or otherwise authorise access to GSOSR (consistent with applicable ITU regimes) are 
sovereign countries, acting individually or in combination. 
One significant effect of this  basic rule is  that strategies for exploitation of GSOSR develop 
primarily at the national level.  Although cooperation in sub-regional systems such as Eutelsat 
may,  at  a given stage for  a given  group of national  players,  best satisfy national  goals  for 
accessing  GSOSR,  the new  empirical  trend  in  Europe appears  to  be toward an  evolution of 
competing national systems typically characterised by pan-European, or nearly pan-European, 
coverage areas.  The proliferation of  such national systems may tend to strain further the supply 
of GSOSR available for European applications. 
The strain will be greater if  access to bands otherwise available for pan-European service remains 
restricted under the Region  1 ITU Plans for the BSS  in particular, and, to a lesser extent, the 
Planned FSS.  As compared with Nonh America, the European continent is comprised politically 
by many ITU-sovereign states.  For this reason the recent global tendency to lock up satellite 
bands in nationally "equitable" GSOSR Plans tends to reduce, in a dramatic way, flexible supply 
of GSOSR for pan-European applications. 
In the  current climate of sovereign states  being  uniquely  competent to  licence satellites  for 
European service, it can be expected that at least some EC Member States may be reluctant to 
surrender fundamental "satellite sovereignty" in the interest of relieving pressures on the supply 
of GSOSR.  This will apply in particular to Member States already advanced  in their use of 
GSOSR, and intending to launch additional space segment facilities. 
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In such an environment, other Members States, whose material stakes in GSOSR are constituted 
mainly by their inclusion in the ITU FSS and BSS Plans, may also be reluctant to abandon those 
regimes. 
4.3  The demand side 
4.3.1  Sub-regional FSS Arrangements Under the ITU Regime 
It may be hypothesized that European regional arrangements for providing .pan-European service 
on a "common user" basis, institutionalised supranationally, could serve as a vehicle for relieving 
demand for GSOSR necessary to satisfy current or foreseeable satellite service requirements. 
The Eutelsat system is an expression of sub-regional satellite system implementation under the 
classical ITU regime for the Unplanned FSS. 
The W  ARC-ORB 88 regime for the Planned FSS also makes provision for sub-regional systems. 
Under a special scheme interested countries choose a nominal orbital position allotted to one of 
them under the Plan.  The associated national allotment is suspended for the life of the sub-
regional system.  Coordination then proceeds consistent with the requirement of  non-interference 
of  national allotments covered by the Plan.  However the specific provisions for coordinating sub-
regional  systems  contained  in  the  W  ARC-ORB  88  FSS  Plan  are  somewhat  unclear  as  to 
obligations of non-interference owed to "existing systems" in the Planned FSS band which may 
not have been implemented. 
It is unclear the extent to which implementation of  sub-regional systems such as Eutelsat - arising 
under the classical Unplanned FSS regime- tends to relieve demand for GSOSR.  In part that 
would depend on the GSOSR requirements of  the particular sub-regional system(s).  What seems 
more likely is the prospect that implementation of a sub-regional system under the Planned FSS 
regime will tend, at least marginally, to relieve demand for GSOSR by substituting a sub-regional 
scheme  for  a  national  one.  On  the other hand,  it  must  be remembered  that  an  operative 
presupposition  of the W  ARC-ORB  88  FSS  Plan was  to  provide domestic  national  service. 
Coordination of protection from non-interfering signals may therefore be problematical outside 
the national territory of the country whose allotted orbital slot is chosen. 
It is well to keep in mind the apparent European trend toward national systems geared to sub-
regional service.  Although such .a trend would seem to raise demand for access to GSOSR,  it 
is generally consistent with Community competition policy in the telecommunications sector, and 
the satellite communications  sector  in  particular.  Experience with  the sub-regional  Eutelsat 
regime  has,  by  contrast,  led  to  major  competition  concerns  which  are  not  endemic  to  the 
constitution of sub-regional systems.  Yet an at least arguable case remains that one positive 
feature  of the  Eutelsat  system  is  its  ability  to  relieve  demand  for  GSOSR  on the part of 
constituent member countries. 
4.3.2  National and Community Law and policy affecting demand for GSOSR 
Consistent with the Community law doctrine of exclusive or special rights (embodied in Article 
90 EEC), an EU Member State which has authorised at least one satellite system becomes subject 
to the cl.aim that it must authorise others (although this notion remains untested in the sparse body 
of Community case law concerned with the satellite sector).  For present purposes the salient fact 
is that no EU  Member State currently exhibits a liberal policy toward licensing of commercial 
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"separate systems" (ie. separate from the ISOs) other than systems owned and operated by the 
dominant national TO or a surrogate linked with the national government. 
As is well known, EU Member States have entered into various ISO intergovernmental covenants 
which discourage commercial competition with the respective ISOs, particularly in the area of 
"reserved service"  (ie.  voice telephony); and  these so-called  "economic harm"  provisions are 
under increased scrutiny in the context of  the Community's deregulatory agenda· for the satellite 
sector. 
The trend toward growing competition with Eutelsat and the other ISOs in Europe appears to be 
fairly  ineluctable,  and  this  trend  may signal  a significant  increase in European demand  for 
GSOSR, particularly if accompanied by parallel deregulation of national licensing of separate 
systems consistent with Articles 86 and 90 EEC.  Based on a preliminary comparative overview 
of  the European and North American satellite communications marketplaces, it seems empirically 
demonstrable that legal  barriers to entry into  provision of European space segment enable a 
limited  number  of  dominant  players  to  maintain  artificially  high  prices.  Accordingly 
liberalisation of European space segment licensing could stimulate unprecedented demands for 
GSOSR access under current international legal assumptions. 
The European Commission's deregulatory agenda on space segment access will in any event bring 
prices  closer to costs by mandating direct access to  ISO space segment and/or by removing 
customary  barriers  to  entry  into  space  segment  provision.  Traditional  EC  Member  State 
sovereign  prerogatives  to  licence  space  segment  may  erode  as  national  separate  systems 
increasingly come into being.  This would be concurrent with the ongoing devolution of ISO 
exclusive  rights  to  provide  access  to  space  segment  for  most  European  applications.  A 
combination of these trends will likely provoke new demands for access to GSOSR on the part 
of would-be space segment providers. 
The effects of  impending EC deregulation of  the satellite services sector generally on demand for 
GSOSR may be dramatic, independent of the space segment licensing issues.  The proliferation 
of  services such as VSA  T, and the foreseeable development of applications such as long-distance 
trunk bypass,  are examples.  Today the major share of European space segment capacity  is 
devoted  to  carrying  television  signals.  In  the  future,  at  least  for  an  intermediate  phase 
concomitant  with  near-term  deregulatory  trends  in  the  telecommunications  sector,  it  seems 
entirely likely that overall European demand for access to space· segment will grow. 
4.4  Conclusions 
Under the existing public international regime, European access to GSOSR can be expected to 
become more not less problematic over time.  The Unplanned FSS regime covers the majority 
of  spectrum resource but substantial spectrum has been tied up in the BSS Plant and the flexibility 
of the less rigid Planned FSS regime remains in doubt. 
The assignment  of GSOSR  to  specific  satellite  systems  remains,  in  the current  climate  of 
European  law,  fundamentally  a  national  prerogative.  Both  this legal  reality,  and  the anti-
competitive covenants contained in ISO Conventions to which European countries including the 
EU Member States are party, have tended to reduce access to GSOSR by European users.  It is 
important to recognise that such legal  limitations on GSOSR access have tended to constrain 
European demand for use of GSOSR at an artificially low level. 
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systems, but the effect of  institutionalised sub-regional scenarios on the supply of GSOSR is not 
entirely clear.  Here it is  well  to keep  in mind the apparent European trend toward national 
systems  geared  to  pan-European  service.  Such  separate  systems  can  function  as  effective 
substitutes for a European ISO such as Eutelsat, and will presumably compete along lines more 
consistent with Community competition policy for the telecommunications sector.  However their 
proliferation may add substantially to European demand for GSOSR. 
At the _level  of public international  law,  including the ITU Radio  Regulation,  and  subject to 
spectrum non-interference, there is no bar to national licensing of FSS space segment serving 
territories outside national jurisdiction.  In Europe, this is illustrated by, inter alia, the SES/  Astra 
system's pan-European coverage.  Elsewhere, US policy on private separate systems has for some 
time permitted the implementation of commercial space segment linking US and non-US points 
(eg. Panamsat, Orion).  The recent use of the Pacific island nation of Tonga as a commercial 
satellite "flag of convenience"  illustrates that,  from  a purely legal  point of view; there is  no 
ultimate requirement that the territory of the licensing country, or its  nationals, be key to the 
business plan of the pertinent operator. 
Empirically, the European sub-regional experience with national space segment provision has 
customarily evolved with substantial emphasis on national systems serving primarily domestic 
coverage  areas.  Prior to  Astra,  the sub-regional  collective solution  was  the supranational 
arrangement represented by Eutelsat.  But, at least from the standpoint of  the Radio Regulations, 
the possibility of national licensing of pan-European coverage was always available, subject to 
the usual norm of non-interference with prior recorded systems.  So why, until perhaps recently, 
was the trend not in the direction of multiple pan-European systems comporting under different 
European flags? 
Several factors no doubt played a role.  First and foremost, all  European countries historically 
reserved satellite communications to favoured "national champions" -ie. incumbent PTOs; and, 
customarily, the PTOs were oriented to provision of  domestic-only telecommunications services 
of all sorts (with international service provided on a mutual correspondent basis).  In respect of 
satellite broadcasting, both the issue of respective national languages,  as  well as the matter of 
mutual respect for national "cultural sovereignty", no doubt played a role.  In addition, national 
industrial policies of  the major European countries compelled the establishment of  an independent 
national identity in the space sector. generally, and satellite communications in particular; but this 
by itself would not necessarily deter national operators from addressing pan-European services 
markets. 
The most profound reason why nationally authorised European space segment providers did not, 
until recently, gear their commercial planning to pan-European services markets was, indeed, the 
rigid compartmentalisation of  European satellite services markets along national lines, with rights 
to serve respective markets reserved to  national PTOs.  Hence the convenience of the Eutelsat 
sub-regional ISO model, which reserved Continental space segment access to national signatory 
(PTO) middlemen, on a territory-by-territory basis.  An associated reason, alluded to elsewhere 
in  this  report,  was  the disincentive  to  introduce  the  possibility of substitutes  to  monopoly 
terrestrial infrastructure controlled by respective national monopolies, much less to do so on a 
cross-border basis (a norm of "mutual non-aggression"). 
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Since satellite telecommunications  service provision in Europe has been - and substantially 
remains - reserved to respective national TOs, there has been little evident interest on part of 
private commercial interests to become licensed for European space segment provision.  Even 
in the current climate of services liberalisation, and even assuming a  "separate system" space 
segment  license  might  be  forthcoming  from  one  or  another  European  country,  lingering 
uncertainty about the pace and scope of liberalisation of two-way satellite services continues to 
undermine the logic of massive capital investment in private satellite systems intended to address 
markets  other than  broadcasting  (which  has  already  achieved  a relatively  advanced  state of 
deregulation in Europe). 
Moreover, assuming national licensing of  private separate systems geared to commercial telecom 
service provision were to be forthcoming at this stage, there would still be the palpable threat of 
an effective commercial response from the dominant incumbent operators.  The enforcement of 
basic competition rules applicable to the sector will likely be crucial to stimulating market entry 
at any stage. 
Achievement of the goal of more efficient access to existing European  .. space segment can be 
expected to stimulate growing demand for GSOSR.  And  it seems clear that the Community's 
deregulatory project directed to competitive provision of innovative satellite services will be the 
most  important stimulus  to  overall  market growth of the European satellite communications 
sector.  A potential  explosion of pent-up demand for new satellite services anticipated to be 
introduced in accordance with impending deregulation of  the European satellite sector could make 
the level of demand for GSOSR unsatisfiable. 
The ITU  experience with  "equitable planning"  of access  to  GSOSR suggests  little basis  for 
optimism that a similar approach would result in greater efficiencies at the European sub-regional 
or Community level. 
In contrast to Europe, North America appears to enjoy less strain on GSOSR access even in the 
face of a much more highly evolved, deregulated satellite communications marketplace.  In part 
this  is  because  fewer  protected  national  GSOSR  allotments  have been tied  up  in  the  North 
American sub-region by international GSOSR planning regimes.  One lesson for Europe may be 
to explore an undoing of the W  ARC 77 BSS  regime at least insofar as that regime applies to a 
definable sub-region comprised of  interested Administrations.  In part North America may exhibit 
a more flexible environment because a centralised and highly sophisticated GSOSR management 
function has been assumed by a single government body: the US FCC. 
The possibility of  dramatic advances in satellite communications technology may provide the most 
comforting basis for optimism that pressure on GSOSR access may be avoidable in the future. 
A separate school of thought holds that telecommunications technology extrinsic to the satellite 
sector, such as universal optical cabling, holds the key. 
The legal  conundrum of GSOSR  access  is so complex that it invites basic rethinking.  One 
compelling notion is that no  regime for access will remain perennially viable so long as basic 
rights  to  exploit  satellite  orbital  and  spectrum  resources  are obtainable  gratis  by  national 
administrations and their chosen operating entities. 
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5  Shortcomings of Existing Regulations 
5  .1  Introduction 
This  section  examines  the  perceived  shortcomings  of the existing  regulatory, system.  The 
following discussion has evolved from interviews conducted with various leading figures in the 
industry and from subsequent analysis and consideration by the team of experts working on the 
project. 
5.  2  Shortcomings with the Existing System 
The main problems in Europe related to the existing regulatory system can be summarised as 
follows: 
•  the creation of artificial scarcity, 
•  distorted competition, leading to economic inefficiencies . 
5.2.1  Artificial Scarcity 
The finite nature of the GSOSR means that the issue of  scarcity is of  particular interest.  The key 
questions include : 
•  what is scarcity?  An economic argument is that this, occurs when there is excess 
demand at the prevailing price.  There are also technical issues relating to the 
finite though re-usable physical capacity of the GSOSR, 
•  whether scarcity currently exists.  Our interview programme and discussions with 
our technical advisers suggest that the overall answer is uncertain, although there 
may  be particular problems in certai.P  frequency  bands and/or specific orbital 
slots, 
•  whether scarcity is  "real" (ie. physical) or "artificial" (caused by the regulatory 
framework).  With  a free  market,  prices would  move to  adjust demand  and 
supply.  To the extent that the current regulatory framework prevents this, while 
simultaneously allowing "paper satellites" (satellites which exist only on paper 
but which can tie-up orbit and frequency resources for up to nine years), scarcity 
can be regarded as  artificial. 
The GSOSR constitutes a reusable resource of finite proportions at any given time and  under 
contemporaneous technological conditions.  Existing regulatory conditions tend to create various 
forms of  artificial scarcity by tying up resources for predominantly unproductive uses.  There are 
various ways in which such artificial scarcity can be caused by the existing regulatory system, 
and each will be elaborated on further below.  In summary the main contributing factors are: 
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•  the ITU Radio Regulations and associated coordination procedures which lead to 
the creation of "paper satellites", 
•  the ITU planned band regimes which can allocate resource to services, such as 
BSS, that do  not develop, 
•  the principle of sovereignty of national  rights over the assignment of GSOSR, 
which results in significant fragmentation of  GSO management in the ITU Region 
and  in Europe in particular, 
•  technical constraints, such as de minimis parameters that effectively fix minimum 
spacing between geo-stationary orbital locations to 3 °. 
"Paper Satellites" 
The ITU  procedures  for  regulating satellite space segment permit the overfilling of national 
assignments to use GSOSR.  The current procedures allow nine years between the beginning of 
the procedure and  the deadline for  using the assjgned  resource.  This includes six years  for 
completion of the coordination procedures and a further three years for the implementation of a 
successful assignment.  Renotification of a similar assignment effectively grants the use of the 
resource in perpetuity. 
In effect there is no basis for assuring an expeditious process of  assignment through coordination 
or into implementation.  This means that satellites which may only ever exist on paper can still 
tie up assigned resource for a nine year period. 
For satellites which are launched there is no procedure for ensuring that the stated proposed level 
of use is  realised.  If, therefore, the actual  use of spectrum is of a far reduced scale than was 
originally assigned, there is no legal basis for remedial action.  Under-utilisation could continue 
at least for the originally stated lifetime of a satellite system, which could be  I 0 - 15  years or 
more. 
With this regulatory system applying to a finite though reusable resource it is not·surprising that 
countries wish to cover their most optimistic needs.  Other countries will be adopting the same 
approach,  leading to  the opportunistic creation of "paper satellites".  These contribute to  the 
creation of artificial scarcity of the resource. 
The extent to which •paper satellites' occupy available orbit and spectrum resources is difficult 
to  determine definitively.  The difficulty  revolves around  the definition and  identification of 
•paper satellites'.  For a •paper satellite' to be making inefficient use of geo-stationary orbit and 
frequency resources it would have to be : 
•  filed  and  coordinated  with  no  intention  of utilisation  except  in  exceptional 
circumstances, 
•  filed and coordinated significantly in advance of the date at which the resource 
is expected to be utilised because of fears over scarcity, 
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•  filed  and coordinated with  exaggerated  frequency  requirements, as  a blocking 
mechanism to  competition or in  advance of their being utilised  because of a 
genuine fear over the future availability of the resource in the future, 
•  in  use,  but  not  utilising the range of frequencies  specified  in  the registration 
process. 
It is not possible to determine without detailed examination of each case whether any particular 
IFRB  filing  can  be categorised by any of the "Paper Satellite" definitions  above.  We have, 
however, conducted research which used the list ofiFRB registrations and assessed the following: 
•  whether a satellite is in operation, 
•  if not  in  operation, whether a contract has  been entered  into  with  a satellite 
manufacturer for a system, 
•  the residual, which will contain all satellites which, for .some unspecified reason, 
at the time of investigation only appear on paper. 
It is true, of course, that filings may not have progressed to fully fledged satellites for very good 
reasons.  The  most  obvious  reason  is  the  very  time  consuming  process  of international 
coordination with  Administrations whose spectrum use, .or intended use,  are affected  by the 
proposed system.  Commercial plans may have failed or been modified in the light of changed 
conditions.  The same sorts of reasons might apply to satellites that are in use but which are not 
utilising the full range of spectrum indicated in the IFRB registration. 
Nevertheless, whatever the legitimacy of  the reasons for 'paper satellites', the result is the same; 
namely, the inefficient use of  geo-stationary orbit and frequency resources.  Figure 5.1 indicates 
that only a relatively small proportion of  satellites fall into the residual category described above. 
In  practice,  however,  a major problem exists  because this does  not cover the issue of over-
specification of frequencies  on satellites  that  exist  but which  only  use a  proportion  of the 
spectrum for which they have filed.  It has been pointed out in our interviews, for instance by 
an official  in a European TO responsible for fdings to  the IFRB,  that in certain bands of the 
spectrum it is 'virtually impossible' to coordinate new satellites based, inter alia, on the necessity 
of coordinating with prior recorded but not yet implemented systems.  The example given was 
for new European FSS in the Ku band.  It was also pointed out that Arabsat and Turksat have 
been and are experiencing serious difficulties in coordinating new systems. 
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The conclusion can be drawn, therefore, that paper satellites constitute a problem which is having 
a significant impact on the ability to launch new satellites, especially amongst new entrants to the 
market.  It is clear that the provisions of the existing regulatory regime,  which protect non-
implemented systems over a considerable period, encourage overfilling.  The solution, however, 
is  not straightforward.  Currently overfilings are closely but not exclusively associated  with 
national interests and the national orientation of  the assignment process.  There is, however, also 
an  interest for any commercial operator to cover comprehensively its future options.  There is 
little or no extra cost in doing this and it can protect future expected growth requirements from 
scarcity problems as well as protect 'hot bird' type locations from competitive intrusion. 
One method of reducing the paper satellite problem would be to apply due diligence - use it or 
lose it -criteria to proposed assignments.  .However, if  such due diligence were to be applied at 
a sub-regional  level rather than  at the ITU  level,  there would be a  d~ger that any ensuing 
efficiency improvements would quickly be absorbed by  ~untt:ies or organisations outside the 
jurisdiction of  the sub-regional body.  A sub-regional solution could only succeed if  this danger 
were effectively addressed.  One approach might be to pool protected but un-utilised GSOSR at 
sub-regional level. 
Planned Bands 
The planned bands, in some ways, can be regarded as institutionalised "paper satellites".  The 
pertinent W  ARC agreements effectively tie up allocations of frequency resource to uses with an 
uncertain economic future.  This has certainly proven to be the case with the BSS band, where 
the inflexibility of the allotment plan clearly introduces a form of artificial scarcity. 
Eutelsat,  Astra and  France Telecom are all  understood  to  be pursuing complex  avenues  for 
exploiting the planned BSS band (both BSS  and FSS).  Hispasat is  an example of where new 
space segment has been co-ordinated in accordance with BSS  "plan modification" procedures. 
"Plan modification"  is,  however,  a procedure that has  not been widely tested.  Ad  hoc plan 
modification has  the potential for  reducing  the inflexibility of the BSS  plan,  but  it  does  not 
remove the problem. 
As a reaction to  "paper satellites"  and the rigidity associated with the planned bands, there is 
evidence of organisations looking  to  interpret regulations so  as  to  broaden their commercial 
options.  Some commentators have pointed to the onus on rights holders to prove interference 
if new operators make use of resources in ways which do not strictly conform with the detail or 
spirit of the regulation.  Proving interference can be a difficult task, particularly when planned 
allotments or assignments have never been implemented.  There is a growing tendency, therefore, 
for regulations that contribute to  artificial  scarcity to be circumvented where possible.  This 
potentially undermines the effectiveness of the planning regime, but in a manner that introduces 
some greater flexibility into the use of the resource.  An argument can be put forward that such 
developments encourage a review of rigidly planned assignments.  The alternative may be for a 
greater degree of anarchy to affect the industry. 
National Rights 
The fact that national  interests are closely linked to the assignment process contributes to the 
"paper satellite" problem.  Because there are so many national interests in Europe, and indeed 
in Region 1, there are more likely to be competing national demands for available resource than, 
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for instance, in North America.  The process described above, whereby overfilling takes place 
to secure even very optimistic potential national uses of  the resource is, therefore, very likely to 
take place.  Sovereign national rights to assign spectrum use are fundamental to the proliferation 
of "paper satellites" and to the artificial increase in the scarcity of  the resource.  The legitimate 
concern of national security should always be borne in mind.  There are, however, accepted 
frequency bands allocated to military users and this should allay concerns from this source. 
Technical Constraints 
Some conventional technical  parameters can also contribute to problems of artificial scarcity. 
Problematic technical conventions include 3 o  minimum spacing between orbital locations as an 
indicator of spacing  appropriate  to  avoid  problems of interference.  .  This  limit  can be too 
restrictive where the dish size is such that relatively low power transmission is possible.  For 
high powered transponders and small receiving dishes it may well be necessary to have more than 
3 o spacing to avoid interference.  The crucial issue is interference.  This is recognised by experts 
at France Telecom who are developing ideas about 'self compatibility' whereby an assignment 
would  be disallowed  if an  identical  adjacent  assignment  in  the orbital  arc  would  result  in 
interference patterns. 
Technical regulations are having to be re-evaluated as technology develops.  The interference 
problems  associated  with  digital  transmission,  for  example,  are less  pronounced  than  with 
analogue transmissions.  It is also possible to transmit a wider variety of service applications on 
the same frequencies using digital transmissions. 
5.2.2  Distortions to Competition 
In aggregate the current regulatory regime tends to distort competitive forces, raise barriers to 
entry and encourage monopolistic tendencies in the market.  A number of shortcomings in the 
existing regulatory system contribute to these tendencies including: 
•  existing administrative procedures, 
•  non tradeability combined with assignments effectively given in perpetuity, 
•  different national.rules covering frequency allocations and orbital assignments, 
•  the exclusivity of  direct access to ISO space segment enjoyed by ISO signatories, 
•  continued distortions  in  the supply of services  using GSOSR,  related  to  the 
regulationlliberalisation of and user service markets, 
•  the artificial scarcity issues discussed above. 
These points are elaborated on below. 




The general  nature  and .complexity  of the  administrative  procedures,  and  the  coordination 
procedures in particular, represent a barrier to entry in Europe and Region 1.  The time it takes 
to coordinate with so many countries and the associated costs inhibit entry to the market by new 
competitors.  According to national experts, co-ordination of a new Ku band FSS satellite may 
entail co-ordination with as many as a dozen countries, and a single bilateral co-ordination may _ 
take up to a year. 
In Perpetuity and Non Tradeability 
Limitations on transferability, the assignment of resources in perpetuity without any ability to 
transfer the ownership of the organisations or the rights to use the resources will tend to insulate 
organisations from market forces.  This situation is typical of most EU Member States.  Inability 
to trade the right to use GSOSR places significant constraint on attaching a value to the resource 
that reflects the economic value that can be generated from  its  use.  In this respect GSOSR 
differs significantly from analogous situations such as land and prope~  markets where market 
forces are usually more pronounced. 
The National Role in Allocation and Assignment 
Both  allocation  of bands  and  assignment  to  specific  uses  are  normally  and  exclusively  the 
sovereign prerogatives of national  administrations.  As  to  allocation,  each country is  free to 
develop any scheme which is not in conflict with prior international allocations legislated at the 
ITU level. 
In  Europe, national assignment of rights to use allocated spectrum for  implementation of new 
civilian space segment facilities typically follows a customary model which presupposes that such 
rights vest presumptively,  typically  to  an  incumbent  national  TO.  Hence there is  no  well-
developed selection procedure, or "licensing process", for granting rights to implement new space 
segment; in general it appears that there is no such process in place at all. 
The most notable example of a European space segment operator other than an incumbent TO 
(or a TO-owned ISO) is, of  course, Luxembourg's SES.  This example, however, does not reflect 
a transition to a competitive selection procedure.  Rather,  it  evidences the establishment of an 
alternative national  "champion" whose ownership is  held substantially by, and whose proceeds 
accrue substantially for the benefit of, the national government. 
At least one significant exception to this general picture is the possibility of  a licence to provide 
a broadcast satellite service in the UK, pursuant of the 1990 Broadcasting Act (the Marco Polo 
precedent).  In addition, there is at least 8ome anecdotal evidence that perhaps a few independent 
entities have applied at the national level  (eg,  in Germany) to  construct and operate so-called 
"separate systems"  independent of dominant incumbents  linked  with the national  government 
concerned.  However the identities of  such applicants, and the procedural environment in which 
their proposals may have been entertained, each remains unclear. 
We are not  aware of any  EU  Member State (other than the UK)  having established a formal 
licensing process which invites proposals for the provision of space segment independent of  both 
the ISOs and the dominant n~tional incumbents.  This regulatory environment, in which exclusive 
Satellites: Final  52 KPXfGJ~ment  Consulting 
or special  rights  to  provide spacesegment  vest at  national  level,  is  open to  challenge under 
Articles 90 and  86 EEC.  Consistent with the general competition rules contained in the EEC 
Treaty, alternative national selection procedures would have to reflect objective, transparent and 
non-discriminatory criteria for deciding among proposals. 
By and large, it seems clear that the standard European model for national assignment of rights 
to implement new space segment resources tends to insulate dominant national players from the 
competitive pressures of an open marketplace. 
Signatory Rights 
The exclusivity exercised by signatories over the access to ISO space segment, such as Eutelsat 
transponders for telecommunications traffic, al~  represents an important distortion that impacts 
upon the market for GSOSR.  The signatories have effectively created geographical monopolies 
over the use of Eutelsat satellites delivering communication services to their territories.  There 
are  signs  that  this  monopoly  power  is  being  reduced  by  competition  emerging  between 
signatories.  Nevertheless, the extent of  competition is still restricted to dte signatories, with the 
consequence of oligolopolistic if not monopolistic market structures developing.  The remaining 
issue is of  direct access to ISO space segment by end users.  An association of  end users said that 
it was now possible for its members to gain direct access to Intelsat services, but that there were 
still restrictions on access to Eutelsat services which had to be rented via the national signatory 
organisation- which was usually the TO.  It was said that some national signatories, such as BT, 
were becoming  more  expansionary  in  their  marketing practices  by offering  access  to  space 
segments to customers outside their national territory. 
Service Liberalisation 
The restrictions over the supply of services to end users also have an·· impact on the market for 
GSOSR (see Figure 5.2).  The TOs continue to have dominant control of  both space segment and 
service provision.  With TOs investing heavily in terrestrial networks - especially fibre- it would 
not seem in their interests to permit rapid opening up of the GSOSR to potential competitors in 
their core businesses.  However, there is a strong trend in European telecommunications markets 
towards liberalisation, opening up previously sacrosanct markets to competition, and the relaxing 
of the state's grip on the sector through privatisation. 
Artificial Scarcity 
The artificial scarcity issues discussed above also contribute to the distortions in the market for 
GSOSR resources.  The creation of  ·such scarcity can  increase costs of entry by  making the 
administrative procedure more complex  and  protracted.  This can prevent competition from 
developing, reduce the incidence of innovation and increase the price of existing services. 
5.2.3  Summary 
The shortcomings of the existing regulatory system manifest themselves  in  the form of both 
artificial scarcity and distortions to competition.  The consequences for Europe .can be regarded 
as: 
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•  high  barriers  to  entry  limiting  competition,  and  inflexibility  in  the  market, 
leading to high prices for transponders relative to what would be the case under 
more competitive market conditions,  · 
•  monopolistic tendencies of incumbent operators resulting in high profitability, 
•  few  competitors  for  pan-European  or national  services,  but  many  operators 
providing geographically fragmented and/or application specific services and so 
not exploiting the full  economic potential of the resources being used, 
•  a regulatory system that leads to the filing of "paper satellites", raising the cost 
of coordination, preventing market entry and creating artificial scarcity. 
The current administrative and  technically driven regulations are, therefore, contributing to  a 
highly fragmented and economically inefficient satellite sector in Europe.  The inefficiencies are 
also tending to  hold  back innovation and  reduce the general dynamism of the sector.  If the 
current situation continues there is  a long term threat to the survival of the European satellite 
industry in the face of increasing pressure from terrestrial based substitUte services. 
Figure 5.3 summarises the shortcomings of the existing regulatory regime. 
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6  The Optional Regulatory Components 
6.1  Introduction 
We have broken down the key regulatory tasks into six broad areas which were developed by the 
team in: consultation with the Commission.  We have used this breakdown as the basis for the 
interview programme and subsequent qualitative analysis, and ultimately for the modelling work. 
The purpose of  -this section is to describe these components, both alone and in combination.  The 









changes in terms and conditions 
technical policies 
•  competition policy 
These are illustrated in Figure 6.1 below.  These components were widely discussed during the 
interview programme.  In addition to the likely impact on the satellite industry, there was  also 
discussion of the main constraints likely to be encountered  in  implementing each component. 
These are described in more detail in Section 8 below.  It should be  noted that for the purposes 
of the modelling (described below) it was assumed that these constraints would not be binding. 
The model is therefore based on an "ideal world", where the regulatory options are successfully 
implemented immediately. 
6.2  Recoup Spectrum 
Significant parts of the GSOSR are allocated to specific uses.  For geo-stationary resources this 
allocation process takes place at both the international and  national levels. Our analysis focuses 
particularly on two areas: 
•  military allocations/assignments 
•  the BSS spectrum 
There  are strong  economic  arguments  against  setting  aside  spectrum  for  specific  uses.  In 
particular,  if the amount  set  aside does  not  conform  to  the level  of demand,  there will  be 
inefficiency,  either  through  excess  demand  for  the  allocated  band  or because  the  band  is 
underutilised.  While in the past there may have been political or technical reasons for justifying 
such a policy, these are becoming less important with the development of digital technologies, 
which reduce the differentiation between signals of different services. 
Military 
Military users are allocated a significant amount of spectrum, both at the international level (eg, 
NATO) and at the national level.  This has traditionally been granted at no cost to the military 
on the strength of national security arguments.  Recent political changes, notably the end of the 
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Cold War, have strengthened the arguments for releasing military spectrum to civilian use as part 
of the "peace dividend"·; 
Discussions are already taking place at both national  and  international levels and  there are a 
number  of examples  of increased  flexibility  on  the part of the  military.  The ERO  (1993) 
proposes  that  managers  of  military  spectrum  should  meet  with  the  ERC  and  CEPT 
administrations to discuss if and how civilian users can gain greater access to spectrum reserved 
for military usage.  In the United States there is pressure to transfer 200 MHz of spectrum from 
government (including, probably, military) to civil use.  However, resistance from the military 
to such moves can be expected.  For example, Intelsat reported that at a conference in Geneva 
in  1979  it  was  agreed to  transfer part of the military C band allocation to civilian FSS.  In 
practice, the military continued to use this spectrum for radar, which made it impossible to use 
for other services.  · 
In addition, it is  not certain that if military frequencies were released they would automatically 
go  to  satellite uses.  Military allocations in the low C band in particular would  be subject to 
strong demand from terrestrial services such as cellular. 
A recent report from the ERO, the Detailed Spectrum Investigation covering 3,400 MHz to  105 
GHz, investigates this issue in more detail.  It concludes that the greatest potential for recouping 
or sharing spectrum currently allocated to military users exists in the 7- 8 GHz and 20/30 GHz 
bands.  This is an area of great sensitivity, however, and.change is likely to be slow. 
BSS spectrum 
WARC-77 provided for national allocations of GSOSR for BSS in Regions I and 3.  A similar 
but  mor~ flexible plan was  adopted  for Region 2 in  1982.  In practice these allocations have 
generally not been exploited to their full potential.  In Europe, the niain provider of 'direct to 
home'  broadcast services  is  Astra,  and  it does so using FSS  spectrum.  In  the USA the  BSS 
bands are only now beginning to be implemented. 
It is  argued that the BSS  allocation has exacerbated the scarcity in the GSOSR.  The allocated 
bands  are  generally  suitable  for  the  provision  of FSS  services.  The WARC-77  plan  was 
nominally for  15 years from  1979.  Although this is  nominally due to elapse in  1994, the Plan 
has yet to  be terminated by a competent W  ARC and  is  unlikely to be addressed before 1997. 
Strong resistance to the termination of the BSS plan is anticipated from LDCs, who are likely to 
view this as  an erosion of their property rights. 
A possible alternative might be to free up the BSS spectrum at a sub-regional level.  This is  a 
complicated  political,  legal  and  technical  question.  The basic rule is  that no  country's BSS 
allotment may be "trespassed" (interfered with).  However, a sub-regional European arrangement 
could probably be designed to avoid trespassing the allotments of the rest of Region  I.  The 
prospects  for such  an arrangement would  be increased if there were a  regional  coordinating 
institution (see 6.3 below). 
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6.3  Institutional ·Change 
This section deals  with  the reorganisation of institutional  responsibilities  for  allocation and 
assignment of GSOSR.  At present,  allocation is  carried out both at the international  level 
(through the ITU Radio Regulations which are negotiated at periodic W ARCs) and, consistent 
with these allocations, at the national level.  Assignment to particular uses is carried out at the 
national level.  As a matter of  public international law it would be possible to carry out allocation 
and assignment at a sub-regional level, such as within Europe, so long as this remained consistent 
with ITU rules and no  third eountry's rights were violated. 
In principle it should therefore be possible to establish a European agency for managing and 
coordinating GSOSR.  Such a body might be envisaged to have responsibilities at any of the 
following levels: 
•  a "full service" coordinator, operating as the focal  point between its members 
and the ITU and dealing in particular with both allocation and assignment, issues 
of  coordination;  interference;  . monitoring  competition,  due  diligence, 
homologation/type approval of equipment, etc.  It would have full  authority to 
represent its members at international fora such as W  ARCs, 
•  a "partial service" coordinator, dealing mainly with spectrum allocation and some 
assignment for selected pan-European services.  Gener~  space segment licensing, 
as  well  as  coordination  and  interference,  would  continue  to  be handled  at 
individual  country  level.  The organisation  would  represent  its  members  at 
international fora, 
•  a "minimalist" coordinator, responsible for the allocation of Europe-wide bands 
for specific services.  All other duties would continue to be carried out at the 
national  level.  This could be viewed as  a first step towards a regulator with 
wider responsibilities. 
The following points would also need to be taken into account: 
•  allocation  at a  sub-regional level  could be considered  a de minimis  scenario 
consistent  with  current  trends  in  telecommunications  (for  example  in  GSM, 
DECT and ERMES), 
•  assignment at sub-regional level would require a consensus of  EU Member States 
under the EEC Treaty.  While it is unclear whether such an arrangement would 
in itself improve the efficiency of GSOSR utilisation, it is likely that it would 
lead to a significant reduction in costs and improvement in the speed of start up 
of space segment providers.  Again it is important to stress that the success of 
such a body would be dependent upon the economic principles guiding its actions 
and the effectiveness of policies meant to implement the principles, 
•  the key issue will be political.  In particular, the existence and responsibilities 
of any European coordinating organisation will depend on the extent to which 
member countries are prepared to delegate sovereignty in this area. 
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In Europe, national assignments generally involve the granting of exclusive rights, within the 
meaning of Article 90 EEC.  Under the current regime the fundamental  international principle 
for assignment at national level is  "first come first served".  Typically, a potential player will 
apply  to  its  national  regulator  for  an  assignment.  The regulator  will  check  for  potential 
interference and  then  file  the proposal  with  the IFRB.  The approval  of the  assignment  is 
determined administratively based on the purely technical criteria of non-interference. 
The lack of transparency  at  national  level  and  the limited  influence of market  forces  create 
considerable inefficiency.  This has led in particular to the presence of "paper satellites", where 
there is a successful registration but the satellite is either not launched or occupies a slot but is 
not fully  operational.  The fact  that the slot is  virtually costless  while at the same time has 
considerable economic value to the incumbent creates a strong incentive for "warehousing" of 
the resource, either for some future use or to prevent competition.  This phenomenon makes a 
considerable contribution to the perception of scarcity of GSOSR. 
There is a number of alternative allocation and assignment mechanisms.  To a greater or lesser 
extent, these attempt to move towards the market solution.  Economic theory suggests that those 
mechanisms that are closest to the licensee paying the market price for the resource will be the 
most likely to promote efficient use of GSOSR.  In particular, with an explicit cost of not using 
the resource,  whether  it  be in  terms of interest charges on capital  or. foregone  income from 
alternative uses of resources, the likelihood of  warehousing and the problem of "paper satellites" 
is considerably diminished. 
We have identified the following alternative mechanisms,  listed in increasing order of market 
orientation:  · 
•  first come first served: like planned regimes, a non-market solution.  Applicants 
are automatically granted a licence with charges set at nominal levels, not related 
to either the cost of administration or the value of the licence, 
•  non-interference: the current international norm.  Licences are still granted on 
a first come first served basis but subject to the proviso that the service will not 
interfere with existing licensees, 
•  national  procedural  norms:  in  addition  to  non-interference,  a5  a  matter  of 
national law applicants may be required to meet a range of other criteria before 
being granted a licence.  Such criteria are often an initial hurdle prior to use of 
an additional  selection procedure (such  as  comparative hearings or lotteries). 
These might include ownership, availability of sufficient financial resources for 
launch, economic criteria (demonstration of a market for the service) or quality 
of  service.  While this makes some progress towards increasing transparency and 
filtering out non-serious applicants, there is a risk of challenge in the courts, 
•  technical planning: allocation of  bands to specific services, determined by purely 
technical criteria (mainly non-interference).  Assignment of licences to provide 
these services would be on a first come first served plus non-interference basis. 






This  is  analogous  to  the  W  ARC/Radio  Regulations  process.  Lack  of 
consideration of markets means that this  is  unlikely to reach  an  economically 
efficient solution.  The digitalisation of satellite transmission suggests that the 
basis for technical allocation is diminishing, 
economic/market planning: allocation of bands to particular services according 
to  an assessment of current or future demand.  This requires the regulator to 
second  guess  the  market  as  regards  the likely  level  of demand  for  specific 
services.  As suggested by the experience with BSS, this is unlikely to lead to 
the most  efficient outcome.  At best, the regulator can only reach the market 
solution, and the likelihood of achieving that is  extremely low.  On the other 
hand, such an arrangement might be an acceptable "second best" solution if it is 
believed that there is  a significant degree of market failure (see discussion on 
public goods in  Appendix 4  ), which would  pr~vent the optimal solution being 
reached under free market conditions,  -
comparative hearings: where there are competing bidders for a licence.  This 
involves holding a "beauty parade~ to allow the regulator to come to an informed 
decision as to the "most appropriate" proposal.  This approach has been used 
frequently in the US.  Apart from the uncertainty of reaching the most efficient 
solution, this option is expensive and time consuming for all parties concerned, 
loneries:  when  there are competing  demands  for  th~ resource,  this  involves 
assignment through lotteries, with the winner being selected at random.  This can 
lead to efficient allocation of resources if licences are subsequently tradeable. 
The US  experience has been that lotteries lead to private auctions of licences 
once they have been officially allocated.  The final user thus pays the economic 
value (with the concomitant incentive to use the resource efficiently), however 
the lottery winner receives this  as  a windfall  gain.  This leads to  speculative 
lottery applications, 
auctions:  where there are competing bids,  licences  are auctioned  so  that the 
government receives the economic value for the resource and the winning bidder 
has an incentive to use the resource efficiently.  This can lead to smaller firms 
with less access to. capital being at a disadvantage in the bidding process.  In the 
US  the  "200  Mhz Bill"  provides  for  the  auctioning  of the  spectrum  that  is 
reallocated to the private sector.  However, the aim is explicitly to raise revenue 
rather than promote efficiency.  There is a wide range of  arguments both for and 
against the use of auctions  for assignment of spectrum.  It is  recognised  that 
while in theory auctions have the potential to reach the optimal market solution, 
the degree of competition in the industry is of critical importance.  This issue is 
addressed further in KPMG (1993)
2
• 
Licensing and declaration procedures for mobile communications in the member 
states of the EC - report prepared by KPMG and Stanbrook & Hooper for the 
EC Commission, August 1993. 
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Apart from the auctions option, there is a number of  alternatives for setting charges for licences. 
The most common current approach is to set nominal fees that are unrelated to either the cost of 
providing the licence or its true value as determined by the market.  One alternative option might 
be to set fees  to  at least cover administration costs, which would reduce the pressure on the 
government budget.  However, compared with the total cost of  establishing a new service, these 
are likely to be relatively low, with little impact on market behaviour.  Another route might be 
to charge user fees that are at least partly related to demand for the service.  While not going the 
whole  way,  this  would  help  to  encourage  efficiency.  This  type  of arrangement  is  often 
considered as part of the economic planning approach. 
6.5  Changes in Terms and Conditions 
The following components cover specific terms and conditions of  space segment licences.  These 
can be used to promote market behaviour (eg by allowing tradeability) or to compensate for its 
absence (setting due diligence hurdles to prevent warehousing). 
•  property rights: current licences are highly specific as regards the particular use 
to  which  an  allocation or assignment can be· put.  One option  might be to 
introduce  a  degree of flexibility,  granting  broader  property  rights  over the 
spectrum.  This might involve granting the right to use the spectrum for any 
service (subject to non-interference) or for a broadly defined set of  services such 
as  "business"  or  "mobile".  This  is  in  line  with  the  idea of technological 
convergence towards digital  signals,  and  with  the view of the GSOSR  as  a 
homogeneous product ("black space").  Allowing licence holders to have broad 
rights to spectrum will enable them to change the service provided in line with 
shifts in the market or (with tradeability) to sell the licence to someone else who 
can make better use of  the assignment.  This increases' the likelihood of  efficient 
utilisation of the resource, 
•  due diligence ("use it or lose it"): the Radio Regulations effectively set a limit 
of nine years, from the first filing, for an operator to get up and running.  This 
is  generally viewed as  sufficient given the long lead times in satellite launch. 
However, the existence of "paper satellites"  suggests that the system is being 
manipulated  in  an  inefficient  manner.  Due diligence is  required  to  prevent 
warehousing of GSOSR (as indicated above this primarily occurs because they 
are essentially  free)  and  to  prevent  the  "deep  pockets"  phenomenon,  where 
incumbents or competitors (such as terrestrial providers) buy up the resource to 
limit competition.  At the national level due diligence requires that the licence 
holder demonstrates use of  the resource.  For example, the FCC requires that the 
licence holder  makes  "meaningful  progress"  toward  system  implementation. 
However, it is often difficult to judge how much progress is "meaningful" and 
regulatory decisions can be open to legal challenge, 
•  duration of  licences: under public international law there is effectively no limit 
to the duration of an assignment.  Licences to provide space segment may vary 
by  country.  There are both advantages  and  disadvantages to  setting  a  fixed 
duration on licences: 
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•  setting a deadline for the implementation of the service helps to prevent 
warehousing, 
•  without tradeability of licences fixed duration licences make it easier to 
clear out inefficient or inappropriate incumbents, 
•  the long lead time for launching a satellite and changes  in  technology -
that extend satellite lifetimes make it difficult to determine the optimum 
duration, 
•  towards the end of the licence period the current holder is likely to stop 
investing or even disinvest due to the risk of losing the licence, 
•  putting the licence out to tender periodically increases the uncertainty to 
the applicant and raises the administrative cost to all  parties. 
From  an  economic  point  of view,  however,  providing  that  licences  are 
transferable then letting them in perpetuity has a greater potential for reaching 
the market solution than setting fixed period licences.  In the US  licences have 
a fixed term but there is  "reasonable expectation of renewal."  This serves to 
send the right messages about due diligence while minimising the disinvestment 
problem.  It could be argued that if  there were tradeability of licences, then there 
is  no  need  to  have a fixed  duration,  and  licences  could be let  in  perpetuity. 
Warehousing  and  deep  pockets  could  be  addressed  through  enforcement  of 
competition rules.  However, bestowing dominion in perpetuity over a limited 
resource such as GSOSR raises complex legal questions, 
•  tradeability: should ownership of GSOSR licences be freely tradeable?  While 
GSOSR cannot be "owned", nevertheless, should the right to utilise a particular 
assignment be considered tradeable as a commercial asset?  As indicated above, 
there are strong arguments for at least making sure that the companies owning 
satellite systems are themselves  fr~ly tradeable.  This can be viewed as a key 
prerequisite for the introduction of  market forces and the resulting improvements 
in efficiency of resource utilisation in  the satellite industry.  With  reasonably 
efficient capital markets, a company that is not operating efficiently or profitably 
could  be bought  out  by  another  that  can  operate  at  lower  cost.  Without 
tradeability there is no  incentive to give up licences.  Unprofitable systems are 
switched  off in  anticipation  of future  uses  rather  than  being  transferred  to 
alternative users.  Other potential users are forced to apply for their own licence 
and launch an entirely new system, 
•  pioneers' preference:  this  is  a  system  whereby  "innovative"  proposals  for 
utilising GSOSR are given preferential treatment over "me too"  applications. 
This can be through priority licensing and even through setting aside spectrum 
for "innovation".  The aim of such a system is to promote innovation by giving 
the new idea a commercial advantage.  This is particularly important for smaller 
firms  who  may  not otherwise be able to  develop their good  ideas.  Pioneers' 
preference has  been  adopted  in  the US  where the openness of the licensing 
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procedures  means  that innovative ideas  are revealed  to  potential  competitors 
before the benefits can be achieved.  However: 
•  it puts the regulator in the position of having to judge what is a "good 
idea" and what is not.  In the US this is readily open to legal challenge, 
•  setting aside spectrum for good ideas may create scarcity elsewhere, 
•  intellectual  property  can  be  protected  in  other  ways,  for  example, 
through patents and copyright. 
6.6  Technical Policies 
The rapid pace of technical progress in the satellite industry means that while the GSOSR is  a 
fixed  resource, its effective capacity is constantly being increased.  However, there is a cost to 
operators  of using  the  resource  efficiently.  Incumbents ·will  be  reluctant to  invest  in  new 
equipment before the physical lifetime of  their existing satellites expires, while new entrants will 
be reluctant to bear the total cost of developing new technology (this is one aspect of the "free 
rider" problem in economics - all users benefit from the introduction of new technology but the 
cost will be borne by the investor, not the incumbents). 
In the satellite production industry and in satellite operation there are significant economies of 
scale.  This  creates  a  strong  incentive  to  build/purchase  satellites  using  tried  and  tested 
technology  rather  than  incurring  the  high  cost  of new  research  or using  new  systems  and 
equipment.  This effect is again likely to hold back the introduction of new technology. 
Technical policy can be used  to  encourage the efficient use of GSOSR.  This  might be done 
through an administrative process as in the US or through some kind of phased introduction of 
new technical norms.  Compensation arrangements could be used to ease the transition to the new 
technical  regime,  with  new  entrants paying. incumbents to  move early or incumbents  paying 
potential new entrants or the regulator to retain their rights for longer than some cut off date. 
There are three issues of particular relevance to Europe: 
•  orbital spacing: while there is  no explicit limit on how close together satellites 
can be situated without interfering, 3° is generally seen as  an appropriate rule 
of thumb.  In the US,  a severe shortage of GSOSR  in the past (the "spectrum 
wars")  led  the  FCC  to develop  a 2 ° spacing  rule,  after technical  study  and 
discussion with the industry. The 2 °  solution involves positioning satellites using 
dissimilar bands and geographically dissimilar coverage areas in adjacent slots. 
Although this had the effect of increasing orbit capacity, there was a trade-off. 
In order to minimise interference, satellite specifications had to be controlled in 
a very precise manner which,  it is  argued,  may have limited  innovation.  In 
addition, 2° spacing imposes a minimum size on the ground stations.  However, 
the market demand  is for  relatively small antennas (at least for TV).  This is 
reinforced  by  local  planning regulations  which  make it difficult to  use larger 
antennas.  At a European level 2° spacing would also require a high level of 
cooperation between national authorities.  In any event this policy alone would 
not  address  the  issue of scarcity of spectrum.  It  should  be  noted  that  with 
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improving technology (particularly digitalisation) spacing of less than 2° could 
become· feasible,  · 
•  frequency sharing and reuse: there is already a number of technical options for 
frequency  sharing  and  reuse,  and  with  greater  use  of  digitisation,  cross 
polarisation and modulation techniques, these are increasing.  A key issue is the 
need  for  international  coordination  with  neighbouring  countries.  There  is 
potential for frequency reuse between Europe and  Africa, for example.  This 
would need international agreement and coordination, 
•  European fine tuning: the issue to be addressed would be to what extent do other 
internationally established technical parameters for relevant services permit local 
fine tuning to improve the efficiency of GSOSR utilisation. 
6. 7  Competition Policy 
As  noted  above  in  the discussion of warehousing,  "paper satellites"  and  the  "deep  pockets" 
phenomenon, there is a key role for competition policy in promoting a more effici~nt utilisation 
of GSOSR.  The main question is the extent to which competition rules are invoked in order to 
maintain a competitive market structure.  Three particular issues might be relevant: 
•  ISO anticompetitive covenants: The covenants provide protection to operators 
against ·economic harm' caused by any new proposed assignment.  Although the 
substantive criteria for coordinating "no economic harm" are relaxing, procedural 
requirements remain burdensome to new entrants.  These treaty clauses probably 
violate Articles 85 and 86 EEC, 
•  maintenance of  exclusive and special rights: Member States granting exclusive 
rights  to  an  incumbent or other space segment provider are vulnerable under 
Articles 86 and 90 EEC.  It could be argued that special rights are inherent to 
the granting of any GSOSR assignment.  On the other hand, the better view  is 
that special rights apply within the meaning of Article 90 only if Member State 
discretion to licence entrants has not been exercised in an objective, transparent 
and  non-discriminatory manner, 
•  "hot birds": owner-operators of "hot bird'' locations, such asSES/Astra, may be 
vulnerable to an Article 86 claim that they dominate a specific service market. 
The question is whether they abuse their dominant position, eg, by charging an 
"excessive" price or unfairly excluding potential competitors from the market. 
If, and only if, this is the case, possible remedies might include enforced price 
adjustment or allowing a new entrant access to the incumbent's assignment or 
space  segment  capacity  (  eg  force  the  owner  to  open  up  a transponder  to  a 
competitor).  Three points should be noted, however: 
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protracted legal challenge, 
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there  is  no  rule  which  in  any  way  prohibits  the  establishment  of 
additional  "hot bird" locations.  The key constraints are availability of 
suitable GSOSR and the abilitY to offer compelling services (eg. popular 
television programming), 
by  virtue of a dominant market position  "artificial"  barriers to  entry 
could be maintained  in the long run.  The key  issue,  nevertheless,  is 
whether the operator is abusing its monopoly power. 
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7  Regulatory Components - Respondents' Views 
7.1  Introduction 
This section summarises  the main  points  raised  during the interview  programme of satellite 
regulators, operators, service providers and  research organisations in Europe and  the United 
States.  The interviews were carried out during June and July 1993.  In addition to discussing 
general points and issues relating to the satellite industry, there was considerable discussion of 
the  regulatory  options  described  in  Chapter  6.  Such  discussion  continued  in  a  workshop 
organised by KPMG  and  the Commission and  attended by leading figures  in  the industry  in 
October 1993.  The main points raised in the workshop are to be found in Appendix 3. 
In general there were substantial differences in emphasis between the views of  the European and 
US interviewees.  In particular, the US respondents were much more familiar with the regulatory 
options  concerning  procedures,  terms  and  conditions  and  certain  technical  policies  such  as 
pioneers preference.  This was partly because many of  the options are already in place in the US. 
The US  respondents in public sector organisations also had a ·greater market orientation, with 
strong views on the need to minimise regulatory interference and maximise competition as being 
the best way to promote economic efficiency of GSOSR utilisation and to improve welfare. 
A key aspect of the US  interviews was the general belief that scarcity of GSOSR is no longer a 
problem (although it still exists in particular niches/frequencies).  The "spectrum wars" of a few 
years  ago are no  longer viewed  as  a big issue.  This was due primarily to  a combination of 
technological  progress  and  competition  from  terrestrial  systems,  particularly  optical  cable. 
Remaining scarcity is viewed as being due to the regulatory framework. 
In Europe there was more concern about issues of  scarcity, the fragmented nature of  the industry 
and, with a few notable exceptions, the general difficulty of introducing new services on a pan-
European basis.  An  important issue is  clearly the appropriate geographic level at which GSO 
regulation should apply.  Should it remain at the national  and  ITU  levels or is  there scope to 
stimulate the market through the introduction of  regional or sub-regional regulatory regimes? This 
is a reflection of the fact that regulations with an economic rationale are practically non-existent 
in Europe.  It was, however, very difficult for most respondents to quantify the likely impact any 
regulatory  change  would  have on future  market  conditions.  The remainder of this  section 
therefore differentiates between the US  and European responses. 
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7.2  Recoup Spectrum 
I  Summarl  I 
European View  US View 
•  military trying to maintain use  •  reallocation from under-used or 
obsolete purposes is 
•  some small amounts of spectrum  desirable/efficient 
may be released, limited market 
impact  •  the problem with TV  -DTH is in the 
market (competition/ copyright) not 
•  BSS would release more  access 
frequencies that could improve 
efficiency of existing satellites -
could reduce numbers of orbital 
locations and costs 
•  planned bands very rigid and 
inefficient, causes scarcity 
European view 
The problem with military use of  spectrum in Europe is in some ways more acute than in North 
America  because  military  authorities  in  different  countries  do  not  always  use  the  same 
frequencies.  This tends to heighten the problem of scarcity.  Overall, however, recouping of 
military  bands  was  regarded  as  a  relatively  minor  issue  compared  to  other  sources  of 
inefficiencies and market distortion. 
The reforms affecting Central and  Eastern Europe, and  the decline in the threat of hostilities 
between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact had led to hopes for a peace dividend impacting 
spectrum  allocation.  The ERO  Report on the  Detailed  Spectrum  Investigations  (1993)  has 
identified 7/SGHz and  20/30GHz as  parts of the spectrum currently tied up by military usage 
which could be released or, more likely, shared with civilian applications. 
There is a counter argument put forward  by military interests that, contrary to popular belief, 
there will  be greater demand for spectrum from  military users in the future.  This is  because 
higher technology defence systems tend  to. be more intensive users of radio communications. 
Such systems are also sensitive to interference.  The greater dependence on such systems, which 
in some ways is a consequence of the peace dividend tending to reduce the numbers of personnel 
in the armed forces, is increasing rather than decreasing military demand for spectrum. 
Progress towards releasing spectrum currently allocated to military uses is regarded by operators 
in Europe as being slow at best.  One operator cited the difficulty of  gaining access to the 14.6-
14.8 Ghz spectrum. 
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Another factor to consider is  the attitude of the Russian military authorities to the release of 
spectrum reserved for military users which is now increasingly underutilised.  The outcome of 
this issue is currently uncertain
3
• 
The  tying  up  of resources  in  planned  bands  - particularly  the  BSS  which  has  not  been 
implemented- is acknowledged as being technically and economically inefficient.  The general 
releas~ of BSS  bands to other uses would therefore reduce the artificial scarcity affecting the 
spectrum.  One multi-national  organisation pointed to  the expected  increase  in  demand  for 
spectrum for  the supply of HDTV services across Europe.  This,  it  was  thought,  might be 
accommodated by means of realisation of the BSS band. 
The existence of  planned bands is being called into question by some commentators.  In particular 
it is the rigidity of  the allocations which causes greatest concern.  It was pointed out in European 
interviews as well as in the US that technological developments - and in particular trends towards 
digitalisation- are undermining to some extent the need to allocate bands to particular services. 
An issue which needs to be considered, however, is whether allocation.of bands to very specific 
services, such as VSA T for instance, is justifiable in terms of the facilitation of pan-European 
services.  A basic problem is the doubt that a commonly available band for uplinking is available 
on a pan-European basis.  The 14.6-14.8 Ghz part of the spectrum has also been suggested as 
a  possible  means  of introducing  VSA T  services,  however,  one  operator  felt  it  would  be 
inappropriate to  allocate any  further  spectrum for the use of a service with uncertain  future 
demand.  It may not be desirable, for reasons of inflexibility, to set as~de parts of the spectrum 
for specific services, but it will be important to ensure that when real demand arises for spectrum 
to provide such services that sufficient bandwidth is allocated to ensure that competition can take 
place.  It may be necessary to make such an allocation on a contingency basis.  Making provision 
for competition would also have the benefit of encouraging scale economies to be reaped in the 
terminals and service equipment associated with new services. 
A view exists that there is an artificial distinction between the FSS and BSS planned bands.  One 
operator would like to  gain access to as  much spectrum as  possible from each orbital location. 
This would  include BSS,  FSS  and  the FSS  planned bands.  Having such access  it  is  felt  will 
allow more optimum use of each satellite and so free up orbital locations by reducing the need 
for so many satellites for any given level of demand. 
It is also felt that the problem of inefficient allocation of spectrum to services is not ·confined to 
the BSS.  It is also a problem applicable to the FSS.  The technical specifications associated with 
the planned bands make it very difficult for operators-to optimise the delivery of their services 
from any given orbital location.  It is acknowledged that it is possible to circumvent the technical 
specification of the planned bands but only on an ad  hoc basis and at significant administrative 
cost.  Applications to change the technical parameters are, for instance, being used by a number 
of operators to gain access to  BSS spectrum for non-BSS applications. 
3 
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Other  authorities  are  also  opposed  to  reforming  the  military  spectrum.  At 
W  ARC-92, Russia, the US and some Asian countries rejected the ITU allocation 
at  1.5 Ghz for DAB. 
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In general, therefore, the operators talked to were very aware of the failings of planned regimes. 
The theme was for much greater flexibility either at the ITU or sub-regional European level in 
the allocation of spectrum for specific application uses.  A dissenting note was struck by one 
respondent who suggested that use of  BSS applications in the FSS planned bands was preventing 
the development of FSS services because of  interference problems.  This point seems to reinforce 
the contention that the existing regulations relating to the planned bands are not managing the 
development of  services in the way that was originally intended.  Their future should be reviewed 
as a matter of urgency by the next W  ARC.  As one operator summed it up "There is no scarcity 
of Ku  band  in  Europe it  is  the  regulatory  procedures  which  are causing  the mess".  The 
uncertainty concerning the interpretation of existing regulations represents, in the view of the 
operator, a significant barrier to new entry. 
US view 
As a general principle it is not efficient to have any sort of band allocation.  To do so involves 
the regulator second  guessing the market,  in which case the best possible outcome (from an 
efficiency point of view) would be the market solqtion.  In practice it is extremely unlikely that 
the regulator can achieve this.  The current band allocations, particularly for the BSS,  were 
viewed as being major causes of scarcity in the GSOSR. 
In the short to  medium  term the shift to  digitalisation. and  other new  technology  will  both 
significantly increase the capacity of GSOSR and result in digitalisation of signals for different 
services.  It therefore makes even less sense in the future to allocate separate bands to different 
services. 
In terms of recouping military allocations, ~e  Emerging Technologies Act of 1993 provides for 
the transfer of 200 Mhz of spectrum from  Federal Government use to commercial uses (it  is 
therefore known as the "200 Mhz Bill").  While the Bill  does not specify where the spectrum 
should come from, it is likely that at least some will be from military applications, as these make 
up about 80% of the Federal spectrum (which in tum is  about 50% of the whole). 
Related legislation, incorporated in the new US Budget Reconciliation Act, also provides for the 
auctioning of the licences for this 200 Mhz, although the purpose is explicitly to raise revenue 
rather than promote efficiency.  Some scepticism was  expressed regarding the spectrum that 
would be released.  Although current users are to be compensated for moving, this would be at 
the technical cost to them rather than the economic value.  It was therefore viewed as being likely 
that only the least useful frequencies would be given up. 
More generally, strong resistance from the military was predicted to any proposed changes in 
Europe.  It is always difficult to counter the emotive argument of "national security". 
Another issue was that military frequencies tend to concentrate on the lower C bands where there 
would be strong demand from terrestrial cellular users.  "This will come down to a fight between 
terrestrial and satellite mobile and the satellites will lose." 
The reasons why  DTH included in the BSS  band remains largely unimplemented include the 
following: 
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•  strong competition from terrestrial providers, particularly the large, vertically 
integrated cable companies which limits the likely demand, 
•  difficulties in accessing programming for copyright reasons.  Legislation was 
recently passed to force cable companies to allow broader access to programming 
under their control. 
The key constraint to the development of DTH therefore lies in the service market.  Access to 
the GSOSR itself was not seen as a problem. 
The LDCs were viewed as the main obstacle to releasing the BSS bands.  The LDC argument 
that this was a matter of their "inalienable rights" was seen as legally weak.  The fact that LDCs 
could hold up the reallocation of prime commercial spectrum when they themselves would not 
be in a position to use it for many years was viewed by one respondent as  "a disgrace". 
The option of sub-regional recouping of the BSS spectrum was generally viewed favourably as 
a quicker solution than changing the Radio Regulations.  However,  ~~re was some scepticism 
over the likelihood of individual countries giving up their rights. 
Satellites: Final  72 7.3  Institutional Change 
I  Summarl  I 
European View  US View 
•  might increase the coverage area  •  good idea but can member 
(CEPT, EC)  countries agree? 
•  would tend towards US price and  •  European licensing good for 
competition levels, but Europe  European operators 
has higher cost base 
•  more openness and more regulation 
•  would reduce numbers of  lead to more litigation 
coordinations and time for 
coordinations and so reduce costs  •  a single European voice could 
and barriers to entry  come to dominate future W  ARCs 
•  Member States doubt impact and 
state practical reasons why it 
would not happen 
•  must cover service introduction 
and liberalisation 
European view 
Amongst organisations interviewed in Europe there was a contrast between the views expressed 
by  certain  Member  State  regulators  or TO  representatives  and  by  non-nationally  oriented 
operators and supra-national regulatory bodies.  The former, in particular, were suspicious of  the 
European Commission's possible ambitions as a pan-European regulator.  Various points were 
raised to argue why existing national responsibility should remain, including: 
•  coordination will still have to take place vis a vis non-EU users of the GSOSR 
and  ~o the creation of a European body would only have a very limited impact 
on coordination problems and procedures, 
•  even when access to the GSOSR is  restricted to organisations such as  national 
TOs there is ample opportunity for competition at a European level because there 
are so many TOs able to access the resource.  In any case there may be countries 
willing to host private or quasi-private concerns wishing to exploit the resource 
(such as  Luxembourg with Astra), 
•  there is no commercially viable future for satellite based communications services 
(with a few  possible exceptions such as VSA  T), and  there are no or only few 
restrictions on the provision of  broadcast services on a pan-European basis.  This 
negates the need for a European regulatory body, 
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•  it is accepted legally that it is nation states that have rights over assignments to 
GSOSR-within  ITU  conventions.  The  principle of subsidiarity  means  that 
countries should continue to exercise these rights. 
Whilst these points have credence, they do not fully acknowledge the significant inefficiencies 
that result from the fragmentation of  the market in Europe.  For each of  these points it is possible 
to present a counter view as follows: 
•  any reduction in the number of satellites with which new satellites would have 
to be coordinated will represent a benefit in terms of time and cost savings.  As 
some 80% of  satellites in Region 1 belong to European operators it would seem 
that rationalising coordination procedures at the sub-regional level would yield 
the potential of significant benefits, 
•  there are undoubtedly various routes open to organisations wishing to coordinate 
an assignment but this does not detract from the fact that the national assignment 
process encourages the fragmentation of satellite serv~ce provision in Europe. 
The logic of national  satellites  s~rving national  coverage areas  is  no  longer 
compelling.  It would  therefore seem  appropriate· for  assignments  to  be the 
responsibility of a regional or sub-regional body.  The current wide range of 
national assignment procedures and  requirements itself represents unnecessary 
complexity and a deterrent to entry, 
•  the point, raised by one European regulator, that satellites had a limited future 
outside broadcasting, would become a self fulfilling prophecy if it were to justify 
not improving the regulatory conditions covering access to GSOSR in Europe. 
It is clear that unless the industry can evolve towards a more optimum structure 
(ie.  one  where  competition  stimulates  efficiency  of resource  allocation  and 
assignment, reduces costs and prices, and thus stimulates demand and provides 
the prospect of operators benefitting from scale economies) then its future vis a 
vis terrestrial substitutes such as fibre will  indeed be limited, 
•  it  is  the  case  that  nations  have  jurisdiction  over  assignments  within  ITU 
conventions.  There is no reason, however, why resources should not be 
6pooled' 
if a common benefit would result.  With satellites increasingly being regarded as 
providers  of services  to  wide  geographical  areas  not  confined  to  national 
boundaries,  it  would  seem appropriate if regulation  would be _applicable  to  a 
similarly 'wide' area.  It may be that Region 1 of the ITU is an appropriate level 
and  it is the case that the larger the area covered by the regulatory body, the 
greater the potential benefit.  Significant benefits would be likely if the CEPT 
countries  cooperated,  or even  if cooperation  was  based  around  a  nucleus of 
European  Union  states.  The principle of subsidiarity  does  not  necessarily 
support the contention that the regulation of  satellites should be at a national level 
in Europe. 
It  was  emphasised  by  some  respondents  that  unless  there  was  effective  liberalisation  of 
telecommunications service markets then there would continue to be limited competition in and 
use of GSOSR.  Unless the introduction of services such as  VSA T, and  international private 
circuits  could  be  freely  marketed  there  would  continue  to  be  major  impediments  to  the 
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commercial development of GSOSR on a pan-European basis.  One European operator said the 
deregulation of end user services may not 'work' unless there is  European level  licensing of 
satellite services - 'there is a need for both'.  The same operator acknowledged, however, the 
problems  associated  with  assignment  that  had  to  take  into  consideration  'local'  terrestrial 
interference issues.  Another, however, said it was not in favour of a 'Euro FCC' -especially 
one that would continue the inflexible system of band allocations to specific services. 
An international organisation emphasised the problems associated with implementing any change. 
It was  pointed out that any  changes only in Europe would  impact non-European countries. 
Maghreb countries, for instance, would be impacted by spillover of signals from new European 
satellites.  Such countries have traditionally objected to reforms that would mean changes to 
existing international treaties.  In contrast to this conservatism, however, it was noted that some 
African countries were interested in options o~  selling or leasing their rights to GSOSR.  Some 
developing countries, such as  Tonga, were realising the economic potential of their rights to 
GSOSR even though no formal framework existed for leasing or selling its rights- to orbit and 
frequency  resources.  Such  ad  hoc  developments  have  the  potential  of undermining  the 
international regulatory procedures and associated institutions.  It was acknowledged, however, 
that an  'economic'  path to  reforming GSOSR had  not really been explored.  It offered  the 
potential of  yielding financial benefits to countries that otherwise would be able to make little use 
of  their national rights of access to GSOSR.  This may represent a catalyst for generating more 
general  reform of the  GSOSR ·regulatory system - especially  if practical  benefits  could  be 
demonstrated for developing countries as  well as European countries. 
There remain, however, two views on this issue.  The first maintains that equity of right over 
access is supreme and  immutable.  The second regards national rights as being something that 
could be traded or leased to gain financial or other negotiated economic benefit.  Any change in 
the fundamentals of the way GSOSR is allocated/assigned, however, it was pointed out would 
be "a long way off" - certainly into the next century. 
US view 
In  the US  assignments  to  the GSOSR are controlled  by  the nation-wide agency  the Federal 
Communications Commission. 
Overall the concept of  having a European agency responsible for allocation, assignment, etc, was 
seen as being indispensable to the long term development of  the European satellite industry.  The 
need for such an organisation was viewed as  "self evident";  "Europe is crazy not to have it." 
However, there was considerable doubt as to whether the member countries could agree to give 
up the degree of sovereignty necessary to make it work- "just look at trade." 
Pan-European bands were not thought to be efficient on the argument that setting aside spectrum 
for any service by administrative fiat would create artificial scarcity.  However, having a single 
contact/licensing point and Europe-wide type approval was viewed as very good for operators and 
service providers serving the European market. 
One interviewee emphasised  the downside of having more open regulation  - a  concomitant 
increase in litigation.  Indeed, the high risk of legal challenge to regulatory decisions was raised 
by many of the respondents.  · 
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Several US regulators identified a potential disadvantage to the US of  having a single European 
negotiator in international satellite affairs.  A unified block vote at international fora such as 
W  ARC would make it much harder for the US  to achieve its own objectives.  The experience 
of WARC-92 was cited, when Europe initially stuck together.  However, the inflexibility of the 
European negotiating team made it easy for the US to get around this by negotiating side deals 
with other countries, while Europe was unable to shift its position.  A Europe speaking with a 
single voice could come to dominate future W  ARCs. 
7.4  Procedural Change 
Summary 
Euro~n  View  US View 
•  interference control is essential, it  •  many economists favour auctions -
is possibly the only relevant  provided for in the "200 MHz" bill 
technical criterion 
•  lotteries with transferability lead to 
•  economic planning is as  private auctions 
problematic as technical planning 
•  only need selection procedures 
•  auctioning must be combined with  where there are competing demands 
suitable terms and conditions 
•  setting restrictive criteria can 
discriminate against small, 
innovative firms 
European view 
In general, thoughts concerning the relative economic efficiency of  procedures to assign GSOSR 
were less well developed in Europe than in the US.  This reflects the relative lack of exposure 
to procedures other than the traditional, largely administrative procedures, that characterise the 
ITU and  national authorities. 
Many organisations in Europe recognise the need to introduce greater levels of competition into 
the area,  but most have not developed definite views on how this  should be achieved.  One 
European operator acknowledged that the introduction of ·economic principles' would decrease 
costs but was  not sure how this  could be. achieved.  It was  widely recognised, however, that 
technical  considerations should  not be the only ones determining allocation  and  assignment. 
Some respondents argued that there should be explicit consideration of the market or economic 
prospects  for  services  prior  to  assignment.  Others,  however,  doubted  whether  market 
assessments or economic planning could predict with sufficient accuracy the future of new and 
potentially volatile service markets.  This led to a reaffirmation of the need for flexibility to be 
built into the regulatory system.  Some respondents thought that decisions should best be left to 
the  market  but  others  doubted  whether  market  forces  would  cope  with  the  technological 
complexities inherent in this area. 
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A  national  regulator favoured  a  "middle ground"  approach  between free market lotteries or 
auctions and technically orientated administrative procedures.  This approach involved inviting 
multiple applicants and drawing up a shortlist on non-economic grounds according to criteria such 
as industrial policy, national interest and public interest.  Economic and financial criteria would 
then be applied to decide amongst the shortlist.  Those criteria would include "consumer benefit" 
and  "general economic interest". 
The examples of failures and potential shortcomings of auction and lottery systems were known, 
but amongst some there was relatively little detailed understanding of  the various forms auctions 
or lotteries could take.  It was stressed by those who had considered the issue in greater depth 
that the success of auctioning was dependent upon the terms and conditions attached to the pre-
qualification,  bidding,  monitoring and  enforcement procedures.  The main concern was  that 
auctioning, like any other form of  assignment, ~uld  lead to a failed or inefficient use of  GSOSR 
which was then tying up resource for long periods if not in perpetuity. 
Another view came from a European operator.  This operator thought auctions would work but 
that "there was no need" for them.  They were regarded as suitable for commercial applications 
but pointed out the need to reserve orbital and frequency resources for 'non-market applications'. 
US view 
The point was emphasised that selection procedures are only necessary where there are competing 
demands for the spectrum.  This suggests that the regulator needs a degree of  flexibility.  In rural 
areas where demand for certain terrestrial services is likely to be low, there would be little point 
in having strict due diligence and trying to enforce competition.  In urban areas the opposite may 
hold. 
The FCC noted that its "philosophy is to promote competition, including in different media, by 
encouraging new technology and services, to give customers a choice."  In the past the FCC has 
used two assignment mechanisms,  comparati~e  hearings and lotteries.  Comparative hearings are 
viewed as expensive and time consuming "beauty parades", where competing bidders must testify 
to  convince the FCC that  their option  is  best for  the public  interest.  These are only really 
feasible with two or three bidders. 
The alternative option of lotteries is used where there are a large number of bidders.  This was 
particularly the case for  terrestrial  cellular  licences.  The experience  with lotteries  was  not 
general  I  y viewed favourably.  The cost of  _entry  is  relative! y low, while the potential profits to 
the  winners  are  enormous.  This  led  to  the  development  of "application  mills"  that  (for  a 
relatively small fee) put in standard applications "by the carload".  The tradeability of licences 
meant that there were private auctions subsequent to the lottery process.  From the economists' 
viewpoint, these did have the benefit that the final user paid the economic value for the licence 
and therefore had an incentive to use the resource efficiently.  However, the prospect of high 
windfall  profits  encouraged  speculative  applications  from  bidders  that  had  no  intention  of 
operating, while denying potential revenue to government. 
As  indicated  above,  government  is  moving  towards  auctions.  The concept of auctions  was 
generally viewed favourably by most respondents, in particular by economists and, to a lesser 
extent, by lawyers.  However, not all interviewees supported auctions.  In particular, those with 
Satellites: Final  77 ;  ;- -t~~~:~t·-x:r;~:it~{f.  .  . 
KPA4liJ~e~t  Consult~g 
a technical background tended to argue against them on the grounds that GSOSR should not be 
treated as a commodity. 
It should also be noted that the FCC licensed two operators in each cellular market to promote 
competition.  An FCC official felt that "there is no question that society is better off' as a result 
of this policy.  Costs for terrestrial cellular hardware and services have fallen dramatically, with 
one reported offer pricing the handset as low as $19.95 plus three months free use.  On the other 
hand, gaps in service have developed where market potential is low even in certain urban areas. 
The FCC was reported to be reclaiming and reletting licences for these. 
The  FCC  normally  reviews  licence  applications  with  respect  to  various  criteria,  including 
technical, economic (proof of  markets), legal (US ownership) and fmancial standards.  The need 
to prove access to sufficient capital for constructing and launching a new satellite system was 
viewed as a  potential constraint to innovation.  For many companies the ability to raise financing 
is dependent on having a licence.  The FCC has introduced a degree of  flexibility.  For example, 
there can be a two part approval process, where provisional approval  is  given conditional on 
financing, allowing the licensee to then raise capital and gain final  ap~roval. 
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7.5  Terms and Conditions 
I  Summa!J:  I 
European View  US View 
•  licensing would need to be treated  •  fiXed duration licences can lead to 
sensitively- trade-off between  disinvestment at end of term 
market forces and investment 
certainty  •  tradeability is essential 
•  due diligence helps prevent 
•  due diligence would be essential  "warehousing" and "deep pocket" 
problems 
•  transferability favoured by private  •  pioneer's preference is a good idea 
sector, novel concept to others  but impossible to implement 
European view 
The procedures followed in the assignment process and the terms and conditions attached to these 
procedures need to be assessed in conjunction with one another.  Auctioning, for instance, is only 
likely to succeed if the right terms and conditions are attached to the process  ..  An example cited 
in the interviews related to the duration of licences.  If  licences are for too short a period then 
investment  could  well  be  discouraged.  If, however,  the  licence  is  in  perpetuity  with  no 
tradeability then market forces are frozen out. 
The issue of tradeability was not a familiar one to those in  Europe who were not in the private 
sector.  For those  in  the private sector the possibility of trading  licences  as  an  asset and  of 
trading companies with such an asset was regarded-as normal.  Tradeability would, of course, 
have the effect of attaching a market value to the asset. 
Appropriate  due  diligence  was  also  widely  regarded  as  sensible  amongst  the  European 
respondents.  This due diligence should cover both the bidding process and subsequent monitoring 
to ensure the resource assigned was being used as  intended.  In the bidding process it was felt 
important that: 
•  financial  resources  were  demonstrable  of a  scale  that  matched  the  scale of 
investment, 
•  market  growth  estimates  were  sensible  and  conformed  with  independent 
assessments, 
•  quality and technical dimensions of the project were taken into  consideration 
where necessary, for instance to ensure there would be no interference problems. 
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In the subsequent implementation phase it  would  be important to  ensure that the terms and 
conditions of the licence were transparent and  adhered  to, and  that there was some suitable 
recourse if agreements were contravened.  As one European operator put it - "Use it or lose it -
we need it".  In applying this principle it would, according to one regulator, also be important 
to take the following points into consideration : 
•  there is currently a requirement to notify the expected launch dat~ and 'period 
of life' of satellites in filings to the IFRB.  Under a system of due diligence it 
would  be important to review the credibility of these claims, rather than just 
accept them, 
•  it would also be necessary to reduce the nine years which operators currently 
have  to  implement  their  filings.  It is  an open  question  as  to  what  is  an 
appropriate period over which to monitqr the implementation of stated plans. 
Nine years was regarded as 'too long' and one year as 'too short'. 
In order for due diligence to be most effective it would need to be introduced globally.  Any 
regional or sub-regional level due diligence would have to pay particular attention to the drift of 
operators outside the regulators areas of jurisdiction. 
US  view 
Duration 
Fixed duration licences were generally not favoured, due to the problem with disinvestment as 
the licence gets close to expiry.  While US licences have a fixed duration, which varies according 
to the service, there is a high expectation of renewal.  Economists were generally in favour of 
granting licences in perpetuity, providing that they were tradeable. 
Tradeability 
Tradeability was viewed as essential for creating a market.  This could either be through allowing 
the licence itself to be traded or through the sale and purchase of the company holding it. 
Tradeability does have a perceived disadvantage (when licences  are effectively free,  eg with 
lotteries) of  facilitating private auctions.  This encourages numerous speculative applications by 
organisations and individuals that have no intention of operating.  As a result the administrative 
cost of running the lotteries increases, while it becomes more difficult (and costly) for genuine 
players to obtain a licence.  The FCC initially tried to get around this by insisting on a three year 
non-trading period for licence holders.  This did not prove effective, as companies got around 
it, by, for example, letting management contracts.  It was argued that with auctions this problem 
would ·not arise as there would be little incentive for speculative bids. 
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Due diligence 
The aim of due diligence is to protect against warehousing of GSOSR and the "deep pockets" 
effect.  The  FCC  generally  requires  that  licence  holders  make  "meaningful  progress"  in 
implementing their proposals.  In the past the FCC has not made much use of this condition, 
however there have been a number of cases recently where licences have been revoked.  This has 
resulted in considerable litigation, as licences are generally viewed as assets.  Again, there is the 
problem that the regulator has to judge what progress is "meaningful".  This is complicated by 
.  the long lead times inherent in the satellite industry
4
• 
The point was made that if licences are traded at their market values there is little incentive for 
holding a licence and not using it.  There may be a situation where a company wishes to hoard 
spectrum in anticipation of future technical deyelopments.  In a market situation this would be 
a normal commercial risk.  In the current situation there is no risk because the licences are free. 
The "deep pockets" problem can be addressed by using competition rules rather than specific due 
diligence requirements.  Companies buying up and holding on to large parts of the spectrum 
could be viewed as operating anti competitively.  On the other hand, the point was made that due 
diligence  conditions  help  to  send  the  correct signals  to  the  industry.  It may  therefore  be 
worthwhile to have them even if they would not be needed in practice. 
Pioneers' preference 
Pioneers' preference is an FCC policy, with the blessing of the Commerce Department's NTIA. 
However, the universal reaction from interviewees, including those from these two organisations, 
was  that  although  the principle of promoting innovation  in  this  way  was  a good  idea,  it  is 
impossible to implement in practice.  Reactions ranged from "politically palatable but inefficient" 
and  "you don't have it  for restaurants so why have it for satellite services?" to  "hopeless", "a 
regulatory nightmare", and  "creates more headaches and litigation than it is  worth." 
. There  was  considerable  scepticism  over  the  ability  of a  regulator  to  judge  what  is  a  true 
innovation and what is merely a copycat application, and setting aside spectrum for "good ideas" 
was viewed as counterproductive, likely to create scarcity elsewhere. 
The key issue here is the need to stimulate innovation.  This leads to  an additional protection of 
intellectual property.  The US licensing system is very open - applicants are often in the position 
of divulging  their technological  innovations,  which  can  be viewed  by any  interested  party. 
However, several respondents argued that innovation could be stimulated in other ways, such as: 
•  patents and copyright, 
•  having  less  open  licensing  procedures  where  proprietary  technology  is  not 
revealed to the public, 
An alternative approach, which  is  less likely to lead to  litigation, might be to  require 
applicants to submit a detailed build/use plan, then give the regulator the right to waive 
it. 
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•  FCC granting temporary experimental licences. 
It was also  noted that in practice an innovative company that gets a six month lead in a new 
technology is generally able to maintain that advantage through continued innovation. 
7.6  .Technical Policies 
I  Summarl  I 
European View  US View 
•  spacing is  application dependent  •  2 • spacing feasible but needs 
uniform specifications and large 
•  digitalisation will dramatically  antennas - there is a cost attached 
increase capacity and reduce 
interference  •  obvious benefits from frequency 
sharing/ reuse 
•  self compatibility 
European view 
Changes to existing technical conventions were not in general regarded as having a major impact 
on the issue of scarcity or economic efficiency.  A  number of interviewees pointed out that 
reducing orbital spacing was not necessarily a sensible way of  addressing scarcity problems.  For 
some applications, especially those in small diameter receivers,  it  ~ould be necessary to have 
greater than 3 • spacing in order to avoid problems of interference. 
It was also stressed that the increasing introduction of digital services will increase the capacity 
of the GSOSR by: 
•  making it possible to combine services transmitted in any given band, 
•  reducing  the  problem  of interference  that  would  characterise  an  equivalent 
analogue signal. 
One potentially major technical policy, however, did emerge from our interview programme. 
This is  known as  'self compatibility'  testing  and  it  is  being developed  as  a way of reducing 
unnecessary scarcity and bureaucratic technical procedures.  The principle is being developed by 
staff at France Telecom and it involves a new approach to testing for unacceptable interference. 
The test for a proposed satellite application would be acceptable if it  did not  interfere with a 
hypothetical clone of itself in adjacent locations.  It is acknowledged that this approach may not 
function well in an analogue environment such as current generation VSA  T or FMTV.  It would, 
however, be particularly appropriate in a digital environment.  This concept is being developed 
for submission to the CEPT working party on the issue. 
US view 
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The  FCC  introduced  2°  spacing  in  response  to  a  perceived  scarcity  of orbit  slots.  It 
commissioned a study which concluded that 2° spacing was technically feasible.  This was agreed 
with the industry before being implemented.  In practice it seems to work in the US, although 
the following should be noted: 
•  coordination requires that satellites must use similar technologies and systems to 
work effectively.  This has  led to "cookie cutter"  satellites, all  very similar. 
While this has the disadvantage that it may stifle innovation, it has also promoted 
economies of scale in the satellite construction industry,  allowing the US  to 
dominate the world market', · 
•  2 ° spacing puts a minimum size requirement on the earth stations, which has a 
cost implication for customers. 
In general, while closer spacing can increase orbit  capacity~ it should not be imposed unless there 
is genuine scarcity. 
' 
The benefits from frequency sharing and reuse wex:e viewed as  "obvious".  Frequency reuse is 
already well developed in the US.  It was questioned whether there was a need to regulate for 
it, however, except on an international basis, as operators have a commercial incentive to avoid 
interference.  It must be borne in mind that unlike the US, Europe is an inherently international 
region.  It was thought that in most cases there is a sufficient buffer between Europe and Africa 
to  permit frequency  sharing and  reuse.  However, care needs to  be taken to avoid  infringing 
African rights to GSOSR access.  · 
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However, although the US dominates the world market for satellite construction, 
many of  the components on the satellites are sourced outside the US.  Europe has 
SO% of  the world market for communications satellite components, for example. 
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7. 7  Competition Policy 
I  Summar~  I 
European View  US View 
•  ISO anti-competitive covenants  •  the best defence against abuse of 
increasingly not invoked, but still  "hot birds" _is  competition 
procedural and psychological 
barrier  •  Astra should not be punished for 
doing a good job 
•  signatories have conflict of interest 
- potential market distortion 
•  "hot birds" should be eroded by 
technological developments and by  ' 
reducing regulatory impediments to 
competition 
European view 
There  were  three  main  issues  raised  with  regard  to  competition  policy.  Firstly  the  anti-
competitive rights held by Eutelsat were said to be irrelevant because they were not invoked. 
It is argued by competitors to Eutelsat, however, that the requirement to coordinate with Eutelsat, 
and to provide Eutelsat with information, however innocuous, about f\lture commercial intentions 
places Eutelsat in an advantageous competitive position.  The existence of such covenants also 
increases the uncertainty faced by potential market entrants and so represents at least a procedural 
and therefore a psychological barrier to entry.  As the anti-competitive covenants have not been 
revoked it remains a potential threat to competitors. 
Secondly, and more importantly, the exclusivity rights of  Eutelsat's signatories over access to its 
transponders in their national territories represents a major distortion to competition impacting 
the use of GSOSR.  This arrangement severely limits Eutelsat's ability to impact end user prices. 
Signatory mark ups vary widely and reflect strong monopolistic power.  There is conflict between 
the signatories as suppliers of satellite services in their own right and as providers of substitute 
terrestrial services.  High mark ups will discourage use of satellite services compared to similar 
services offered through other media.  This may be consistent with strategic decisions to invest 
heavily in terrestrial networks but it tends to distort the operation of  market forces in the GSOSR. 
It is also in the interests of TOs to protect their positions as much as possible in markets being 
threatened by liberalisation.  One potential threat would be from geo-stationary satellite services 
which  could  provide  competitive  communications  services  over  wide  areas  of  Europe 
comparatively quickly.  It is  not in the interests of the TOs to encourage liberalisation of the 
GSOSR at the same time as they are facing increasing threats to their terrestrial services. 
Thirdly, "hot birds" in Europe were not generally regarded as abusing a dominant position.  It 
is  recognised that Astra,  Europe's dominant "hot bird"  operator (with the largest number of 
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ground  stations  aligned  to  its  satellites),  had  exploited  the  distorted  European  regulatory 
environment in a very effective manner.  It was  felt  that technological developments such  as 
double  antennae  dishes  could  allow  effective  competition  to  Astra.  It  was  also  noted  that 
removing regulatory constraints would also facilitate greater competition with the Astra "hot bird" 
location. 
Competition policy is a sensitive issue because it is acknowledged that the EC has the necessary 
institutions  to  enforce open and  fair competitive practices.  It is  also sensitive because it  is 
acknowledged that liberal market conditions would have to be applied throughout the supply chain 
of satellite services for it to be effective at the GSOSR level.  Without consistency of  application 
throughout the vertical structure of the industry, market signals would tend to be distorted by 
regulatory "bottlenecks" or "asymmetries". 
US view 
The US  survey concentrated on the "hot bird"  issue and Astra's percei-ved dominant position 
within Europe.  Respondents were strongly against regulating for competition unless Astra was 
clearly  abusing  its  position.  "Why  punish  Astra  for  being  good  at  what  it  does? ...  Using 
legislation to force access to  Astra's capacity is totally absurd." 
The best defence against the abuse of "hot bird" positions is to promote competition.  It is  not 
very  expensive to  realign  satellite dishes,  and  if a competitor  were  to  arise offering  better 
programming then it would be relatively simple for audiences to switch. 
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8  Implicati<?.~S of Regulatory Scenarios 
8 .1  Introduction 
One of the key findings arising from the interview programme is that the likely impact of the 
individual regulatory components described in Chapter 6 will be relatively small.  In order to 
have a significant effect they must be implemented in combination.  We have therefore developed 
four scenarios utilising various combinations and levels of these components.  The first scenario 
involves the most radical changes, and the greatest amount of market liberalisation.  Scenarios 
two and three involve progressively less radical change, with scenario four representing relatively 
minor modifications of the existing regulatory regime.  It is not our present aim to evaluate the 
actual likelihood of any of these scenarios although practical difficulties in their implementation 
are considered in Section 8.6. 
The  remainder  of this  section  briefly  describes  the scenarios  and  provides  a  preliminary 
qualitative indication of  the likely impact on the transponder market and·on the satellite industry. 
This was based on the interview programme and ort discussions with the industry experts within 
the  team.  Figure  8.1  summarises  the  potential  remedies  to  shortcomings  of the  existing 
regulatory environment. 
In looking more generally at the satellite industry, the following are considered: 
•  impact on innovation and scope of services provided, 
•  impact on competition between existing (satellite and  terrestrial) suppliers and 
their possible reactions, 
•  impact on market entry and exit, 
•  impact on industry structure. 
The issue of sustainability of  the current incumbents was also considered, where "sustainability" 
is defined as the ability to produce at the lowest average cost possible in the long run.  This has 
been a problem in other industries where incumbents had to face a reduction in demand because 
of the entry of smaller independent operators who specialised  in  niche markets.  The current 
literature
6 does not consider this to be a significant issue in  the  E~ropean satellite industry.  It 
should be noted, however, that this research assumes that Eutelsat is free to set prices at market 
levels. 
6  The Optimal Structure of the European Satellite Operations Industry - a report submitted 
to ESA - Roller and Waverman, INSEAD  1991 
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In looking at the impact on the transponder market the following are considered: 
•  supply of GSOSR, 
•  supply of transponders, 
•  price of transponders, 
•  demand for transponders, 
•  costs of launch and service provision, 
•  economic welfare. 
Tables 8.1  and  8.2 below summarise the four scenarios, to allow them to be compared easily. 
In Table 8.1  we have indicated at what level (national, European or international) the four main 
regulatory  responsibilities  would  be  handled.  These  responsibilities  comprise  allocation, 
assignment, coordination and legislation.  Table 8.2 compares the four scenarios across the six 
regulatory components described in Chapter 6. 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 8.2  Scenario 1 : Market Approach- Worldwide 
Description of scenario 
This scenario is designed to be the most market oriented.  It is actually closer to a pure market 
approach  than the current US  regulatory framework,  particularly  in  the use of auctions  for 
assigru.nent of licences.  It also assumes that the market principles described below are applied 
generally at the ITU level to the whole of Region 1 (Europe, including the CIS, Africa and the 
Middle East).  The main components of Scenario 1 are: 
•  establishment of a  "full service"  coordinator with responsibility for spectrum 
assignment, dealing with coordination, monitoring competition and due diligence 
for the whole of ITU Region 1.  It would also liaise with international standards 
bodies such as CCITI to sponsor industry cooperation, such as development of 
common standards and would be responsible to inform the industry about current 
and future availability of orbits, 
•  band allocation is  assumed to be minimised at ITU level.  All ITU allotments 
within the planned band (BSS, FSS) are assumed to be abolished, with suitable 
arrangements for compensating governments that lose out.  "Grandfather rights" 
of incumbents  operating  in  these  planned  bands  would  be  maintained,  but 
newcomers would be able to buy them out, 
•  assignment (ie. the determination of use of a specific combination of orbit and 
frequency resource) would be carried out through tenders, auctions or (possibly) 
lotteries.  With tradeability of licences, this will ensure that the market value is 
reached, 
•  licences  to  use  GSOSR  to  operate  satellite  systems  and  to  provide satellite 
services would: 
be freely tradeable with no _additional restrictions other than notification 
requirements, 
incorporate a broad definition of  property rights ("exclusive, unrestricted 
easement subject to non-interference").  Licences would not be restricted 
to  providing a particular service,  although  there could  be geographic 
coverage limitations as  an option, 
be offered either in perpetuity or given a long term (10- 20 years) with 
a high expectation of renewal, 
•  there are assumed  to  be due diligence provisions at the ITU  and/or regional 
level, with periodic examinations to ensure progress.  For example, pre-launch 
time limited to five years and reviewed regularly as technological developments  · 
enable a shorter construction period,  post-launch  requirement for  a specified 
proportion of the assigned spectrum to be utilised for three consecutive years. 
Assignments failing the test would be subject to mandatory re-auction.  A sub-
regional  reiDJlator  would  have a  degree of flexibility  in  applying this.  For 
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example, licence holders where there had been no competition for licences would 
be given more leeway than those serving prime markets, 
•  newcomers  would  be able to negotiate with incumbents with  recourse to the 
regulator only as a final arbiter if they cannot agree.  Potentially, this could be 
a  significant barrier to  entry unless the regulator has  considerable power to 
impose fines/other measures soon after disagreement arises. The regulator would 
act as a facilitator for frequency sharing and reuse and other efficiency promoting 
arrangements and would coordinate with interests outside ITU Region 1, 
•  ISO non-competition covenants would be abolished to remove barriers to new 
entrants.  EC style competition laws would ensure distortive barriers to entry are 
not raised, 
•  countries, especially LDCs, could be encouraged to lease access to GSOSR over 
which they have acquired rights to commercial users, and a tax could be levied 
on  auction  revenue  in  Region  1  to  fund  satellite~ based  communications 
developments in LDCs. 
Industry dynamics 
With both costs of entry and barriers to entry falling,  the potential for greater competition is 
enhanced  significantly.  This  would  stimulate  more competitive practices  amongst  users  of 
GSOSR and have a knock on effect with the services such as broadcasting and telephony that 
deliver services via satellite but which face entry costs that are not expected to be as high as for 
satellite operators. 
Increased competition would put considerable pressure on prices and would force operators to 
improve their efficiency and reduce their costs by expanding their scale of operation. 
The increased opportunity  "for space segment provision, pressures for increased efficiency, falling 
transponder costs and a reduction in the barriers to entry should encourage innovation and the 
provision of  new services.  However, the use of auctions for licences may limit access by smaller 
firms that may not be able to raise sufficient capital to pay the market value.  This is a result of 
imperfections in capital markets rather than in the market for GSOSR.  It could be argued that 
if an innovation were good enough it could be sold to a larger company that had the resources 
to exploit it. 
In addition, for operators paying the full  economic value for  licences, this would lead to  an 
increase in initial start-up costs.  The extent to which costs are passed on to service providers will 
depend  on  market  conditions.  We have  assumed  a  relatively  high  level  of space segment 
competition, such that operators are required to bear the increased licence costs. 
7 
This option is likely to meet strong resistance from existing space segment suppliers (particularly 
the TOs).  However,  the widespread  lowering of barriers  to  entry,  the intrpduction of due 
7  see KPMG {1993), ibid, for further discussion of auctions 
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diligence, the independence of the regulator and the fact that the fastest growth is likely to be in 
services where the TOs are least strong, all suggest that this resistance may diminish in the long 
term.  Existing suppliers will either have to increase efficiency of operation (having equipment 
in situ and established markets they will have an initial competitive advantage) or exit the satellite 
industry altogether.  Exits from the sector may be facilitated if  incumbents with grandfather rights 
can financially gain from selling their licences. 
Possible market impacts 
There would be a significant increase in the supply of GSOSR resources through: 
•  freeing up of previously allocated bandwidth, particularly the BSS and Planned 
FSS allocations.  To the exten_t that military bandwidth is recouped it is  more 
likely to be applied to terrestrial services, 
•  increasing  the efficiency  of utilisation of the GSOSR  resources.  Operators 
paying the full economic cost for the resource would be under pressure to make 
the best  use of it.  Tradeability of licences  would  allow them  to  go  to  the 
companies that were able to make the best use of  them and broad property rights 
would facilitate switching of  services to meet shifts in demand and accommodate 
new  services.  Licence  holders  would  have  an  incentive  to  invest  in  more 
efficient new technology in the knowledge that they would be able to operate it 
for long enough to be viable, 
•  the combination of due diligence, the upward delegation of national assignment 
rights  in Europe and  increased trading of licences should largely remove the 
"paper satellites" problem.  Satellite operators would face the true costs of not 
utilising their resource, while periodic review by the regulator should prevent 
anticompetitive behaviour by terrestrial service providers. 
Overall, it is likely that the considerable increase in market flexibility combined with the increase 
in availability of GSOSR will facilitate greater supply of transponders equivalents.  This should 
enhance drastically the potential for entry in the industry and should therefore lead to increased 
competitive measures and lower prices. 
Falling  prices  would  stimulate  demand  for  transponders  from  two  services  in  particular: 
broadcasting  (including  TV  and  SNG)  and  data  services.  Telephony  will  continue  to  be 
dominated by terrestrial delivery mechanisms. 
Tradeability will  help  to  promote continuity of service as  unprofitable  incumbents  could  be 
bought out by more efficient providers.  This would promote a continuity of-demand for space 
segment. 
As indicated above, equipment costs are likely to fall somewhat as a result of  economies of  scale 
and  because of increased  competition.  The likely  impact on the cost of providing satellite 
services is uncertain.  There is a number of competing effects: 
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•  competition in the operator industry combined with increased supply of GSOSR 
should  reduce  transponder  costs  to  service  providers,  particularly  from 
economies of scale, 
•  new  operators  of  pan-European  services  will  benefit  from  the  reduced 
administrative burden and increased flexibility of the new system, 
•  operators may benefit from economies of  scope, ie, frQm offering more than one 
service, 
•  international coordination would be easier without "paper satellites", 
•  terrestrial  substitutes will  be under pressure to  reduce costs to  compete with 
satellite providers. 
These factors should lead to a very significant reduction in costs, benefiting the most efficient 
operators.  This effect could however be moderated by: 
•  increased  licence  costs  for  new  operators,  although  for  practical  purposes 
licences would become more tradeable, 
•  the need to use GSOSR more efficiently which may increase equipment costs to 
the extent that it  requires new technology. 
Overall the impact on welfare is likely to be positive and significant.  Over the medium to long 
term,  as  the markets  become established, prices should come down substantially.  This  will 
reduce the costs to service providers, while increased competition will ensure that these savings 
are passed on to consumers.  For end  consumers  rather than just'intermediate consumers  to 
benefit there is a need for competition to prevail throughout the supply chain.  The lower cost 
framework will encourage the development of new services, and with the reduction in barriers 
to  entry  it  will  be easier for  these to  get to  market.  A knock on effect that  is  likely to  be 
significant (but which  is  not measured by our mod~l) would be the increase in welfare arising 
from falling prices of terrestrial substitutes as  competition in their markets increases and their 
traditional stranglehold on the satellite operation and services industries diminishes. 
In addition, to the extent that it is believed that welfare would be higher if government were to 
receive the economic value of licences than if private companies did, welfare would be increased 
more if assignment were by auction than by lottery. 
8 
1  This is based on the equity argument that government spending of  these funds would create 
more social benefit than a private company distributing its profits. 
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8.3  Scenario 2 :·Market Approach- Europe 
Description of scenario 
This scenario is  essentially the same as Scenario  1 but with the important difference that the 
minimisation of band  allocation,  the scrapping of ITU  allobnent  plans  and  the assignment, 
coordination, monitoring and due diligence functions are carried out at a European, rather than 
a  world,  level.  Discussions  with  our advisory  team  and  the responses  from  the interview 
programme suggest that this could have a considerable impact on the industry. 
This scenario represents the combination of the removal, from national to European level, of 
allocation, assignment and international coordination functions, with the implementation of  strict 
due diligence to clear out "paper satellites" in Europe.  With no change in the regulatory situation 
outside Europe, the likely response from non-European players would be to fill the gap by filing 
their own "paper satellites".  (This assumes that no pan-European mechanism is installed to 
prevent such behaviour.)  Under these circumstances it is possible that European operators could 
be worse off than at  present,  with  the loss of meir own "paper satellites"  but no long term 
increase in the availability of GSOSR in Europe.  Therefore, it may be crucial for the European 
countries involved  in  establishing the new sub-regional regime to decide, from the outset, to 
deposit into a common resource pool those rights over GSOSR which they already hold but are 
not actually exploiting. 
An  alternative,  however,  may  be that  with  the increased  tradeability of licences  in  Europe, 
countries outside the region would probably be encouraged to lease or otherwise trade their 
assignment rights to European operators.  This could potentially increase the GSOSR available 
(at the market price) to existing and new operators.  The downside would arise from the financial 
transfer out of Europe of  the cost of these rights (which the third part}' countries had essentially 
obtained for nothing).  However, this might be one way of transferring resources to the LDCs. 
Overall, it is extremely difficult to judg~ what the likely impact on the satellite industry and on 
the market for  GSOSR would be without further  information on the likelihood of the above 
alternatives.  Our analysis and modelling results proceed, however, on the basis that an effective 
solution can be found to the threat of  non-European paper satellites absorbing efficiencies initiated 
by regulatory change in Europe. 
The main components of this scenario are as  follows : 
•  a "full service" coordinator for Europe responsible for assignment, coordination, 
due  diligence,  and  possibly  representing  CEPT  or  EU  administrations  at 
international negotiations, 
•  minimal band allocation at European level, with abolition ofiTU allotment plans 
within Europe (maintaining "grandfather rights" of operating incumbents), 
•  assignment of licences through tenders, auctions or lotteries (with tradeability), 
•  licences to operate systems and provide services would : 
be freely tradeable, 
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incorporate broad property rights, 
be offered in perpetuity or with high expectation of renewal, 
•  strict due diligence would be enforced at European level, with no  "grandfather 
rights" for paper satellites, 
•  no restriction on orbital spacing, subject to non-interference, 
•  ISO  non-competition covenants would be abolished and  EC style competition 
regulations would be vigorously enforced. 
Industry dynamics 
The effect on the satellite industry of scenario two would  be similar to that described under 
scenario one, except the impact would be smaller as only Europe rather than the whole of  Region 
1 would be affected.  The potential threat of other Region 1 operators absorbing the efficiencies 
generated in Europe is assumed not to materialise.  The methodology and policies that should be 
employed in order to ensure that it does not occur, however, require further investigation. 
Possible market impacts 
As described under Scenario 1,  there would be expected benefits from  increased economies of 
scale.  However, these economies may not be as great as  in the US, as the technical pressures 
for having similar satellites would probably be weaker.  This, combined with the generally higher 
cost base in Europe, suggests that prices and costs would not be as low as current US  levels. 
8. 4  Scenario 3 : Partial Markets 
Description or scenario 
The crucial differences between Scenarios 2 and 3 are as  follows  : 
•  in  Scenario  3  the  European  coordinating  authority  has  more  limited 
responsibilities (described more fully below) than in Scenario 2, 
•  market_  conditions  are  promoted  in  a  more  partial  fashion  through  national 
authorities. 
In more detail the characteristics of Scenario 3 can be described as follows : 
•  establishment of a  "partial  service"  coordinator dealing  primarily  with  pan-
European allocation and  representing  Europe  (CEPT or EU)  at international 
negotiations as described in Scenario 2.  It would also deal  with sub-regional 
competition policy which  would be vigorously enforced  in order to minimise 
"paper satellites".  Assignment and  international coordination functions would 
remain at national level, 
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•  band  allocation  within  the  Radio  Regulation  satellite  frequencies  would  be 
progressively  removed  at  a  European  level,  starting  with  the  BSS  bands. 
Incumbents'  rights would be preserved in perpetuity,  provided that they were 
actually operating, 
•  national  level  assignment  criteria and  mechanisms  would  be  common  across 
Europe and  would  be objective,  transparent  and  non-discriminatory.  Entry 
criteria would assess the applications for assignments against the specifications 
of the service, 
•  there would be a significant increase in the flexibility of licence provisions, as 
follows: 
tradeability would be allowed but service-specificity would gradually be 
phased out along with rigid European allocations, 
licences  would  be for  a  limited  period,  which-.  could  depend  on the 
particular service, but they would be easily renewable. 
there would be strict due diligence carried out at national level to deal 
with "paper satellites", 
•  ISO  covenants  would  be  phased  out,  to  reduce  entry  barriers,  and  EC 
competition law would be vigorously enforced, 
•  no restriction on orbital spacing, subject to non-interference. 
There would need to be common procedures adopted at the national level which, within the EC, 
may  be  defined  in  a  harmonising  directive.  These  procedures  would  cover  assignment 
applications and procedures, due diligence, licence terms and tradeability issues. 
Industry dynamics 
Under this option the level of  competition, and therefore the likelihood of innovation, is initially 
administratively determined.  However, vigorous enforcement of EC competition rules ensures 
the abolition of  special or exclusive rights to provide space segment at national level.  This would 
mean a substantial opening of  entry opportunities into satellite operation. But, this would by itself 
do nothing to alleviate the.paper satellite problem. 
Over  time  the  development  of private  auctions  of licences  should  increase  the  level  of 
competition.  However there is a considerable political risk.  Politicians instinctively see private 
auctions  as  "unfair"  and  will  strive to prevent them.  Incumbents  are also  likely  to  expend 
considerable effort on political lobbying in order to protect their position.  Given the high level 
of involvement of national  regulators  this  lobbying has  a  good  chance of success.  Private 
auctions may promote warehousing by existing suppliers and providers of  competing services (the 
"deep pockets" effect).  Although this would be addressed by due diligence, it would be carried 
'out at national level, which will again be open to lobbying by incumbents and holders of "paper 
satellites" to protect their positions. 
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Overall there is likely to be some limited increase in the level of  competition in the industry and 
therefore some pressure on current operators to  increase efficiency  and  reduce costs.  The 
inflexibility of licences and the introduction of due diligence suggests that there could be some 
exit, however. 
In addition, this regulatory framework could act against smaller innovative companies who may 
be unable to surmount the barriers to  entry.  This could be addressed  by setting appropriate 
selection criteria for licences. 
Possible market impacts 
There would be some increase in GSOSR through the following: 
•  removal of BSS and phasing out of  other allocations.  This will be limited by the 
need to coordinate with other countries, ·  · 
•  once licences begin trading there will  be pressure for increased efficiency of 
GSOSR  utilisation.  However,  ~is  will  be  constrained  by  the  continued 
limitations on property rights associated with the licences, 
•  the  limited  introduction  of market  forces  and  to  some  extent  the  use  of 
application criteria, but more importantly the introduction of  strict due diligence, 
will  reduce "paper satellites •.  The speed at which this occurs will  depend to 
some extent on the degree of grandfathering  allowed  and  the actual  level  of 
competition enforcement. 
To the extent that there is currently a constraint on the use of GSOSR there is likely to be some 
increase in the supply of transponder equivalents in response to the relaxation of this constraint. 
However,  the  relatively  limited  degree of market  forces  initially  allowed  under  this  option 
suggests that the price of  transponders will not fall significantly, at least over the short to medium 
term.  This is due to the limited scope for competition  and for economies of scale. 
Some interviewees suggested that the large price reductions experienced in the US  were due to 
the impact of economies of  scale and to competition from terrestrial service providers rather than 
any  regulatory change.  However, this could not have taken place without a relatively liberal 
regulatory framework in the satellite market and in the markets for services which by reducing 
barriers to entry increased the threat of competition and therefore forced  incumbents to reduce 
prices and  costs.  It  is  possible that in  Europe deregulation of the satellite industry without 
accompanying deregulation in general telecommunication service markets could substantially limit 
the potential welfare gain. 
There would be some increase in the demand for transponders as market rigidities are relaxed. 
This will be driven in particular by reduced application costs for licence holders and a reduction 
in the restrictive practices of the TOs.  However, this process is again likely to be gradual.  To 
the extent that there is increased competition in the operator market the costs to service providers 
should also fall. 
The limited increase in competition in the market and the sub-regional nature of  the arrangements 
will  limit the potential for  welfare gains.  Although the development of a secondary  market 
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should ensure that part of  the potential gain is realised through the producer surplus of  the lottery 
winners, it could be argued that this is a less beneficial outcome than if it had been realised by 
government. 
8.5  Scenario 4 : Institutional and Allocation Reforms 
Description or scenario 
This scenario represents a minimal change to the current situation, with some deregulation in the 
institutional framework and in allocation.  This could be viewed as an initial step towards a more 
fully deregulated industry.  There is little introduction of market forces in this option and the 
implications for welfare are consequently relat~vely small. 
The key components of this option are as follows: 
•  minimalist European regulation focusing on  Europe-wide~allocation of spectrum 
for services such as VSAT and SNG, 
•  coordination and assignment continue at national level as current! y, 
•  granting of licences for these specific services would be determined on the basis 
of economic, administrative and technical criteria at the. national level.  Prices 
would be set administratively, but would aim to approximate the market outcome 
(eg Ramsey pricing), 
•  some increase in flexibility of use of BSS bands, but only if  this is an outcome 
of a WARC, 
•  no restriction on orbital spacing, subject to non-interference, 
•  ISO barriers to be phased out to reduce barriers to entry; general EC competition 
rules obviously remain applicable, with an uncertain level of enforcement. 
Industry dynamics 
There is likely to be little impact on competition, either between service providers, operators or 
between satellite and terrestrial providers of  communication services.  However, this will depend 
to a great extent on national licensing policies which determine the level of  competition in these 
markets.  To the extent that licensing authorities continue to be influenced by their TOs, the 
scope for increased competition in either operator or service markets will remain limited.  There 
may be some scope for increased competition in VSA  T services, as a result of  any pan-European 
allocation.  This will depend as much on demand for these services as on availability of  European 
VSA  T bands.  Moreover, it remains unclear whether a dedicated VSA  T band would represent, 
in any sense, an optimal allocation of GSOSR. 
Some new space segment providers are likely to supply pan-European coverage, particular!  y in 
data services where demand is believed to be strong.  The continuation of  high barriers to entry 
and monopoly profits suggest that there will  be little impact on exits from the market.  The 
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EC).  As a practical matter, in the absence of  a special treaty making provision for resolution of 
conflicts of laws (inter alia), this seems problematic. 
The complete abolition of ISO  non-competition  covenants  is  a  relatively  credible prospect, 
although this is in any event unlikely to be achieved completely overnight. 
"Leasing" access to GSOSR is a plausible prospect independent of Scenario 1. 
Finally, there would still be inter-Regional coordination and planning issues in respect of  GSOSR 
utilisation, no matter what happens at the ITU Region 1 level. 
Scenario 2 
The main hurdle, once again,  is  political.  If pressure on usable GSOSR in Europe is  indeed 
growing and  the massive economic inefficiencies of the current regime become more widely 
acknowledged, it is conceivable a scenario such as this becomes, in principle at least, a function 
of the common self-interest of the countries concerned. 
As  with Scenario  1,  it is possible to imagine a mechanism for delegating authority by special 
treaty or an equivalent instrument.  But, as with Scenario l, it would be insufficient to achieve 
such consensus solely within the framework of  the EEC Treaty, since many European countries 
are not party to this instrument, and it is assumed at least all CEPT members would have to be 
involved. 
Our interviews revealed that international coordination of new European space segment often 
involves coordination with Region l administrations outside Europe (eg. Arabsat).  Accordingly 
it  cannot  be  expected  that  Regional  "paper  satellite"  problem  would  be  comprehensively 
addressed by this Scenario. 
In order to protect existing European claims on GSOSR on a collective basis, it might be possible 
for the countries involved to assign their respective rights (including existing ttpaper"  rights) to 
the new European collective.  But the political challenge remains daunting. 
Scenario 3 
This scenario may  be seen to  advance current trends over the foreseeable future.  But some 
aspects seem quite problematical. 
It is  hard to envision general  abolition of specific satellite service band allocations at a sub-
Regional level.  This could engender serious technical coordination problems at the Regional and 
inter-Regional levels.  · 
The protection of incumbents' rights is suspect to the extent that, empirically, the incumbents 
happen to be mainly dominant TOs and other dominant players.  Existing competition rules would 
tend to require a levelling of the existing playing field before the Scenario could implement in-
perpetuity space segment licences. 
Scenario 4 
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absence of  any significant regulatory change may in fact spur further entry in the industry which 
would increase on average the costs for operation for the whole industry.  With no increase in 
competitive pressure there will also be little pressure for innovation. 
Overall,  existing  suppliers,  particularly  the  TOs,  should  be  able  to  block  competition 
successfully, with the possible exception of the new Pan-European services. 
Possible market impacts 
The impact on the supply of GSOSR under this option is  uncertain.  On the one hand,  any 
increase in the flexibility of  use of  BSS should increase spectrum availability, and in theory closer 
orbit spacing could increase the supply of orbit slots.  On the other hand, allocating bands to 
European services is likely to have the opposite effect. 
Setting  prices  closer  to  market  values  will  provide  an  incentive  to utilise  spectrum  more 
efficiently.  The impact on resource availability will  depend on the degree of grandfathering 
allowed (ie whether existing "paper satellites" are allowed to continue)_, the extent to which due 
diligence is applied and the amount of competition allowed by the regulators. 
To the extent that there is an increase in supply of  GSOSR and that there is currently a constraint 
on  transponders,  the  supply  of transponders  is  likely  to  increase  marginally.  Without  a 
significant increase in competition among operators and with limited prospects for economies of 
scale there is unlikely to be any significant impact on transponder prices. 
Given that licences are currently virtually free, any move towards economic pricing will increase 
their cost to operators, and indirectly, to service providers.  Otherwise there will be little impact 
on the costs of providing space segment.  Concerning pan-Eropean service specific allocations, 
demand for transponder capacity to provide VSA  T services is likely to be relatively low as this 
is  an  efficient  user  of capacity.  The demand  by  SNG  providers  is  likely  to  be  variable, 
depending to some extent on the occurrence of major events such as  the Olympics. 
Overall, any increase in welfare benefit arising from this option is likely to be marginal and may 
be negative, depending on the impact of increased band allocation and the effect of the limited 
deregulation on costs. 
8.6  Principal Practical Difficulties to  Realising Scenarios 
Scenario 1 
The main hurdle is the political difficulty of  such a radical shift of  sovereign national powers and 
responsibilites  throughout  Region  1 or indeed  the  world,  to  a  body designed  to  administer 
Regional GSOSR management.  Although it is  possible to conceive of a legal mechanism for 
delegating  such  powers by general  consensus  (eg.  under  a  new  Region-wide Treaty), such 
consensus is difficult to imagine being achieved in a short term timeframe. 
Enforcement of a special competition policy at the ITU Regional  level would require complex 
coordination/cooperation arrangements with national and other sub-regional bodies (especially the 
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This Scenario  conforms  most closely  with  current trends.  The minimalist provisions of this 
scenario would not be without significant practical difficulties relating to political, administrative 
and legal impediments to change. 
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9  Overview of The Model 
9.1  Introduction 
The ultimate aim of the modelling exercise is to evaluate the economic impact in  quantitative 
terms  of a  number  of possible  regulatory  scenarios  that  have  been  discussed  during  the 
prograinme of interviews.  The regulatory scenarios are concerned with potential changes in the 
regulation of GSOSR.  We have focused on the demand and supply of transponder equivalents 
as a proxy for GSOSR. 
We have developed  a  model  which  is  based  on current and forecast  demand  and  supply of 
transponder equivalents  in  Region  1.  The model  is underpinned by classical  microeconomic 
theory in which certain assumptions regarding the behaviour of producers and consumers hold, 
and that the results of this behaviour can be represented by smooth and  well-defined curves 
representing willingness to pay (by consumers) and willingness to supply (by producers).  In 
constructing the model, we have collated data from a number of sources and these are described 
below. 
The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows: 
•  we set out in detail the structure and assumptions of  the demand and supply sides 
of the model, 
•  the result of the interaction of demand and supply is described along with the 
outputs from the model.  In addition, the base case scenario and the capabilities 
of the model are discussed, 
•  model limitations are set out, 
•  a list of data sources is given. 
9.2  Structure and assumptions of the model 
The model is based on the interaction of  supply and demand of  transponder equivalents.  Demand 
for  transponder  equivalents  is  derived  from  the  demand  for  the ultimate services  that  they 
provide, which we have categorised as television channels, telephony services, data services and 
mobile communications.  The demand for transponder equivalents ultimately leads to a demand 
for operating satellites, which translates to a demand for orbit slots and frequencies.  The supply 
side is  similarly structured.  All  transponder equivalents referred to are in terms of 36 MHz 
equivalents. 
The following points illustrate the basic structure of the model and the key set of assumptions .on 
which the analysis rests: 
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Demand Structure: 
•  the demand  for  satellite services  broken  down  into  tv,  telephony,  data  and 
mobile, 
•  we  assume  that  economic  signals  are  transmitted  throughout  the  industry 
effectively.  We assume for  instance that benefits  resulting  from  regulatory 
changes affecting GSOSR can be transmitted to end users of  satellite services and 
not absorbed by intermediate suppliers, 
•  a technical parameter is applied to translate demand for services into demand for 
36 Mhz transponder equivalents.  In order to take into account improvements in 
satellite capacity  arising  from  technical  progress,  an index of technological 
change is  applied  to  future demands.  1bis takes  into  account  technological 
developments such as digital compression, 
•  demand forecasts for transponder equivalents and estimates of  the demand growth 
in the 1993-2000 period.  By making assumptions about the price elasticity of 
demand
9 we obtain demand curves for each year, 
•  given the demand for transponder equivalents and the state of  technology (ie, the 
number of  transponder equivalents per satellite), we obtain demand for satellites. 
Supply Structure: 
9 
•  the  current  and  planned  number  of  GSO  satell_ites  is  the  main  variable 
underpinning the supply side, 
•  from the current and planned number of satellites we estimate the growth path 
of  transponder equivalents over the forecast period, taking into account expected 
technological trends that impact on the number of transponders carried on each 
satellite and on the capacity of individual transponders, 
•  a  cost function  for  the supply of satellites  is  derived.  The producers'  cost 
function used in the model is a cubic function.  This type of cost function was 
estimated  by Snow'
0  in his case study of Intelsat and  is  a good approximation 
of the function used by INSEAD in their case study of Eutelsat
11
•  It  is  a well-
defined  cost function  and  its shape is  a  good  characterisation of the satellite 
This measures the responsiveness of  demand to price.  A good is said to be very elastic 
if when price falls significantly, demand increases significantly.  Conversely, a good is 
very inelastic if when price falls significantly demand does not increase by very much. 
See Appendix 4. 
10  The Intelsat system : an economic assessment - Snow, 1988 
II  Roller and Waverman (1991), ibid 
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industry,  ie.  it accords with  previous  research  which suggests that there are 
increasi_ng returns to scale up to a ce~in  level of outpue
2
, 
•  operators are assumed to be the ultimate suppliers of transponder equivalents. 
The price mark-ups of signatories to these operators are included in the supply 
side of the model, 
•  given the expected demand for transponders, and therefore satellites, the model 
calculates how many new satellites are launched each year if operators are free 
to maximise their profits, and 
•  the above steps yield the supply of transponder equivalents in each year and the 
cost associated with that supply. 
The  effects  of deregulation  are  modelled  as  a  "move"  of the  industry  towards  the  fully 
competitive outcome:  this  outcome would  imply a significantly lower price and  significantly 
higher demand (and supply) of transponders. This is economically the most efficient outcome, 
since the benefits for both producers and consumers are maximised. The industry is assumed to 
move closer to the fully competitive outcome the more effective the deregulatory package is in 
terms of increasing competition and facilitating more efficient production. 
A  full  non-technical  list of the basic assumptions  concerning the structure of the  model  is 
provided in Appendix 5.  Readers are likely to get a better feel of the quantitative results after 
reading the relevant parts, even if they are not familiar with economic principles. 
9.3  Outputs and capabilities of the model 
Model Outputs 
The demand and supply sides of the model interact.  It is assumed that the operators are profit 
maximisers and, reflecting the degree of monopoly power in the market, price is always above 
marginal cost and  is  set by the suppliers.  The profit maximising number of new satellites is 
calculated in the model and the associated price, average cost and marginal cost are calculated 
for each year.  The outputs of the model are: 
•  the number of new satellites being launched and put into operation in any year, 
•  the associated number of existing and new transponder equivalents, ie. the total 
number of transponder eq~ivalents in the market, 
•  the cost per satellite and the price of transponder equivalents, 
•  industry revenue (turnover), cost and profit for any given year, 
12  Snow, ibid 
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•  profitability (profits divided  by revenue and  multiplied  by  100)  and  mark-up 
(price minus average cost, divided by average cost and multiplied by  100), 
•  consumer, producer surplus and total  welfare for any given price and cost per 
satellite. 
Welfare Changes 
As indicated above, our key welfare measure is provided by changes in the sum of consumers' 
and  producers' surpluses. To investigate the implications of regulatory change, we model  its 
likely  impact  on the supply and  demand of satellite transponders and  calculate the resulting 
impact on economic welfare relative to the base case.  This allows us to arrive at a quantification 
of the  net  welfare impact of regulatory  change.  The quantitative  measure of the impact of 
regulatory change, as calculated in the model, is illustrated in Figure 9 .1.  Regulatory changes 
will give rise to changes in welfare if they impact on :  · 
•  technology, 
•  profits, 
•  the costs of transponder equivalents, or 
•  the price of transponder equivalents. 
In  the  satellite operation  industry,  however,  unless  the  final  market  for  satellite  services  is 
competitive,  increases  in  consumers'  surplus  will  translate  into  increased  profits  to  satellite 
service suppliers.  In order that final consumers benefit from regulatory changes in the market 
for GSOSR,  competition also needs to be injected into the market for satellite services. 
Initial simulations - the base case 
Prior to using the model to investigate the implicatiOt:lS of  the four scenarios described in Chapter 
8, we need to develop a base case against which to compare them.  The formulation of the base 
case is discussed more fully in the following chapter. 
9.4  Model Limitations 
In the previous Chapters of the report we presented and discussed in detail the capabilities and 
limitations of the model.  It is  important to  note however the following general points: 
•  the model provides an overview of the satellite operation industry in  Region  1 
and Europe for the final users. The quantitative results of the modelling exercise 
represent  the  whole  industry  rather  than  any  one particular operator  (either 
satellite operator or TO acting as an ISO signatory). It follows for example, that 
the  revenue  figures  would  represent  the  revenue of all  independent  satellite 
operators (eg Astra, TV-Sat, TDF, etc) and the revenue of  the TOs derived from 
ISO satellite operations, rather than simply the revenue of Eutelsat and Intelsat, 
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•  the model  assumes that regulations work as they are intended.  The practical 
difficulties associated with the definition of  the detailed provisions of  regulations 
and the effective implementation of the regulatory regime are issues that would 
have to be addressed by subsequent work. 
9.5  .Interpretation of the Results 
Prior to introducing the results, it is important to note a few points concerning the interpretation 
of the results.  These have been discussed in detail, as appropriate, in the previous Chapters of 
the report but we present here in brief a summary of the main points: 
•  the estimated number of new satellites launched each year has been "smoothed 
out" (using a three year moving average) over time.  This has been done so as 
to get a good  indication of the annual average number of planned satellites by 
smoothing out differing (time of year) launch dates, 
•  the transponders  available on different satellites are considered to  be perfect 
substitutes  for  each  other  after  appropriate  technical  transformations  (see 
Appendix 5). This is not a restrictive assumption as long as each satellite has at 
least another satellite which can offer similar services or that .could potentially 
offer the same services at a very small cost,  · 
•  the results are indicative, that is, they order the impact of regulatory changes, 
rather than providing exact predictions of the variables of interest, 
•  the profits in the model include signatory mark ups, 
•  the forecasts up to 1996 and the implications of welfare change assume smooth 
developments in technology. Any radical change in the capabilities of  existing or 
new satellites launched could have a significant impact on the industry and can 
only be modelled in subsequent  wor~, 
•  welfare is defined as the unweighed sum of consumers and producers surplus. 
This  is  an  accepted  welfare  measure  amongst  economists  and  means  that 
consumers and producers/operators are of  the "same importance", have the same 
weight/political salience, and are equally deserving; 
•  welfare estimates are "long term" estimates, ie. estimates of the average annual 
welfare gain achievable after 5-10 years following all the workings through of 
deregulation, 
•  a range of welfare estimates for the regulatory scenarios is given.  The values 
depend on the degree of competition amongst the operators and the extent of 
consolidation that occurs, following regulatory change, and 
•  when modelling the industry and the effects of  deregulation a distinction is made 
between Europe and the whole of Region  1.  Since our aim is to evaluate the 
impact  of regul~tory change,  this  distinction  should  reflect  largely  whether 
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operators are regulated  by  a  European or a Region  1 regulator,  rather than 
whether their satellites cover partly some area outside the primary jurisdiction 
of regulation (ie. the jurisdiction in which GSOSR is assigned). 
Satellites: Final  109 /{J;MGJManagement Consulting 
10  Model Results 
10.1  Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is to set out in detail the orbit and  frequency resources modelling 
exercise and present in quantitative terms the welfare impact of the regulatory scenarios. As a 
general  rule,  the  greater  the  economic  efficiency  of the  market/regulatory  mechanisms  that 
allocate GSOSR to users, the greater the potential welfare gain associated with any s~enario.  A 
full  description of the basic assumptions used in the final  version of the model and a list of the 
parameters taken as given from outside the model can be found in Appendix 5.  The aim of this 
Chapter is  to provide a concrete quantitative framework for the application of the above rule. 
It covers the following: 
•  1992, "Base Case" and "Alternative Case" forecasts - the quantitative results 
for  1992 (for Europe and for Region 1), including the underlying assumptions, 
and our forecast of the development of the industry in the "Base Case"  (when 
operators respond to  expected demand),  and  in  the "Alternative Case"  (when 
operators proceed with their plans), 
•  quantifying  the  impact or deregulation  :- a  short  description  of the  four 
scenarios, how they translate into changes in the model, the quantitative results 
of the model under each regulatory scenario and an evaluation of the advantages 
and practicalities of each one, 
•  model sensitivities and potential - a discussion of the sensitivities and potential 
of the model, 
•  conclusions - from the modelling exercise. 
10.2  Modelling the Satellite Operation Industry 
In  this section we set out how we have used the economic model to analyse quantitatively the 
satellite industry in Region 1 and Europe in 1992. The model is used to derive forecasts about 
the development of the industry up to the year 1996. Given the uncertainties surrounding the 
possibility of technological  and  structural  changes  in  the  industry  we  have not  at  this  stage 
forecast developments beyond 1996. The model could of course be used to derive such forecasts 
when a more definite view is established about the likely changes in the variables driving demand 
and  supply  in  the satellite industry.  It must be noted  that the regulatory changes  tested  are 
assumed to be in place and fully  effective as from  1992.  The analysis, therefore,  is  indicative 
of what industry conditions would have been like over the 1992-1996 period had these regulatory 
scenarios been in effect. 
10.2.1  The quantitative results for Region 1 
Start Year:  1992 
The.quantitative model results for the Region 1 satellite operations industry in 1992 are presented 
in the second  column of Table 10.1.  According to our data sources the net  number of new 
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satellites launched (ie additions of satellites minus retirements) in 1992 was seven, bringing the 
total number of satellites in Region 1 to 39. 
The average price per Ku transponder was estimated at ECU 2.6 m and the price per "average" 
transponder at ECU  1.1  m. Note that if operators restricted utilisation of the existing satellites 
to  80%,  we  estimate that the price per Ku  transponder would  increase to  ECU 3.1  m.  The 
estimated market size for the Region 1 industry is around ECU 1.5 bn. Our cost results suggest 
that the total  cost of operating the 39 satellites was around ECU  1.1  bn, leadirig to profits of 
ECU 373m, a profitability (profits/revenue) of24.4% and a mark-up (price minus average cost, 
- divided by average cost) of 32.3%. 
The last two rows describe the current situation in terms of available welfare.  The first  row 
(Consumer Surplus) represents the benefit to ~nsumers  and the second row (fotal Welfare) the 
benefit for society, ie consumer and producer surpluses, for the given prices and costs. 
1he 1993-96 Forecasts: the ·sase Case • 
The-basic modelling assumptions for the forecasting results are the same as the assumptions made 
to derive the 1992 results.  Demand for transponders is assumed to grow at  11%  per year for 
1993  and  1994, growing to  12%  in  1995 and  1996 (these are based on current expectations 
according to two independent sources
13
). In the "Base Case", operators are assumed to  respond 
to the growth in demand. 
The results of the forecasting exercise are presented in the last four columns of Table 10.1. Net 
additions of satellites are between four and five a year. This implies a gradual growth in the total 
stock of satellites which reaches 57 by the year 1996. 
The number of operators is forecast to increase significantly over the forecast period, especially 
in Region  1 (with the addition of Amos, Turksat, Arabsat, Asiasat, etc). The cost per satellite 
therefore increases also over the forecast period, as the growth in the number of operators and 
the lower growth in demand imply a reduced number of  satellites operated by each operator. This 
implies losses in efficiency (ie average costs increase) and leads also to reduced profitability and 
mark-up throughout the forecast period. Profits are also reduced in 1993/1994 compared to 1992, 
but as demand accelerates in 1995/1996 they exceed the 1992level. ProfitabilitY and mark-up are 
also on an upwards trend after 1994.  -· -- · 
13  The sources used are 
•  Neven, D.  Roller, L.-H. and Waverman, L.  "The European Satellite Industry: 
Prospects for Liberalisation", working paper (now published as CEPR discussion 
paper# 813 and  in Economic Policy, #17, October 1993) and 
•  a summary of forecasts  derived by Hyperion Consultants fot'  the Booz-Allen 
1992  report  "Prospects  and  Policy  for  Europe-Wide  Specialised  Satellite 
Services" and the Euroconsult 1991/92 report "World Space Industry Survey". 
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TABLE 10.1 
THE BASE CASE AND FORECASTS FOR THE REGION 1 SATELLITE INDUSTRY 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 KPXfGJManagement Consulting 
1he  "Alternative Case": Operators proceed with their plans in Region 1 
Our  "Base Case"  forecast  is  derived under the demand  growth  forecast  by  two  independent 
sources. The number of planned satellites however significantly exceeds the expected demand 
growth, as can be seen in the first two rows of Table 10.2 {in  1996 the planned number of new 
satellites  is  almost  the  same  as  the  forecast  so  1996  is  omitted  from  Table  10.2).  In  the 
"Alternative Case" we therefore examine what would happen to the industry profits if  operators 
proceeded with their plans and demand grew according to our independent forecasts. 
The very significant divergence of  expected demand for satellites and plans led us to consider for 
Region  I two scenarios,  "pessimistic", where prices fall  significantly and  "optimistic"  where 
operators manage to avoid price falls by restricting utilisation of the new satellites launched. 
In  the first scenario (pessimistic),  the excess- capacity resulting from the number of satellites 
launched exceeding the expected demand, leads to more price competition amongst operators as 
they try to attract customers in order to fully utilise their capacity. Operators therefore manage 
to utilise all their capacity and although this leads to lower (average) costs because of efficiency 
gains  it also  leads to  larger reductions in price. In such a case profits are reduced drastically 
because the reduction in prices for services offered from the new satellites launched drives prices 
down for the whole market.  Operators would therefore be loss making in all three years {with 
losses ranging from ECU 21  m to ECU 647 m), and are expected to face an annual reduction in 
profits in the order of ECU 657 m,  on average, compared to the "Base Case" (when launched 
satellites equal the expected demand). 
This is quite a pessimistic scenario, and it would be reasonable to expect that in the face of  such 
significant losses operators would realise that a price war would hurt them all significantly. They 
would prefer therefore to maintain prices {and costs) at the current level by restricting utilisation 
of the new satellites launched to meet expected demand. In that case the new satellites would be 
utilised at between 45.6% and 55.4%, and operators would have to absorb the extra fixed costs 
of the launched but not utilised satellites/transponders. This would lead again to a reduction in 
profits  compared  to  the  "Base Case",  but the reduction  would  be  much  smaller than  in  the 
"pessimistic"  scenario,  as  shown  in  the  lower  part of Table  10.2.  Operators  would  face  a 
reduction  in  profits  of the  order of ECU  281  m a  year,  compared  to  ECU  657  m  in  the 
pessimistic scenario.  Note also that in this scenario the industry is  profit making in all three 
years, unlike the results obtained in the "pessimistic" scenario.  ·-· 
Those two scenarios describe the "extreme" cases but in both cases the magnitude of  the potential 
loss· is relatively large because the difference between expected demand and the plans of  operators 
would affect profits from both existing and new satellites launched. 
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THE EFFECTS ON THE REGION 1 SATELLITE INDUSTRY OF OPERATORS 
PROCEEDING WITH THEIR PLANS 
Planned new satellites (Net,MA) *  .· 
Expected demand for new satellites·  ···=\'\ 
UTILISATION OF N'EW.SATS(%)_._._,·  .. 
Planned end of period. sateJiites  .. ,: .. _:_:-:::),  ... ·.·.:  ..  :,:=:=::=-=:  ... ::::J  ·.:::_:, 
.  ;.·.·.:::-.··.=:·.·:·.·:-:::=:-:=:···  ·'·  .····  ...  :·  ·.: ... ·.--.·  .. :  ...  :::·:·:=::_::.:  :·=··-·:.-:::·  ·:  ···:·····.  .;· 
TOTAL PROFITS. IF OPERATORs··:=·=·=::·=''=':::=-'=·:.-:_-;_::·.:· 
PROCEED WITH PLANS (Ecu·  .m)': ·  ... 
TOTAL PROFIT~_.-lF:  OPERATO_RS,:.F\~~-~-OND  :  .  .-
TO EXPEC.DEMAND {ECU m)-Base.Case. · 
REDUCTION IN PROFITS IF OPERATORS · ..  · 
PROCEED WITH PLANS (ECU m) 
AVERAGE REDUCT10N/YR··= (ECU'  m)'::::=·.==:=.-·=====-'===····=  =.-:  =  .-.. = 
- .·  .· .. :.:_:.::-··.·:·-_:-·:.- .·- ..  - ·:- _:.·.:-.·-··:····:'  '.·  ...  ·-:  .. ··.·.·:_:·.:·.: 
Optimistic Scenario 
NO REDUCTION.IN COSTS.OR PRICES=··= 
---.-:.:.:.·:·· ..  _  .. 
TOTAL PROFITS IF OPERATORS. 
PROCEED WITH· PLANS -(ECU m)  .:.::.· 
TOTAL PROFITS IF OPERATORS RESPOND 
TO EXPEC. DEMAND (ECU m}-Base Case 
REDUCTION IN PROFITS IF OPERATORS···· 
PROCEED WITH PLANS .(ECU m) ..  :_  ·.·  ,.·-:-=.-:- ....  _·  .. 
AVERAGE REDUCTION/YR (ECU·m)  .···.  · ..  ,  __ ::  =:·  _·. 
1993  1994  1995 
8.0  9.0  8.0 
4.0  4.0  5.0 
50.2  45.6  55.4 
50.4 
47  56  65 
-227.6  -646.7  -20.8 
329.7  358.3  387.2 
-557.3 -1005.0  -408.0 
-656.7 
196.1  61.9  -24.8 
329.7  358.3  387.2 
-133.6  -296.4  -412.0 
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In practice, it is conceivable that some price competition would occur initially. This could drive 
the small/inefficient operators out of the industry which would then leave the largest operators 
restricting utilisation in order to maintain prices. Since a number of operators would have left 
the industry, utilisation of new satellites under an "optimistic" scenario would therefore not fall 
to the levels predicted earlier (45%-55%). Given the current structure of  the industry, however, 
and  the significant  divergence between  plans  and  forecasts  we still  estimate  that  significant 
underutilisation of new satellites would occur. 
10.2.2  The quantitative results for Europe 
1992 and "Base Case" forecasts for 1993-96 
The results for  1992 and the "Base Case" forecasts for  1993-96 for the European industry are 
presented in Table 10.3. The basic assumptions underlying the m<>Qelling and forecasting exercise 
are the same as  for  Region  1.  Recall  that  in the  "Base Case"  operators launch  a  number of 
satellites sufficient to meet expected demand, as forecasted independently. 
Starting with  the  1992  results,  there is  a net addition of seven satellites in  Europe in  1992, 
bringing the total to 33. The price per Ku transponder in Europe (ECU 2.7 m) is higher than in 
Region  1 and the average cost is marginally lower. Note again that if utilisation was 809'0, the 
price would rise to ECU 3.3 m per Ku transponder. Revenue and costs are both lower but profits 
are higher, reflecting the fact that most of the rest of Region 1 operators would probably niake 
losses in a commercial environment. 
The  profitability  and  mark-up  are  higher  in  Europe  alone,  as  expected,  since  they  now 
incorporate the mark-ups ofPTTs. The benefits for consumers and society as a whole are slightly 
smaller, in line with the relatively smaller market size. 
When undertaking the forecasting exercise we assume that demand grows in Europe alone at the 
same rate as  in Region 1 in 1993 and  1994, but then levels off at  10%  per year, reflecting the 
relative maturity of the European market. This leads to three to four net additions of satellites 
per year in Europe alone (compared with four to  fiye in Region 1). 
The movement in prices and costs is very similar for Europe alone and Region 1 as a whole and 
the rationale behind these movements is largely the same. Average costs in Europe alone exceed 
those for Region  1 over the forecast period, however, mainly because we expect further entry 
in Europe (ltalsat, Hispasat) compared to  Region  1. This means more fragmentation in terms of 
costs and therefore less efficient operation. 
Profits, profitability and the mark-up are again higher in Europe compared to Region 1 for the 
forecast period. However, the movement of these variables in the two areas is very similar. 
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THE BASE CASE AND FORECASTS FOR THE EUROPEAN SATELLITE INDUSTRY 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
11.0  11.0  10.0  10.0 
New Sats Launched--_- -- -- ·.  ::  ._-_::  · ·.=.:-::=.::·  --:-:::  __  -_.:.=):=:=:=Ji:~:~:  7.0  3.0  3.0  4.0  4.0 
End of period SatS··,_ ..  _.  _  ..  _.  · ·  ;=_  -:::-·_  Jt=::.:=- 33.0  36.0  39.0  43.0  47.0 
.-.. :·:.;._-:-;:  ' .  .-:·=:.  ..-:·=  :: ......  =·=: ..  ·  :.:·-::  ·:::·?? 
116.0  117.0  131.0  143.0 
1326.0  1443.0  1574.0  1717.0 
36.8  37.0  36.6  36.5 
Average .i#::::.of.- Ku:.::tr.,sppn=d~r$/~~ieUM~~~~~;;~;;j~~j~i#~M\~ii  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0 
..  ::--.:,·--.  :-::::--::-::-·  .·  _.·  __  -=:::·=.::-:":::::::  ::_::-::.:·=;·.:  -
._·_·=-):_-,·,::::,7 
1.1  1.2  1.2  1.2  . 1.2 
2.7  2.9  2.9  2.8  2.8 
_.  -:::'.-.:·_  .. :.-.:_.:=:-.-:;.:::: 
·:-- .·-_:·:-::·:::  .·.=:  ·:;:._·  --.- :-_  :  __ :--::.;.:_ ... -.. 
:  ..  -·- ._ ... :  ·: .. -=-=.:,::).{:::=:':=:=:  '  --:  - :_.;:._  ::::=-
Average Cost/satellite {ECU.nil:=:=···:-:====·-:-:--.  :- ·  ·==:=-:=.  29.3  34.0  33.8  33.6  33.4 
.  ·'::_:):.;::::::=:;:_·.=.:··  ..  :_:::.:.:--:'_._::  ::.:_.;:::·:;._:;::::'_::  ..... :::  ·::_:: ...  ·.· ..  ::.::':=:':::;:, 
Revenue/year (ECU-.m) .-.:: ..  :·=:  __  .-=--·=.::::::=:-:::=  .:·,=.:=-=====-==:=.:=:.::·.·:=- :'- .  ·,:''::·  1359.6  1590.9  1727.7  1864.9  2012.5 
TOTAL PROFITS {ECU mY=·=·-::.:-.. :-.. :·.-:=.:-=-==:'==--··===-= .. .-:: __ ,=.,.·--··.- 386.1  348.1  374.6  399.7  428.7 
.  ,:·:-·::·:-.::---..  ·:·  .. ·:::  :-·:  ----·_.--:-·:·  .':• ·:·--:  ·  ..  · .·.  ·_.· ....  -.:·--:.:-.:  _  _. ... ·  .. · .· .. 
GROSS PROFITABILITY (%)-·.::=··  28.4  21.9  21.7  21.4  21.3 
MARK-UP(%)- 39.7  28.0  27.7  27.3  27.1 
Consumer Surplus. ECU.m)::·.-._- ·- 57  4.1  583.1  644.3  712.8  781.1 
Total Welfare (ECU m) -·-_- =  960.2  931.2  1019.0  1112.6  1209.8 KPXfliJManagement Consufting 
1he  "Alternative Case" Operators proceed with their plans in Europe 
Under the alternative case,  the net number of new satellites that operators plan to  launch  in 
Europe alone does not exceed significantly the expected demand growth, as can be seen in the 
first two rows of  Table 10.4.  In fact in 1995 the two figures are the same, and slightly stronger 
demand growth in 1993 and  1994 would also bring the expected number of new satellites closer  · 
to plans. The potentially negative effects of operators proceeding with their plans are therefore 
much less pronounced in Europe alone compared to Region 1, and we therefore consider in the 
"Alternative Case" only one scenario for Europe. 
In this scenario we assume that there is no price war because the overcapacity is relatively small 
compared to Region  1,  so that operators maintain price (and costs) at their original levels by 
restricting the utilisation of the new satellites (this corresponds therefore to  the "optimistic" 
scenario for Region 1).  Operators still have to. absorb the extra ftxed cost of the new satellites 
that are not being utilised so that their profits are lower by around ECU 89 m a year, on average 
(see last row of Table  10.4). This result suggests that since the plans of European operators 
approximate  much  more  closely  the  expected  demand  growth,  the  potential  for  losses  is 
considerably reduced. 
It should be noted that demand forecasts and the planned number of new satellites cannot be 
predicted with certainty. In the analysis of the alternative case therefore we are not providing a 
precise and accurate estimate of the implications for the satellite industry of an overestimation 
of demand.  Rather we aim to show the upper limit for the potential losses as a function of the 
size of the overestimation. 
10.3  Quantifying the Effects of Deregulation : The Scenarios 
10.3.1  Introduction 
.  In this section we set out the key  results of the modelling exercise:  the potential  impact that 
regulatory changes could have upon the industry.  In presenting the results, the impact is always 
set out as  a change in  welfare
1
"  relative to  the "Base Case".  A  range of welfare changes is 
given, which depends on the degree of  consolidation in the industry.  The welfare gains or losses 
are "long run" annual averages.  Prior to setting out the results, we first present-a recap on the 
nature of the scenarios investigated and how the various regulatory changes are translated into 
economic effects.  We then explain in  general terms the nature of the quantitative information 
provided and proceed with the presentation of the quantitative effects of  deregulation for each of 
the four scenarios. 
14  Changes in prices, costs, -number of  satellites and number of  transponders are also given. 
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TABLE 10.4 
THE EFFECTS ON THE EUROPEAN SATELLITE INDUSTRY OF OPERATORS 
PROCEEDING WITH THEIR PLANS 
Planned new satellites (Net~MA)  .*>.·.:·'·:·: 
,,,_,  .·.··:.·'":.r·::-.·.  ··:. , ..  :>·:: ..  ·,_::::;:.-.-:·,  :·::':::•:·_-.. :,  ·.·.":·.·'"·:r~···.:· 
..  ·.·:-::-.··,::.:.'.:·.·  .· ....  :·  .  ·.·:· ... ···:  .. : .. ·:· ..  ;:·:,:::.:.::·::  "·:;:  .....  :::::_:·:;.·:·.::,:·  .;:·:·:·:::·....  ::: 
UTI Ll SATION. C%r.:;:·-.::· ·  .....  :--::::-:::·}::.: .  .-:::,;:::::·  ::.:-.····:. ::·:;.:.:.  ..-::.  :.':=: ·.::: 
.  .  .  .  ..  .  .  .  '  . .  .  ")::·:·:  :-:-.··  .  ·:-: :-:  Average .utthsatJon .1.993_~·gs_::_'_:·:: :,_.:.::::/.:.::.  :- · ·  ::- .. :.:·::: 
.....  ·  ·.  · ......  ·.·.·-·'·.·  - .:: ....  ·,  .. :  .•  ;  .. '".·:-:::.·  •::  :.·:·:  .·:-:··  ·.·:  :.:  ··.:·  ·.  ::::  ·:·.·:/.::::····  ...  ,  .......  ·.·.·.;.;.;.;.;.·.;·.· ...  ·.·:.  .·.; 
..  ·  -·- . 
.  .  .  '  . 
. ·  .. ::·  .·.  ·:· ..  ··  /.  :· . 
...  ,.·_  :;::-··::._; ..  ··::,::.:;.;::::·:;: ...  ,.·.:· ...  =-·:·::::·:·:.··  :;.· 
TOTAL PROFITS IF OPERATORS. 
PROCEED WITH PLANS (ECU m) 
.... . { .. ~·-.  .  .. 
-.- .. -:·  :;.,:-.- .·· 
TOTAL PROFITS IF OPERATORS RESPOND 
TO EXPECTED DEMAND (ECU m):· .. ··:. · 
(Base -Casar::: ·-=:·::::::·,,:".:-:-·  ·  ·.::::.  -,::·:., ..  ·_ .... :·, 
REDUCTION IN PROFITS IF OPERATORS 
PROCEED WITH PLANS (ECU m) 
--... 
..  ·:  :,  .· 
AVERAGE. REDU.CTION/YR .(ECU ni) 
* MA denotes a 3-year Moving Average 
1993  1994  1995 
5.0  5.0  4.0 
3.0  3.0  4.0 
66.4  69.0 
67.7 
38  43 
283.5  260.5 
348.1  374.6 
-64.6  -114.1 
-89.3 kPitfGJManagement Consulting 
The four scenarios 
The scenarios  are  concerned  with  changes  to  key  aspects of the present procedures  for  the 
allocation and assignment of  orbit and frequency resources.  In some cases the changes assumed 
aim to ensure the correct working of  the market (eg competition policy or tradeable licences) and 
in other cases the changes are expected to have a direct impact on the resource available (eg 
recouping spectrum or no  limits on spacing).  Scenario  1 is  the most  market orientated  and 







Scenario 1 :  market approach - worldwide - this  entails the recouping of 
spectrum and institutional changes at the worldwide level; the establishment of 
a  full  service  coordinator  at  Region  1  level  (responsible  for  assignment, 
coordination, competition and due dilige~ce) and the minimisation of ITU band 
allocation,  licences  with  broad  based  property rights  issued  long term or in 
perpetuity to be allocated via auctions, tenders or lotteries; no restrictions on 
orbital spacing (subject to non-interference), ISO non-competition covenants and 
the planned  band  phased  out,  and  LDCs encouraged  to  lease their rights  to 
GSOSR resources, 
Scenario 2 : market approach - Europe - as for scenario 1 but the recouping 
of spectrum and institutional changes are at the European level, 
Scenario 3  :  partial  markets  - this  entails  the  establishment  of a  "partial 
servi.ce"  co-ordinator at the pan-European level.  Assignments  would  remain 
national, but would work according to a common set of criteria and procedures 
with  entry  criteria,  service  specific  licences  that  are  tradeable,  and  the 
progressive  removal  of European  level  band  allocation  and  service  specific 
licences, and 
Scenario  4  :  institution/allocation  reforms  - under  this  scenario  there  is 
assumed  to  be minimal  European regulation for Europe-wide service specific 
allocations, coordination and assignment continue at the national level, licences 
are determined administratively and there is the possibility of increased flexibility 
in the BSS, but only if it is the outcome of W  ARC. 
Translating regulatory changes into economic effects 
In  order to  evaluate the effects of deregulation on the satellite operation industry using the 
economic model we must determine the economic effects of  the various dimensions of regulatory 
change. The various dimensions of change considered have been discussed in detail above and 
are as follows: 
•  institutional change, 
•  procedural change, 
•  terms and conditions, 
•  competition policies, 
•  recoup spectrum, and 
•  technical policies. 
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Each dimension of regulatory change will have an economic impact on the industry through one 
or both of the following routes: 
•  increase in competitive behaviour, by establishing a "level playing field"  (ie 
equal treatment of competitors/no exclusive rights) through: 
•  lowering pecuniary barriers to entry (lower coordination and notification 
costs, shorter application procedures, etc), and 
•  lowering non-pecuniary barriers to  entry (full tradeability of licences, 
"use it or lose it", etc), 
•  more  efficient  production,  by  facilitating  or  reducing  the  obstacles  for 
consolidation of the industry in order to take advantage of economies of scale. 
The two  routes  are  not  independent  since the  absence  of competitive  forces  can  allow  the 
profitable operation of an industry at very inefficient levels. The absence of such forces leads to 
relatively higher prices than would exist otherwise.  Inefficient operators with relatively high 
costs can therefore survive and often make significant profits.  Although consolidation could lead 
to lower costs and higher profits for the whole industry, in the case of the satellite industry the 
legislative environment does not facilitate such a development. There is therefore a continuation 
of inefficient operation and, somewhat paradoxically, the profitable operation of relatively small 
operators attracts more players in the market. This makes the industry even more inefficient. 
It is therefore of crucial importance to intrOduce deregulation which allows as much as possible 
the  development of competitive forces.  This,  combined  with  a  relaxation of constraints  for 
consolidation, would then lead to more efficient production. The recent wave of privatisations 
in the UK and elsewhere, combined with the introduction of  competitive forces or where they are 
absent, proxied by regulation, serves as the most obvious example. 
The possible economic effects on the satellite industry of all  the regulatory measures already 
identified are summarised in Table 10.5. 
It is important to note at this stage that the effectiveness of  deregulation is not so much a function 
of any individual regulatory measure implemented but depends largely on the coordination and 
simultaneous operation of the various dimensions of regulatory change.  It  would therefore be 
misleading  to  provide  a  detailed  evaluation  of the  economic  effect  of each  component  of 
regulatory change based on some mechanical formula, since the effectiveness of  each component 
will depend largely on "the regulatory package" of which it is a part. 
For the same reason, when the quantitative effects of  deregulation are evaluated, we consider the 
effectiveness of each scenario already identified as a "regulatory package", rather than as a sum 
of the effectiveness of each specific measure that forms part of the "package". 
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10.3.3  The quantitative information provided 
The quantitative effects of deregulation for all  four Scenarios are presented in a single table, 
Table  10.6,  to  ease  comparison.  In  the upper part of the table,  in  the first  column of each 
Scenario we present the "Base Case" values over a five year period for price, cost and quantity 
under  the assumption of no  regulatory  change - the status quo.  The second column of each 
scenario gives the values for the same variables when deregulation is implemented and the third 
one provides the percentage changes. 
In the lower part of the table, we present the extra gain to consumers, producers and society as 
a result of deregulation, compared with the "Base Case" (no regulatory change). In some of the 
alternatives considered the industry as a whole could be loss making as a result of large falls in 
prices  not  accompanied  by  equivalent  reduction  in costs.  In these  cases  it will  therefore be 
necessary  for  the governments/regulatory authorities to introduce a mechanism which  would 
cover the shortfall ~n revenue for the industry by transferring part of the gain of  consumers back 
to the operators. The maximum amount of such a transfer is given in the last row of the table. 
The range of possible ou~comes, even within each scenario, is quite large, depending on: 
•  how significant the effect of any regulatory change is, and 
•  whether it affects the competitive environment, the efficiency of production or 
both. 
Within  any  scenario,  if the  effectiveness  of any  regulatory  change  in  terms  of increasing 
competition is relatively small, the fall in price will also be small, other things being equal. This 
would  then deliver relatively high  prices and  is  indicated  in the "Limited regulatory  impact" 
price/transponder row. If regulation is effective however then the price will fall by more and this 
is presented in the "Significant regulatory impact" .Price/transponder row. 
A similar argument holds for the effectiveness of any regulatory change in terms of facilitating 
efficient production.  If the policies are not effective, costs/satellite will  not fall  by  much  (the 
"Limited regulatory impact" row). If they are, then it is possible to obtain much more significant 
gains in efficiency (the "Significant regulatory impact"  row). 
As  far  as  the number of transponders  is  concerned,  the  "significant  regulatory  impact"  row 
presents the number of transponders that would be demanded if regulation had a large effect on 
comr.etitiveness and led to a significant fall in price. Equivalently, when the effect of  deregulation 
is small, the number of transponders demanded would only be likely to reach the level given in 
the "Limited regulatory impact"  row. 
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The gain for consumers will be greater the larger the fall  in price; the "max"  row, giving the 
monetary  values  of the  maximum  possible  consumer  gain,  corresponds  therefore  to  the 
"Significant regulatory impact" price. The producers gain on the other hand will be greater the 
larger the fall  in costs and the smaller the fall  in price. The "max"  row for producers' gains 
corresponds  therefore  to  a  combination  of the  "Limited  regulatory  impact"  price  and  the 
"Significant regulatory impact" cost. 
The society gain is simply the sum of  the gain of producers and of consumers. It will be greatest 
("max"), under the largest fall  in both prices and costs.  Note that this would provide also the 
"max"  gain  for  consumers  but not for  producers;  it follows  that the "max"  society gain  is 
smaller than the sum of "max" consumer surplus and "max" producers' surplus. Similarly, the 
"min" society gain is larger than the sum .of the "min" consumer gain and the "min" producer 
gain. 
It is possible when society reaches the maximum gain for the industry to be loss making. Such 
an outcome would therefore only be realised if governments and/or regulatory authorities were 
willing and able to introduce a mechanism which would cover the losses of the operators, either 
by transferring some of  the consumers' gain (which would be at a maximum) to the operators or 
by using some other mechanism (the general Europe wide tax system, direct cost reduction, etc). 
10.3.4  The quantitative effects of deregulation : Scenario 1 
Basic description and assumptions 
Scenario I is the fullliberalisation scenario and implies that maximum progress is made in terms 
of establishing a competitive environment and an industry structure allowing the most efficient 
operation possible. In terms of the analysis of  Table 10.5, -it is assumed that regulatory changes 
are implemented in all areas, from recouping spectrum, through institUtional/procedural/technical 
and administrative structures to competition policy. 
This is the most radical change envisaged and we therefore model this scenario as representing 
a move of the satellite operations industry to, or very near, a "perfectly" competitive outcome. 
The effects of  deregulation 
The quantitative effects of the Scenario 1 deregulation measures are presented in columns 2 and 
3 of Table 10.6. The status quo figures are presented in column  I. 
Under the assumption of perfectly competitive markets we estimate that the price would fall  by 
nearly 67%. Even in the case where the impact of deregulation on the competitiveness of the 
industry is weaker, we estimate that in Scenario 1 prices would fall by nearly 45%. This would 
have a very significant effect on the quantity of transponders demanded which we estimate would 
increase by between 54.6% and 82.8%. 
The reductions  in  costs  are also  significant but somewhat smaller in  magnitude.  Under the 
assumption of full gains in efficiency the industry would be operating near the maximum level 
of efficiency possible (ie almost at the minimum cost per satellite taking nearly full advantage of 
economies of scale) and  the cost per satellite would be reduced by nearly 58%. This would 
involve significant consolid~tion in the industry with a possible major reduction in the number 
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of players. If the full  efficiency gains are not realised,  we estimate that the cost per satellite 
would fall  by around 32%. 
The welfare effects are very significant. Society as a whole could gain annually between ECU 
701  m and ECU 1,373 m. This is not evenly distributed however since consumers stand to gain 
significantly, even with a relatively small decrease in price, whereas operators face the possibility 
of a significant reduction in profits. 
In the extreme case of "perfectly" competitive markets which would result in the largest fall  in 
price, operators would be making losses. In that case it would be necessary for the governments 
or regulatory authorities to establish a mechanism which would cover these losses. We estimate 
that in Scenario 1, the required transfer could be up to ECU 260 m a year. 
In the more realistic case where regulation implies that the industry moves close to, but not at, 
the "perfectly competitive" market outcome, operators could also benefit from deregulation, with 
extra profits of around ECU 172 m a year. This would only be possible however if there were 
full  efficiency gains in the industry, resulting in a reduction of the cost per satellite of around 
57%. 
10.3.5  The quantitative effects of deregulation : Scenario 2 (Europe) 
Basic description and assumptions 
In Scenario 2, full deregulation is assumed to occur in the European industry only. This does not 
translate however into a movement at, or very near, a perfectly competitive outcome for Europe 
only, since there will still be a need for coordination at a Region 1 level. This means that barriers 
to entry will continue to exist. Furthermore, there is the possibility that Region 1 operators will 
frustrate  the  development  of effective  competition  in  the  European  industry  and  costs  of 
coordinating with non-European, Region  1, or indeed operators from other ITU  regions would 
remain at existing levels. Under this scenario.,  we assume that the European countries covered 
by the regulatory change (those currently members ofCEPT) would be able to benefit from relief 
of resource constraints resulting from regulatory change. This would mean perhaps some form 
of pooling of GSOSR  that  prevented  organisations that did  not participate in. the regulatory 
reform,  from  capturing  any  resource  that  becomes  available.  Achieving  such  protection  of 
European resources  is,  however,  a complex  legal  issue which  would  require further detailed 
investigation and analysis. 
For  these  reasons  we  model  Scenario  2  as  a  movement  of the  European  industry,  to 
approximately  midway  between  the  status  quo  and  the  "perfectly"  competitive  outcome, 
represented by Scenario  1. 
1he effects of  deregulation 
The quantitative effects on the satellite industry if Scenario 2 was implemented are presented in 
columns 5 and  6 of Table 10.6.  Note that the status quo has  also changed since we are only 
considering Europe. 
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The price fall expected under this scenario is between 25% and 36%, reflecting the weaker effect 
of the Scenario 2 regulatory measures on competitiveness. The demand for transponders would 
similarly increase by less than in Scenario 1; we estimate an increase of  between 33% and 50%. 
Because  of the  current  fragmentation  of the  industry  the  reduction  in  costs  resulting  from 
increased efficiency can still be very significant and could reach 50% . 
The pot_ential  gains for society from the implementation of the Scenario 2 measures are still 
substantial, ranging from ECU 438 m to ECU  1,015 m.  The gains are now also more evenly 
distributed, with operators standing to gain up to ECU 353 m a year from deregulation, if they 
are encouraged to achieve the maximum efficiency possible. 
In  the case where prices fall  substantial I  y (by  35.7%) but there is  only a relative! y moderate 
reduction in costs (22.6%) the industry would be loss making. In that case, there would be again 
a need  to transfer part of the consumers'. gain to operators in order to cover the shortfall  in 
revenue.  The  magnitude  of the  transfer  however,  around  ECU  20  m  a  year·,  would  be 
significantly lower than in Scenario 1. 
10.3.6  The quantitative effects of deregulation : Scenario 3 
Basic description and assumptions 
In Scenario 3 the regulatory measures implemented cover Europe but their effectiveness in terms 
of increasing  competitiveness  and  efficient production are reduced  significantly compared  to 
Scenario 2.  This is because the service allocations are carried out only at the European level by 
a  "partial  service"  coordinator and  therefore certain barriers to  entry and  issues  of national 
fragmentation  remain.  The crucial issue affecting the impact of regulatory change will be the 
extent to which the national level regulatory responsibilities will be implemented consistently and 
effectively. The more effective and consistent the implementation the more homogeneous will be 
the operation of the GSOSR market in Europe. It would be as if a single regulatory environment 
was  in .place. 
The Scenario 3 regulatory changes are therefore ass1:1med to result in only a partial competitive 
market outcome, implying that the European satellite industry moves again midway between the 
status quo and the Scenario 2 outcome.  We have also included as the extreme case under this 
scenario the possibility of no efficiency gain. 
The effects of  deregulation 
The quantitative implications of Scenario 3 for the European satellite industry are presented in 
columns 8 and 9 of Table 10.6.  Note that the status quo  figures  (column 7)  are again those 
prevailing in Europe (column 4). 
The fall in price under this scenario ranges between 17.9% and 10.7%, the latter occurring if  the 
remaining barriers to entry mean that the competitive pressures are not very significant.  The 
increase in demand for transponders would range from  17.1% to 26.0%. 
If deregulation has  no  effect on the ability of operators to  improve their efficiency then costs 
would not fall at all. It is possible again however to have a relatively large reduction in costs (up 
to 44.5% ), like in Scenario 2, if the full gains in efficiency are realised. 
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If we assume that deregulation will result in lower prices, costs or both, then the gain for society 
as a whole is in the range of ECU 44.5m to ECU 789m. Like in Scenario 2, this gain could be 
fairly evenly distributed, with a potential maximum gain for consumers of ECU 388m and for 
producers of ECU 401 m. 
By considering the extreme case of  no change in costs we can in this case evaluate also separately 
the welfare effect  of achieving  the maximum  change in competitiveness  with· no  change  in 
efficiency (ie.  no reduction in costs per satellite). 
In this case consumers would gain up to ECU 243m a year but producers would lose up to ECU 
199m a year. This would in fact result in the minimum ·gain for society in Scenario 3 of around 
ECU 44.5 m/year. 
The key implication of these results is that deregulation should aim at establishing a competitive 
market and at facilitating the movement towards a more efficient operation for the industry as 
a whole. Otherwise the regulatory authorities run the risk of  redistributing welfare from operators 
to consumers, without really affecting the overall gain for society. 
10.3.7  The quantitative effects of deregulation : Scenario 4 
Basic description and assumptions 
Scenario 4 assumes minimal change in the current regulatory framework. There would be only 
tentative moves towards increased efficiency in the allocative mechanisms, some reduction in the 
barriers to entry and a small increase in the level of competition.  The scenario could therefore 
be seen as a description of a first stage before moving towards fuller deregulation described by 
Scenarios 2 or 3.  -
Scenario 4 is therefore represented as a very modest move towards competitive markets. In fact 
costs might increase as a result of further fragmentation of the industry, following the absence 
of any substantial regulatory change. 
1he effects of  deregulation 
The quantitative effects of Scenario 4 are presented in columns  11  and  12 of Table 10.6. Since 
there is only a minimal change in competitiveness in this scenario, price falls by around 7.1%. 
This leads to a very limited increase in the demand for transponders (10% ). 
If  the number of operators in the industry remains the same as in the "Base Case", there would 
be no opportunity to take advantage of  economies of  scale and the cost per satellite would remain 
the same. The absence of any substantial  regulatory change can also be taken as a signal  by 
potential entrants that the authorities do not intend to intervene in the market at all. This could 
therefore attract them in the market and thus increase the fragmentation and the average cost per 
satellite. We estimate that in such a case costs could go up by 3.4%  .. 
The very limited changes in prices and costs imply that the potential for welfare gains is reduced 
drastically. Consumers stand to gain a maximum of ECU 138m a year whereas producers will 
loose between ECU 107m and ECU 152m a year. It is therefore possible under this scenario for 
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deregulation to be associated with a welfare loss of ECU 13.9m a year, whereas any potential 
gain would be extremely limited. 
10.3.8  Key differences between the scenarios 
The key differentiating factors, from the point of  view of  the likely impacts on welfare, are two-
fold: 
•  the level at which deregulation takes place - whether national, Europe, Region 
1 or worldwide, 
•  the degree to which market forces are introduced. 
These issues are described in more detail in Chapter 8. 
Scenario I has both the broadest coverage and the most market oriented regulation.  In particular, 
allocation is carried out at the international (ITU) leyel, assignment and coordination at European 
level.  In terms of market orientation, assignment is by tenders, auctions or lotteries and licences 
are let in perpetuity, are tradeable and have broad based property rights.  In addition, existing 
band allocations are recouped at world level.  A priori, therefore, one would expect the welfare 
gain to be greatest for this scenario. 
Scenario 2 has the same market orientation as Scenario 1, but the coverage, both of allocation 
in general and of  the recouping of  band allocations, is limited to Europe.  Potential welfare gains 
will be more limited than in Scenario 1 but still significant. 
Scenario 3 retains the more limited geographical coverage of  Scenario 2 and also involves a more 
limited  introduction  of market  forces.  Although  it  envisages  tradeable  licences  and  the 
introduction of tenders or lotteries over time, property rights remain service specific (at  least 
initially) and time limited. 
Scenario 4 involves the least deregulation, with geographical coverage remaining at national level 
and only limited recouping of planned bands.  Licence terms and conditions remain very much 
as  at  present,  although  the  introduction of economic  factors  into  assignment  procedures  is 
envisaged.  This scenario is therefore likely to generate the most limited welfare gains. 
10.4  Model Sensitivities and  Potential 
10.4.1  Sensitivities 
We have already analysed a range of  possible outcomes within each scenario of  regulatory change 
in order to reflect the possibility that regulatory change could have a range of impacts on either 
or both the competitiveness and efficiency of  the industry. 
Furthermore, the model can be used to examine the effects of gradual changes in the parameters 
taken from outside the model on the "Base Case" results and on the impact of regulatory change. 
We could therefore examine for example: 







the effect of changes in the competition from terrestrial services, modelled as a 
change in the elasticity of demand  an~/or a reduction in the level of demand, 
the effect of more optimistic or more pessimistic demand growth predictions, 
the effect of changes  in  technology and  in  some or all  of the  components of 
costs, including the possibility of reductions in launching/construction costs, 
the effect of changes in the expected lifespan of a satellite, and 
the effect of changes in the number of transponders per satellite  . 
Model  potential 
The model can also be used as  it currently stands or by appropriate extensions to: 
•  forecast beyond 1996, 
•  assess the desired degree of consolidation in the industry as a function of the 
effectiveness  of deregulation  and,  depending  on  data  availability,  the  cost 
efficiency of the different operators, 
•  examine the provision of more than one or distinct services, 
•  examine the potential effects of significant technological change, 
•  model alternative regulatory scenarios, 
•  estimate  the  timing  and  assess  the  transition  to  the  chosen  deregulated 
environment, 
•  assess the potential  welfare effects of deregulation on the  interaction between 
satellite and substitute/competing services, and 
•  examine mechanisms for transferring some of  the gain of  consumers to operators 
and/or other means of covering operators' losses if deregulation implies that the 
industry could be loss making. 
10.5  Conclusions 
The  aim  of this  Chapter  was  to  evaluate  quantitatively  the  potential  gains  for  consumers, 
operators and society as a whole from the implementation of a new regulatory framework for the 
assignment of GSOSR  in  the  European and  Region  1 satellite operations  industry.  The key 
conclusions that emerge from the above analysis are the following: 
•  the potential benefits to  producers and  consumers from deregulation are very 
significant and could realistically exceed 1000 million ECUs a year; this is true 
Satellites: Final  129 kPJl45JManagement Consutting 
for the maximum gain achievable for  society in two out of the four scenarios 
considered (in the third scenario the maximum achievable gain could approach 
800 million ECUs a year), 
•  the above figures assume that benefits from deregulation can and will be passed 
on to final  consumers. It assumes also that deregulation will facilitate or in any 
case will not prevent consolidation in the industry so that operators also realise 
a significant gain;  this will  enable the achievement of the maximum  "society 
gain"  possible  by  more  efficient  production.  It  will  also  facilitate  the 
implementation of regulatory change, since it should reduce opposition by the 
established large operators in the industry, 
•  the  above  figure  excludes  the  benefits  from  deregulation  resulting  in  the 
"competing" terrestrial industries and the possibility of  further feedback through 
increasing demand for satellite services.  · 
The overall  results  therefore  support  strongly  the  case  for  deregulation  along  the  lines  of 
Scenarios 1-3. Although a precise figure for the cost of implementing the regulatory package and 
setting-up and running the relevant regulatory authority can only be determined from subsequent 
work,  the potential  gains seem significant enough  to justify such costs.  Furthermore, unlike 
deregulation and privatisation in monopoly markets in a number of  sectors in European countries 
where a single incumbent stood to loose significantly from the implementation of deregulation, 
the European satellite operation industry seems to offer significant potential benefits for most or 
all of the current incumbents because of currently unexploited economies of scale. 
Scenario 4, although attractive because of its gradual nature, seems to offer very little potential 
for welfare gains. If  not accompanied by explicit statements that the authorities are determined 
to proceed with further deregulation, it could also lead to welfare losses through more inefficient 
production. It seems to be therefore a very risky option. The choice between all the scenarios 
however will  depend  largely on a detailed  cost analysis of implementing them,  which should 
include tangible and non tangible/pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs and can only be determined 
with precision in subsequent research. 
Satellites: Final  130 KPlfGJMcnagement Consulting 
11  Policy  I~plications 
The preceding  analysis  provides  compelling  evidence that the existing system of regulating 
GSOSR requires significant reform. Introducing more economic considerations into the regulation 
of GSOSR would  yield  significant economic benefits to the geographic areas  covered  by  the 
reforms. The main issues, therefore, are: 
•  how should the reforms be introduced and implemented? 
•  precisely what regulatory reforms should and could be introduced? 
The international benefits of  introducing such reform needs to be communicated effectively at an 
international. level.  Consideration should be given to explaining the analysis contained in this 
report and the principles that are necessary to the realisation of potential benefits. 
11.1  How to  introduce the reforms 
It is clear that the greater the geographic area covered by the reforms the greater will  be the 
overall  improvement in  the economic efficiency of the resulting regulatory environment. The 
optimum  solution,  therefore,  would  be for  reform  to  take  place  at  the  level  of the  ITU, 
encompassing Regions  1, 2 and 3.  Such regulatory reform would be very difficult to introduce 
as  it  would  involve  extensive  multilateral  negotiations,  changes  to  UN  conventions  and 
fundamental reform of the structure and responsibilities of the ITU. 
The ultimate aim for policy makers in Europe should be the initiation of  change at the ITU level. 
European policy makers, however, should not be  constrained by the likely slow progress in 
achieving change at the ITU level. There is an opportunity in Europ_e  to provide a model  for 
changes which should take place at a wider level.  It is very important, therefore, that there is 
a clear understanding of the principles that are behind changes in the regulation of the GSOSR 
that would yield, if implemented effectively, a more efficient market for geo-stationary satellite 
services. 
These principles would be as follows: 
•  that as much of the GSOSR as  is possible is  subject to free market conditions. 
Care  should  be  taken  to  ensure  that  any  GSOSR  reserved  for  non  market 
applications is  not allowed to distort the operation of market forces outside the 
reserved  area.  If GSOSR  is  reserved  for  economic development purposes  in 
developing  countries  for  example,  it  should be completely  separate from  the 
GSOSR operating under market conditions, 
•  there should be ease of entry to, and exit from, the market: this will ensure that 
inefficient operators could be replaced by efficient operators. The realistic threat 
of  entry to markets should act as an important incentive for existing operators to 
maintain their competitiveness, 
•  there should be no barriers to entry for the operation of  services except for the 
absolute minimum of regulation required to ensure the technical integrity of the 
services  being  ·offered:  this  would  mean  no  restrictions  on  the  type  of 
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organisations  allowed  to  provide  satellite  services,  or on  the  geographical 
coverage of these services, 
•  the existing principles of EC competition policy should apply,  so prohibiting 
practices such  as  predatory pricing, cross-subsidisation,  abuse of a dominant 
position, exclusivity agreements with distributors or major customers. 
These principles, which require formal elaboration, should become enshrined in the articles of 
association of any European agency responsible for the regulation of  GSOSR.  Again the broader 
the territorial coverage of such an agency the greater its potential beneficial impact. If an agency 
could be established to cover the CEPT countries this would benefit the broad European market. 
If progress proves too slow at this level then the agency should, at least as an interim measure, 
be established to cover the EU Member States. It would be preferable to introduce an effective 
agency,  implementing the right kind of regulatory reforms to a smaller area than it would to 
compromise on the fundamental principles of reform for the sake of wider coverage. 
11.2  Which regulatory reforms should be introduced 
The preceding analysis identified a number of areas in which regulation should be modified in 
order to  get  the benefits  of greater efficiency  in  the allocation  and  use of the GSOSR.  The 
following regulatory principles would be crucial to achieving greater market orientation and the 
associated improvements in economic efficiency: 
•  ensure  that  the  regulatory  regime  applies  to  all  operators  delivering  space 
segment services to the geographical area covered by the agency.  This would 
be important to  ensure regulations were not circumvented by operators basing 
themselves outside the area of jurisdiction of the new agency.  There is a role 
for the agency to  initiate a pooling of resources currently under the cont_rol  of 
participating countries.  It would also have a role in reducing inefficiencies that 
are a legacy of historical decisions and the existing regulations.  In this sense it 
would  be  helpful  to  apply  due  diligence  criteria  discussed  below  on  a 
retrospective basis, 
•  in perpetuity rights of use combined with transferability of the right to use, or 
long  duration  licences  combined  with  a  high  expectation  of renewal  and 
transferability of licences.  These measures would allow flexibility in use of the 
GSOSR.  Use should be more responsive to changes in patterns of demand with 
such  a  provision.  The decision  as -to  whether there should  be  in  perpetuity 
tradeable rights or long duration licences depends on whether regulators wish to 
retain the possibility of intervention in the future.  It should not be necessary, if 
due diligence regulations are effective, to have such a review.  It would however 
be important to  detine carefully the "property rights"  associated with the right 
to use the GSOSR, 
•  basic qualifying characteristics of those applying to use, to ensure they have the 
minimum technological, management and financial resources to implement plans. 
There are  benefits  to  screening  potential  users  against  criteria judged  to  be 
essential for the successful  commercial development of GSOSR.  The criteria 
should be explicitly established, transparent and objective.  This screening would 
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reduce the possibility of projects  failing  and  continuing  to  tie  up  potentially 
scarce resources, 
•  due diligence during the period leading up to and following  the placing of a 
satellite  in  space  - use  it  as  intended  or lose  it.  There needs  to  be active 
monitoring to ensure that operators are using the resources as indicated.  Clearly, 
careful further consideration should be given to how such due diligence should 
work in practice.  There needs to be implementable powers, however, that can 
withdraw the right to use GSOSR if there is unacceptable under-utilisation of  the 
resource or unreasonable time delays in it becoming productively used, 
•  introduce an  economic method of determining who uses which GSOSR.  New 
licences  should  involve open selection  methods  with  certain prequalification 
criteria to ensure the capabilities of  the applicants.  Access to the GSOSR should 
be determined by tendering.  Again further work is required to specify the details 
of what  method of tendering should be adopted.  There should be some basic 
screening to ensure the credentials of bidders.  Price, other things being equal, 
should be the final  arbitrator, but whether it is  a simple highest price plus due 
diligence, or some more complex varia.nt of this formula is subject to  further 
review. 
The  coordination  agency  should  either  administer  these  regulations  directly,  or  it  should 
coordinate their uniform  introduction and  implementation across all  participating states.  The 
precise structure and  responsibilities of different regulatory agencies should be addressed as  a 
matter of urgency.  This will, however, to a certain extent depend on which solution is  most 
palatable politically.  There is a need for an agency to be established that can drive the process 
forward.  Such an agency should represent the interest of a critical mass of European countries 
in the first instance and it may form the core of a body with wider regulatory responsibilities. 
Action is required because the satellite communications industry and its consumers are suffering 
from the economic inefficiencies that exist under the current regulatory system.  The benefits of 
greater efficiency could potentially spread to a very wide range of consumers both  inside and 
outside Europe.  Such stimulation of the industry would also provide it with a greater chance of 
competing effectively with terrestrial substitutes- thus spreading the benefits of competition even 
further through society. 
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El  Introduction 
The KPMG Consortium has been retained to undertake an economic assessment of the way in 
which  geostationary  orbit  and  spe:.trum  resources  (GSOSR)  are allocated  and  used  in  the 
International Telecommunications union's (ITU) Region 1, particularly the European sub-region. 
The objectives of this study are as  follows : 
•  to develop a set of principles, based in particular on economic theory relating to 
resource management, that will facilitate the optimal allocation of scarce orbit 
and spectrum resources; 
•  based on these prin.:iples and as far as possible incorporating the main technical, 
legal, political and other considerations, to develop principles for managing the 
allocation and utilis.arion of orbit and spectrum resources. 
Current!  y  there  are  few  or  no  explicit  economic  regulations  impacting  the  allocation  or 
assignment of GSOSR at the international or national levels in Europe.  This does not mean, 
however, that there are no  resulting e.:onomic impacts.  Indeed the technical and administrative 
regulations  tend  to  interfere  v.ith  and  distort  market  forces,  thus  leading  to  economic 
inefficiencies  de~eloping in the market. 
E2  Review of the literature and analogous regulatory systems 
Economic analysis and regulation or the satellite industry 
A wide range of relevant literature exiStS.  dealing explicitly with the satellite industry or with 
other sectors and situations that can be viewed as analogous.  However, coverage of economic 
theory and its practical application ro  satellite issues is relatively recent.  To a great extent this 
reflects the development of  the industry itself, which has only recently begun to take into account 
economic theory and  market forces.  ha\·ing  previously been driven by technical and political 
factors.  Key conclusions are as  foll0ws: 
•  the innovative  narur~ of this study is  reflected in the sparsity of the literature. 
Little work has  b~=: wrried out on the economic evaluation of orbit/spectrum, 
although a number of studies have focused on specific aspects of the issue.  The 
techniques  used  alw tend  to vary considerably, generally being developed to 
address specific  pr0-~l~ms rather than the more general analysis needed for this 
study; 
•  very little quantitative analysis was identified even in the most recent literature. 
Modelling approach~  adopted a variety of  methodologies, including comparative 
utility  analysis.  pr0bability  analysis,  estimation of cost  functions  and  more 
pragmatic  market  forecasting.  None of these  are  considered  to  be directly 
applicable to the current problem; •  all the literature emphasised the rapid change in technology that characterises the 
industry.  A  key  implication of this  for modelling purposes  is  the need  for 
careful  specification  of tbe  baseline  case  against  which  alternative  policy 
scenarios will be evaluated; 
•  the satellite industry is  extremely complex.  In addition to rapid technological 
change there are market failures,  such as : the participation of competitors (the 
PTOs) as  shareholders in the main providers of transponder capacity; and the 
degree of technical regulation and government involvement. 
Overall, the analysis of the literature suggests that the approach adopted will need to be based 
on  sound  economic  concepts,  straightforward  to  model  and  bearing  in  mind  likely  data 
limitations. 
The review also highlighted two areas of particular interest to the rest of the study: 
•  scarcity of orbit and spectrum: there is considerable debate as to the existence 
of scarcity, its causes and  whether it will be a problem in future.  While it is 
generally agreed that the constraints of the 1970s and early  1980s have been 
alleviated (partly because of a switch to fibre optics, at least in the US), demand 
can  still  exceed  supply  in  particular  geographical  locations,  orbit  slots  or 
frequency  bands.  Some commentators argue that technological progress will 
increase capacity  to such  an  extent that scarcity  will  not be an issue in the 
foreseeable  future.  Others,  however,  note the rapid  growth in demand  for 
telecommunications services,  and  the explosion of new services that use the 
airwaves, arguing that this will continue to put pressure on resources.  Those 
who believe that scarcity  is  primarily a  function of inappropriate regulation 
would argue that this is more apparent than real and could be eliminated by a 
more appropriate pricing policy; 
•  alternative allocation mechanisms: there is considerable policy debate over 
alternatives.  In  particular7  there has been considerable interest in the use of 
auctions and tenders, although this issue is controversial. _  The main arguments 
in favour of  auctions are that they improve economic efficiency and, by allowing 
Government to cream off monopoly profit, are fairer than current mechanisms. 
Those against auctions argue that creating a market for orbit and spectrum may 
prevent essential services from  being provided; provide Government with an 
incentive to promote monopoly in order to maximise revenue gains; and cannot 
achieve an  efficient solution given the existence of market failure elsewhere in 
the telecommunications industry. 
Examples of national satellite regulations 
A review of national satellite regulation regimes throughout the world suggests that most of them 
continue to operate on a non-market orientated basis.  However, in recent years the trend towards 
increasing deregulation  in  the telecommunications sector has  begun  to  spread to  the satellite 
industry.  A  small but significant number of countries has adopted  relatively liberal  regimes, 
although in most cases these are still at a very early stage.  These countries include: 
ii •  the US, which has been described as "the most relaxed in the world".  Award 
of licences  to  provide  telecommunication  services  generally  is  either  by 
comparative hearings or lottery.  Award of licences to  implement new space 
segment is  generally a case-by-case procedure.  Comparative hearings are used 
when less than all  applicantions for use of GSOSR can be awarded.  Current 
legislation to reassign some Federal spectrum to commercial use provides for the 
use of auctions, but it is  unclear whether this mechanism will be applied in the 
context of licensing of new space segments; 
•  New Zealand. where licences provide broad property rights to spectrum (they are 
tradeable,  technically  specific but not purpose specific)  and  are awarded  by 
auction.  Australia is adopting a similar approach; 
•  the UK,  which has  issued broad Satellite Class licences to provide services not 
connected  to  the  PSTN,  as  well  as  tWo  licences  permitting  international 
telecommunications.  Under the 1990 Broadcasting Act, new space segment may 
be implemented by licencees other than the incumbent PTO (BT); 
•  Germany, which allows private provision of two way networks,  private voice 
transmissions and connections to the PSTN (depending on the likely threat to the 
PTO monopoly);  · 
•  by and large, European countries still reserve provision of space segment to a 
favoured incumbent PTO or  other national "champion".  Four EC Member States 
- the UK, France~ Germany and the Netherlands - now permit access to Eutelsat · 
space segment via any of the signatories of their four countries. 
Analogous regulatory environments 
\Ve reviewed the regulatory frameworks  in place for a number of industries, including roads, 
independent radio, terrestrial and cable television, airport landing slots and airline routes.  There 
is  a  number of approaches to  allocating resources, some of which have differing objectives, 
ranging from economic efficiency through to equity.  In some industries pricing is used in order 
to  reach  a  market  equilibrium  whereas  in others the  price  mechanism  is  not  used  at  all. 
Ownership and transferability of ownership of  rights to produce, or rights of access to a service 
are also important.  For example, a government may own a resource and then allocate it for free 
on a first come first served basis (like the National Health Service in the UK or motorways in 
Germany), or it may give the resource to the highest bidder (as in the franchise monopolies for 
regional terrestrial television in the UK).  Issues which are relevant to the regulation of GSOSR 
include: 
•  what sort of me-..::hanism should be used to assign orbits and frequencies?  If price 
is  used, should  it  be  set and  the resource assigned on a first-come-first-served 
basis, or should it be assigned via some bidding process? 
•  should the behaviour of the "owners" of the rights to use orbit and  spectrum 
rights be regulated? 
•  what should be the duration of spectrum and orbit rights? 
iii •  once rights over an orbit or frequency are conferred, should they be transferable? 
All these issues are relevant to the development of regulatory scenarios for orbit and frequency. 
It  is  important to stress the difference between regulation that  _imp~~ts upon the structure of the 
market,  and  that which  influences the conduct of competitors in  the market.  The regulatory 
scenarios  for  orbit  and  frequency  resources  described  below  reflect  both  these  forms  of 
regulation. 
iv E3  Technology trends 
Technology is a critical factor in the current and future development of  the satellite industry, and 
the likely technical developments will need to be taken into account both in developing any model 
of the future of the industry and in developing possible regulatory scenarios. 
There  are  two  physical  resources  which  limit  the  worldwide  capacity  for  satellite 
communications.  These are: 
•  the potential orbits for satellites; 
•  the frequencies used to  communicate with the satellites, the available range of 
which is limited by technology (the techniques for exploiting higher and higher 
frequencies require constant development) and physics (only certain frequency 
ranges penetrate the earth· s ionosphere). 
The dominant orbit for communications  satellites has  always  been the geosynchronous  orbit 
(GSO),  a ring located some 35,000km above the Equator.  This unique orbit allows a satellite 
to  remain apparently motionless  relative to  any point on the Earth's surface.  Technological 
constraints have meant that satellites situated in the GSO cannot be placed less than 2 · apart, thus 
severely limiting the potential number of orbital slots.  This is particularly the case in popular 
positions, such as those best suited to serving the US  and Western Europe. 
The spectrum is -also crowded.  Satellite communications use the microwave frequencies,  from 
0.9 Ghz upwards.  However, not all frequencies above 0.9 Ghz are available, since the earth's 
ionosphere is  impenetrable at many frequencies.  There are a number of windows,  and  these 
windows  (bands)  are shared  by civil  and  military satellite communications.  As  frequencies 
increase,  so  the signals  are  increasingly  subject to  fade,  so  that  the  exploitation  of higher 
frequencies is highly dependent on the development of fade countermeasures (FCJ\.1s). 
In fact geostationary satellites may be co-located in the GSO, but the main constraint on GSOSR 
is the problem of potentially interfering frequencies from overlapping transmissions (downlinks 
or uplinks).  This constraint is most alternated for the use of the most effective bands (typically, 
Ku) from the most popular ranges of orbital arc. 
There is  increasing pressure on both orbit and frequency resources.  This is being addressed by 
a number oftechnological means both in isolation and in concert.  Most of these technologies are 
expected to be in operational use in  the late  I990s-2000.  For example: 
•  DSP techniques which will  allow efficient use of the radio  spectrum~ 
•  allocated  digital  compression  will  increase the number of circuits  that  can  be 
carried within a certain physical bandwidth; 
•  new  modulation  techniques  will  further  increase  spectral  efficiency,  making 
broadband technologies such  as  A  TM and  SDH feasible; 
v •  the development of LEO and MEO systems.  However, whilst this may relieve 
pressure on geostationary orbit slots, it does nothing to relieve pressure on the 
spectrum. 
Against such technological developments can be set the growing importance and  acceptance of 
standards.  This  is  likely  to  slow  down  the  introduction of innovative  technology.  The 
convergence of satellite services, using broadband technologies and the digitisation of TV and 
radio,  may  eventually  greatly simplify  the Radio  Regulations  by  removing  the distinctions 
between services.  However, this is a long term tendency, since it is unlikely that broadcast TV 
will  converge in the next ten years.  Until  it does,  the best  that  can  be hoped  for  is  the 
convergence of two types of service: TV and the rest.  The one exception to this is likely to be 
the specialised user of TV, such as  SNG, which is likely to go digital in the short term (since 
there is no existing standards base which must be supported), and so can converge with the other 
digital services. 
E4  Existing regulatory environment for assigning GSOSR 
Particularly in the ITU Region 1 and the European sub-region, the existing regulatory system for 
access to, and use of, GSOSR predominantly involves procedures which are administrative and 
technical in nature rather than economic.  Just because there is no economic rationale behind the 
regulations, however, does not mean there is an absence of economic effect.  Indeed, the lack 
of consideration of  economic factors not surprisingly leads to economic inefficiencies and market 
distortions.  So~e  of the key issues related to the current regulatory system are as follows: 
•  European access to GSOSR can be expected to become more problematic over 
time.  The Unplanned FSS regime covers the majority of spectrum resource but 
substantial spectrum has been tied up in the BSS Plan, and the flexibility of  the 
less rigid Planned FSS regime remains in doubt; 
•  assignment of  GSOSR to specific satellite systems remains a national prerogative. 
Both this and the anti-competitive covenants contained in ISO Conventions have 
tended to reduce access to GSOSR by European users.  These legal limitations 
on GSOSR access have tended to constrain European demand for use of  GSOSR 
at an artiticially low level; 
•  the Unplanned and Planned FSS regimes permit accommodation of sub-regional 
systems, but the effect of institutionalised sub-regional scenarios on the supply 
of GSOSR is  not entirely clear.  The apparent European trend toward national 
systems geared to pan-European service should be borne in mind.  Such separate 
systems  can  function  as  effective  substitutes for  a  European  ISO,  and  will 
presumably compete along lines more consistent with  Community competition 
policy for the telecommunications sector.  However their proliferation may add 
substantially to  European demand for GSOSR; 
•  more efticient  a.:cess  t0 existing  European space segment can  be expected to 
stimulate demand for GSOSR.  A potential explosion of demand for new satellite 
services. anticipated to be introduced in accordance with impending deregulation 
of the European satellite sector, could make the  level  of demand for  GSOSR 
u nsat is fiabl e~ 
VI •  the ITU experience with ·equitable planning" of  access to GSOSR suggests little 
basis for optimism that a similar approach would result in greater efficiencies at 
the European sub-regional or Community level; 
•  North Ameri.:a appears to enjoy less strain on GSOSR access even in the face 
of  a  much  more  highly  evolved,  deregulated  satellite  communications 
marketplace.  In  part this is  because fewer protected national allotments have 
been tied up  ~y international GSOSR planning regimes.  One lesson for Europe 
may  be to  explore an  undoing of the W ARC 77  BSS  regime.  In part North 
America  may  exhibit  a  more flexible  environment because  a centralised and 
highly sophisticated GSOSR management function has been assumed by a single 
government body, the FCC. 
The legal  conundrum of GSOSR  access  is  so complex that it  invites basic rethinking.  One 
compelling notion  is  that no  regime for  access will remain perennially viable so long as basic 
rights  to  exploit  satellite  orbital  and  spectrum  resources  are obtainable  gratis  by  national 
administrations and their cho-s-en operating entities  ..  The shortcomings of  the existing regulatory 
system manifest themselves in the form of both artificial scarcity and distortions to competition. 
The consequences for Europe can be regarded as: 
•  high  barriers  to  entry  limiting  competition,  and  inflexibility  in  the  market, 
leading to high prices for transponders relative to what would be the case under 
more competitive market conditions; 
•  monopolisti.: tendencies of incumbent operators resulting in high profitability; 
•  few  compemors for  pan-European or national  services,  but  many  operators 
providing ge-,•graphically fragmented and/or application specific services and so 
not exploitir:g the full  ~onomic potential of the resources being used; 
•  a  regulatory  system  that  leads  to  .regulatory  protection  of unimplemented 
("paper") sar:llites~ raising the cost of  coordination, preventing market entry and 
creating anifi.:ial scar  .:ity. 
The application of ITU  reg-.:~2rions 3! the  national  level  in Europe can lead  to  fragmentation 
because of the geo-political s:::u.:ture of the continent. 
The current administrative  2.::..-J  techni.:311y  driven regulations are, therefore, contributing to a 
highly fragmented and econo:::i.::ally inefficient satellite sector in Europe.  The inefficiencies are 
also  tending to  hold  back  ic~wation 2nd  reduce the general dynamism of the sector.  If the 
current situation continues  c~e  is  3  long  term threat to the survival of the European satellite 
industry in the face of incre..2.Sing  pressure from terrestrial based substitute services.  European 
industry  is  already  threatene-~ by  the  ~..:onomies of scale available to  US  manufacturers,  who 
supply a relatively robust  dc::J~tic S.3tdlite market. 
vii ES  The key regulatory components 
We have broken down key regulatory factors into six broad areas, which we have used as the 
basis for  an interview programme and subsequent qualitative analysis,  and  ultimately for  the 
modelling work.  The six areas are as follows: 
•  recoup spectrum : significant parts of the spectrum are allocated to  specific 
uses.  To the extent  that these  resources  are  used  inefficiently,  there  is  an 
argument for releasing  some or all of these for  wider commercial use.  Our 
analysis focuses panicularly on two areas : 
military allocations/assignments, 
the BSS spectrum; 
•  institutional  change  :  at  present,  allocation  is  carried  out  both  at  the 
international level  and, consistent with these allocations, at the national level. 
As  a  matter of public  international  law  it  would  be possible  to  carry  out 
allocation and assignment at a sub-regional level, such as within Europe, so long 
as  this remained consistent with ITU rules and no third country's rights were 
prejudiced; 
•  procedural change : the lack of  transparency in assignment at national level and 
the limited influence of  market forces create considerable inefficiency.  There is 
a  number of  alternative allocation and as_signment mechanisms.  Economic theory 
suggests that those m~anisms  that are closest to the licensee paying the market 
price for the resource will be the most likely to promote efficient use of  GSOSR. 
In particular~ with an explicit cost of not using the resource,  whether it be in 
terms of  interest charges on capital or foregone income from alternative uses of 
resources, the likelihood ofhoarding or 'warehousing' and the problem of  "paper 
satellites" are considerably diminished.  The main mechanisms available, listed 
in increasing order of market orientation are : 
•  preemptive  righrs:  dominant  incumbent  "champions"  obtain  rights  in 
GSOSR on an exclusive or nearly exclusive basis, 
•  jirsr come firs: sen¥?d: currently the norm for coordinating spectrum use 
at international level, but typically not a factor in spectrum assignments 
at the nation211evel in  Europe, 
•  non-imerference: assignments are subject to the proviso that the service 
will not interfere with existing assignments (a fairly universal norm), 
•  national procedural norms: applicants may be required to meet a range 
of criteria (te-..:hni.::al,  financial,  etc), 
•  technical plan.rzing: allocation of bands to specific services, determined 
by purely technical criteria, 
viii •  economic/market planning:  allocation of bands  to  particular services 
according to an assessment of current or future demand, 
•  comparative hearings: a "beauty parade" to allow the regulator to come 
to an  informed decision as to the "most appropriate" proposal, 
•  lotteries: with the winner selected at random, 
•  auaions: where the government receives  the economic  value for  the 
resource and  the winning bidder has an incentive to  use the resource 
efficiently; 
•  changes  in  terms  and  conditions  of space  segment  licences  include  the 
following elements: 
•  propeny  rights:  current  licences  are highly  specific  as  regards  the 
panicular use to which an assignment can be put.  One option might be 
to introduce a degree of  flexibility, granting broader property rights over 
the spectrum, for example, to use the spectrum for any service, 
•  due diligence (·use it or lose it·): to prevent warehousing of  GSOSR and 
the .. deep pockets" phenomenon, where incumbents or competitors buy 
up the resource to limit competition.  At the national level, due diligence 
requires that the licence holder demonstrates use of the resource, 
•  duration of  licences: under public international law there is  effectively 
no limit to the duration of an assignment.  From an economic point of 
view~  providing  licences  that  are  transferable  then  letting  them  in 
perpetuity has a greater potential for reaching the market solution than 
sening fixed period licences, 
•  tradeabiliry:  there are strong arguments for at  least making  sure that 
satellite systems are themselves freely tradeable. _  Without tradeability 
there is  no  in.:entive to give up licences and  every incentive to hoard 
them. 
•  pioneers' prejerence:  a  system  whereby  "innovative"  proposals  for 
utilising  GSOSR  be  given  preferential  treatment  over  "me  too" 
appli.:.2rions.  The aim is to promote innovation by giving the new idea 
a com1·nercial  advantage, particularly important for  smaller firms  who 
may  r.-vt  otherwise be able to develop their good ideas; 
•  technical  poLicies  us~ to  encourage the technically  efficient  use of GSOSR. 
There are thr~ issues of particular relevance to Europe: 
•  orbi.Id spacing: while there is  no explicit limit on how  close together 
satellit~ can  ~e situated without interfering, 3° is  generally seen as  an 
appropriate rule of thumb.  In the  US?  a shortage of GSOSR  led  the 
FCC to impose a 2° spacing rule,  after technical  study and  discussion 
with  t..?-t~  industry. 
ix •  frequency  sharing  and reuse:  there is  already a  number of technical 
options  for  frequency  sharing  and  reuse,  and  with  greater  use  of 
digitisation,  cross polarisation. and  modulation  techniques,  these  are 
increasing, 
•  European  jine  tuning":  the  extent  to  which  other  internationally 
established technical parameters for relevant services permit local fine 
tuning to improve the efficiency of GSOSR utilisation; 
•  competition policy the key point here is the extent to which competition rules 
are invoked in order to maintain a competitive market structure.  Three particular 
issues are relevant: 
•  ISO anticompetirive covenants: provide protection to  operators against 
~economic harm
1  caused by any new proposed assignment, 
•  main!enance of exclusive  and special  rights:  Member States granting 
exclusive  rights  to  an  incumbent  or other  preferred  national  space 
segment provider are vulnerable under Articles 86 and 90 EEC, 
•  "hot birds·:  owner~perators of satellite systems occupying uniquely 
valuble "hot bird. locations may be subject to an Article 86 claim that 
they dominate a specific service market.  The question is  whether they 
abu..~ their dominant position, eg, by charging an "excessive" price or 
unfairly excluding potential competitors from the market. 
These regulatory componentS were discussed as part of an interview programme with satellite 
regulators,  operators, service providers and  research organisations in Europe and the United 
States. 
In general there were substantial diffcren.:.es in emphasis between the views of the European and 
US interviewees.  In particular, the US  r~-pondents were much more familiar with the regulatory 
options,  concerning  procedures,  terms  and  conditions· and certain technical  policies  such  as 
pioneer's preference.  This was panly be.:ause many of the options are aiready in place in the 
US.  The US respondents in  public sector organisations also had a greater market orientation, 
with strong views on the need to minimise regulatory interference and maximise competition as 
being the best way to promote economic efficiency of  GSOSR utilisation and to improve welfare. 
A key aspect of the US interviews was the general belief that scarcity of GSOSR for domestic 
use  is  no  longer a  problem  (although  it still  exists  in  particular  niches/frequencies).  The 
"sp~Lrum wars" of the late 1970s/early 1980s are no longer viewed as a big issue.  This was due 
primarily to a combination of technologi.:.al  progress and competition from terrestrial systems, 
particularly optical cables.  Remaining s~city  is viewed as artificial, being due to the regulatory 
framework which is  inflexible and slow to adjust.  This makes it difficult for GSOSR resources 
to shift to  new uses or those with the grezrest economic value. 
In Europe there was more concern aNut issues of  scarcity, the fragmented nature of the industry 
and, with a few notable exceptions, the general difficulty of introducing new services on ·a pan-
European basis.  An importam issue is clearly the appropriate geographic level at  which GSOSR 
X regulation should apply  .. Should it remain at the national and ITU levels or is there scope to 
stimulate the market through the introduction of  regional or sub-regional regulatory regimes? This 
is a reflection of the fact that regulations with an economic rationale are practically non-existent 
in  Europe. 
E6  The regulatory scenarios 
\Ve  have  developed  four  regulatory  scenarios  for  evaluation,  both  qualitatively,  through 
discussion  with  the  satellite  industry,  and  quantitatively,  through  modelling.  These  are 
summarised  in  Tables  El  and  E2  below.  Table El  indicates  at  what level  four  principal 
regulatory  responsibilities  impacting  GSOSR  - allocation,  assignment,  coordination  and 
legislation (radio regulation) -are carried out.  Table E2 compares the scenarios across the six 
regulatory components and highlights the likely ordering and relative magnitude of the market 
and welfare impacts. 
E7  The model and results 
The ultimate aim of the modelling exercise is to evaluate the economic impact in quantitative 
terms of a number of the regulatory scenarios described above:  We have developed a model 
which is based on current and forecast demand and supply of transponder equivalen~ in Region 
1.  The model is underpinned by cla.'Sical microeconomic theory in which certain assumptions 
regarding the behaviour of producers and consumers hold, and that the results of this behaviour 
can be represented  by  smooth and  well~efined curves  representing  willingness  to  pay  (by 
consumers) and willingness to supply (by producers).  It is based on the interaction of  supply and 
demand of transponder equivalents. 
The following points illustrate the basic structure of  the model and the key set of assumptions on 
which the analysis rests: 
Demand Structure: 
•  the demand for satellite services is  broken down into tv, telephony,  data and 
mobile; 
•  there are no monopolistic restrictions on which organisations can provide the end 
user service:s on whi.:h demand for GSOSR depends; 
•  a t~hnical paramete-r is applied to translate demand for services into demand for 
36 ~fhz transponder ~uivalents.  In order to take into account improvements in 
satellite  capa~ity arising  from  technical  progress,  an  index  of technological 
change is applied to future demands; 
•  demand fore-.:asts for transponder equivalents and estimates of  the demand growth 
in  the 1993-2000 period.  By  making assumptions about the price elasticity of 
demand we obtain d.:mand curves for each year; 
•  given the demand for transponder equivalents and the state of technology (ie, the 
number of  transponder equivalents per satellite), we obtain demand for satellites. 
xi Supply Structure: 
•  the  current  and  planned  number  of GSO  satellites  is  the  main  variable 
underpinning the supply side; 
•  from the current and  planned number of satellites we estimate the growth path 
of transponder equivalents over the forecast period, taking into account expected 
technological trends: 
•  a cost function for the supply of satellites is derived; 
•  operators are assumed  to be the ultimate suppliers of transponder equivalents. 
The price mark-ups of ISO signatories are included  in  the supply side of the 
model. 
Given the expected demand for transponders, and therefore satellites, the model calculates how 
many new satellites are sent up  each  year if  opera~ors are free to maximise their profits.  This 
will yield the supply of transponder equivalents in each year and the cost associated with that 
supply. 
To investigate the implications of regulatory change, we model its likely impact on the supply 
and  demand of satellite transponders  and  calculate the resulting  impact on economic  welfare 
relative to  the base (no  change)  case.  This allows  us to  arrive at a quantification of the net 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 The possible economic effects on the satellite industry of all  the regulatory measures already 
identified are summarised in Table E3 below.  In the upper part of the table, in the first column 
of each Scenario we present the "Base Case" values over a five year period for price, cost and 
quantity under the assumption of no regulatory change - the status quo. The second column of 
each scenario gives the values for the same variables when deregulation is implemented and the 
third one provides the percentage changes. 
In the lower part of the table, we present the extra gain to consumers, producers and society as 
a result of deregulation, compared with the "Base Case" (no regulatory change). In some of the 
alternatives considered the industry as a whole could be loss making as a result of large falls in 
prices  not  accompanied by  equivalent  reduction  in costs.  In  these cases  it  will  therefore be 
necessary for  the governments/regulatory authorities to  introduce a  mechanism which  would 
cover the shortfall in revenue for the industry by transferring part of  the gain of  consumers back 
to  the operators. The ma~imurn amount of such a transfer is given in the last row of the table. 
The range of possible out~mes, even within each scenario, is  quite large, depending on: 
•  how signifi.:.ant the effect of any regulatory change is, and 
•  whether it  affects the competitive environment, the efficiency of production or 
both. 
E8  Results 
The key conclusions that emerge from the modelling analysis are the following: 
•  the potential benetits to producers and  consumers from deregulation are very 
significant and could realistically exceed 1000 million ECUs a year; this is true 
for the ma~imum gain achievable for society in  two out of the four scenarios 
considered: in the third scenario the maximum achievable gain could approach 
800 million ECUs a year.  It should be noted that the gain achievable by society 
is not dire.....Lly  related to the GSOSR market size.  Lower prices and increased 
demand  for  satellite  services  will  always  lead  to  a  ga_in  for  consumers  and 
producers  if  efficien~y  improves  sufficiently.  The  market  size  will  not 
necessarily increase since more will be sold but at a lower price.  Since lower 
prices are likely to attract more consumers into the market, however, market size 
will  most  probably  also  increase.  Welfare gain  could  also  have benefits  in 
upstream or downstre.am markets; 
•  the 1000 million ECC estimate assumes that benefits from deregulation can and 
will  be passed  on  to  final  consumers.  It  assumes  also  that  deregulation  will 
facilitate or in  any  case will  not prevent consolidation  in the industry so  that 
operators also realise a significant gain; this will enable the achievement of the 
maximum  .. society  gain"  possible  by  more  efficient  production.  It  will  also 
facilitate  the  implementation  of  regulatory  change,  since  it  should  reduce 
opposition by the established large operators in the industry; 
•  the  1000  million  ECU  estimate  does  not  include  the  likely  benefits  from 
deregulation resulting in the "competing" terrestrial industries and the possibility 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 The overall  results  therefore support  strongly the case for  deregulation  along  the lines  of 
Scenarios 1-3. Although a precise figure for the cost of implementing the regulatory package and 
setting-up and running the relevant regulatory authority can only be determined from subsequent 
work,  the potential  gains seem significant enough to justify such costs.  Furthermore, unlike 
deregulation and privatisation in monopoly markets in a number of  sectors in European countries 
where a single incumbent stood to lose significantly from the implementation of  deregulation, the 
European satellite operation industry seems to offer significant potential benefits for most or all 
of the current incumbents because of currently unexploited economies of scale. 
Scenario 4, although attractive because of its gradual nature seems to offer very little potential 
for  welfare  gains.  If not  accompanied  by  reasonable  evidence that  national  authorities  are 
determined to proceed with further deregulation, it could also lead to welfare losses through more 
inefficient production. It seems to be therefore a very risky option. The choice between all the 
scenarios however will depend largely on a detailed cost analysis of implementing them, which 
should  include tangible and  non tangible/pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs and  can  only be 
determined with precision in subsequent research. 
E9  Policy Implications 
The preceding  analysis provides  compelling  evidence that the existing  system of regulating 
GSOSR requires significant reform. Introducing more economic considerations into the-regulation 
of  the GSOSR would yield significant economic benefits to the geographical areas covered by the 
reforms. 
It is clear that the greater the geographical area covered by the reforms the greater will be the 
overall  improvement in the economic efficiency of the resulting regulatory environment. The 
optimum  solution,  therefore,  would  be  for  reform  to  take  place  at  the level  of the  ITU, 
encompassing Regions 1, 2 and 3.  Such regulatory reform would be very difficult to introduce 
as  it  would  involve  extensive  multilateral  negotiations,  changes  to  UN  conventions  and 
fundamental  reform  of the structure  and  responsibilities of the ITU.  However,  there is  an 
opportunity for Europe to provide a model for changes which should take place at a wider level. 
It is very important, therefore, that there is a clear understanding of  the principles that are behind 
changes  in  the  regulation of the GSOSR  that could  yield  a  more efficient  market  for  geo-
stationary satellite services.  · 
These principles would be as  follows: 
•  that  as  much  of the  GSOSR  as  is  possible should  be subject to  free  market 
conditions. and care should be taken to ensure that any GSOSR resource reserved 
for  non market applications  should not be allowed to distort the operation of 
market forces outside the reserved area; 
•  there should be ease of entry to, and exit from the market. This will ensure that 
inefficient operators could be replaced by efficient operators. The realistic threat 
of entry to markets should act as an important incentive for existing operators to 
maintain their competitiveness; 
•  there should  be  no  barriers  to  entry or operation of services  except  for  the 
abs.olute minimum of regulation required to ensure the technical integrity of the 
services being offered; 
XVII •  the existing principles of EC  competition policy should apply?  so prohibiting 
practices such  as  predatory pricing?  cross-subsidisation,  abuse of a dominant 
position. 
These principles, which require formJ.l  elaboration, should become enshrined in the articles of 
association of any European agency responsible for the coordination and regulation of GSOSR. 
Again the broader the coverage of su~h an agency the greater its potential beneficial impact. 
The following regulatory principles would be crucial to achieving greater market orientation and 
the associated improvements in  econ~.."~mic efficiency: 
•  in perpetuity rights of use combined with transferability of the right to use, or 
long  duration  licences  combined  with  a  high  expectation  of renewal  and 
transferability of licences.  These measures would allow flexibility in use of the 
GSOSR. which would be more responsive to changes in patterns of demand; 
•  due  diligen~e  of those  applying  to  use  GSOSR  to  ensure  they  have  the 
technologicaL  management and financial  resources to implement proposals; 
•  due  diligenc~ during the  period leading up  to  and  following  the placing of a 
satellite  in space  - use  it  as  intended  or lose it.  This  would  require active 
monitoring; 
•  ip.troduce an  economi~ method of determining who uses which GSOSR.  New 
licenses should invoh·e open tenders.  Price, other things being equal, should be 
the final  arbitrator: 
•  ensure that the regulatory regime applies to all operators delivering serviceS to 
the geograpbi.::al  are2.  .:-0vered by the agency. 
A new agency should either administer these regulations directly, or it should coordinate their 
uniform introduction and  implemenurion across all  participating member states.  The precise 
structure and responsibilities of different regulatory authorities should be addressed as a matter 
of urgency. 
Action  is  required  b~ause the  s.ateEite  industry  and  its  consumers  are  suffering  from  the 
economic inefficiencies that  ~xist un2;::- u.iJe  current regulatory system.  The benefits of greater 
efficiency could potentially spread  t0  .:.  \·ery wide range of consumers both inside and outside 
Europe.  Such  stimulation of th~ irr.:il!stry  would  also  provide  it  with  a  greater chance  of 
competing effectively, both  NitSid~ E~r'-•pe and  with terrestrial substitutes - thus spreading the 
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MANAGEMENT SUMMARY 
INTRODUCTION 
This summary is intended as an introduction to the history and development of 
satellite technologies.  It places panicular emphasis on the impact of these 
technologies on the key physical resources used in satellite communications; the 
orbital slots into which satellites are placed, and the RF frequencies (and associated 
bandwidths) by means of which they communicate.  However, it is important to note 
the link between the two, since a communications satellite is inextricably linked with 
a set of RF frequencies. 
The key technologies and the trends in those technologies (both current and future) 
are discussed, focusing on satellite orbits, signal processing techniques, intelligent 
satellites and broadband services. The effects of these technologies on the orbit and 
frequency resources will also be assessed. 
This report deals with the technological pressures on regulation, but other pressures-
and the relationship between technological and other pressures-must also be 
recognised. 
HISTORY 
The worldwide satellite communications infrastructure was originally developed by 
Intelsat during the 1960s, and provided a limited number of telephony and TV 
channels.-.Communication was entirely between PITs (the signatories to lntelsat), 
with national distribution by the relevant P'IT. 
Satellites increased in number and sophistication during the 1970s, and spectrum 
efficiency was improved by the use of  dual polarisation.  It became possible to lease a 
transponder from Intelsat, allowing closed, private networks to be created, though 
country distribution was still carried out by the P1Ts. 
The 1980s saw an exponential rise in the use of satellites and the range of  services 
supported.  Data services were developed, and for the frrst time earth stations were 
allowed to be placed on customers' premises.  The rise of  regional systems, such as 
Eutelsat and Arabsat, increased pressure on both orbital slots and the RF spectrum. 
Other developments which increased the pressure on the RF spectrum were: 
•  Satellite TV broadcast direct to home (TV-DTH) services 
•  Business/VSA  T services 
•  Mobile communications, both personal telephony and store and forward 
messaging systems 
Inmarsat became operational in 1982, and now offers a wide range of mobile 
communication services. 
The 1990s are likely to see the rise of low- and mid-earth orbit (LEO and MEO) 
satellites, which will decrease the pressure on orbital slots, particularly in the 
geosynchronous orbit (GEO}, but which will only serve to increase the pressure on the 
RF spectrum.  · 
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There are two physical resources which limit the worldwide capacity for satellite 
communications.  These are: 
•  the potential orbits for satellites 
•  the frequencies used to communicate with the satellites, the available range of 
which is limited by technology (the techniques for exploiting higher and 
higher frequencies require constant development) and physics (only certain 
frequency ranges penetrate the earth's ionosphere). 
The dominant orbit for communications satellites has always been the 
geosynchronous orbit (GEO), since it allows a satellite to remain apparently 
motionless above a point on the Earth's equator.  Technological constraints have 
meant that satellites in this orbit cannot be placed less than 2· apart, thus severely 
limiting the potential number of  orbital slots.  This is particularly the case in popular 
positions, such as over the US, the Atlantic and Western Europe. 
This situation will soon be eased by the growing trend towards the use of  LEO and 
MEO orbits, in which the coverage of  a single GEO satellite is provided by a 
constellation of  LEO/MEO satellites (which, since they are not geosynchronous, also 
provide worldwide coverage, including the poles, which a GEO satellite cannot 
address). 
Although the pressure on the orbit resource may be eased by the use of  LEOIMEO 
satellites, this will not affect the problem of the crowded RF spectrum.  Satellite 
communications uses the microwave frequencies, from 0.9 GHz upwards.  However, 
not all frequencies above 0.9 GHz are available, since the earth's ionosphere is 
impenetrable at many frequencies.  There are a number of  windows,  -and these 
windows (bands) are named and divided between civil and military satellite 
communications. The bands used in civil satellite communications are: 
•  L band (1  - 2 GHz), which is used for mobile services 
•  S band (2 - 4 GHz), which is used for mobile services and for telemetric 




C band (  4 - 6 GHz), which is used for general telecommunications services 
Ku band ( 10 - 14 GHz), which is used for both general and broadcast 
telecommunications services 
Ka band (20 - 30 GHz), which is used for general telecommunications 
services. 
Exploitation of higher frequencies is the subject of  research.  As frequencies increase, 
so the signals are increasingly subject to fade, so that the exploitation of higher 
frequencies is highly dependent on the development of fade countermeasures (FCMs). 
The allocation of frequency bands to services is carried out by World Administrative 
Radio Conferences, the most recent of which, W ARC '92, allocated bandwidth to 
LEO/MEO mobile satellite services (such as Motorola's proposed Iridium system) 
and to satellite sound broadcasting. 
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The RF signals must be modulated if they are to carry data.  The two principal 
modulation schemes currently in use are variations on Phase Shift Keying (PSK): 
•  Binary PSK (BPSK), which offers the best resilience to phase noise, but is not 
as spectrally efficient (offers lower transmission speeds) as other schemes 
•  Quadraphase PSK (QPSK), which offers double the spectral efficiency of 
BPSK, but is more sensitive to phase variations and additive noise. 
Consequently, it is more difficult and expensive to implement 
More spectrally-efficient modulation schemes are now being developed, in particular 
for use in broadband transmission and for mobile communication with LEO/MEO  -
satellites. 
Older, analogue technology (both on board satellites and in earth stations) does not 
make efficient use of the portion of the spectrum allocated for a particular 
transponder.  This is being addressed by means of  Digital Signal Processing (DSP) 
techniques, which are being used to implement modems; this will allow better 
perfonnance and a degree of  flexibility in changes between modulation schemes. 
Finally, a large proportion of the RF specuum has been allocated to users who do not 
make full use of  it; in particular the blocks set aside for military use are not efficiently 
used, though they are unlikely to be released. 
TECHNOLOGIES 
The principal satellite communications serVices are: 
•  Telephony services, which are likely to become more prevalent because of  a 
number of  technical advances: 
DSP techniques and VLSI implementation will reduce the cost of the 
earth stations 
Digi~al compression techniques reduce the bandwidth required from 
what was once 64 kbls to (currently) 16 kb/s, with a potential reduction 
to 2.4 kb/s for mobiles 
Digital speech interpolation (DSI) further reduces the bandwidth 
required for the transmission of  speech by removing the redundancy, 
the gaps, from the speech. 
Taken together, these factors have the potential to make satellite telephony a 
viable option; the proposed LEO/MEO personal telephony networks, such as 
Motorola's Iridium, will all use a handheld earth station, much as today's 
terrestrial cellular telephone networks do, and promise to be ·only slightly more 
expensive to use.  This is in contrast to the current telephony networks, which 
are expensive to use and require a much bulkier earth station (nonnally a 
VSA  T), so that their mobility is limited. 
The well-developed terrestrial telephony infrastructure in developed countries 
clearly limits the potential of  satellite telephony, so that its principal 
application in those countries is in rural development.  Another potential use 
of satellite telephony is in links with areas where the terrestrial infrastructure 
is far less developed, such as links with Eastern Europe.  However, these 
limited uses meant that Europe and Japan, with their limited rural development 
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opportunities, were opposed to the allocation of bands to LEO/MEO satellite 
telephony systems at W  ARC '92. 
•  TV-DTH and TV Direct Broadcast by Satellite (DBS) services, which 
currently generate more than half of the European satellite communications 
revenue.  These services have seen a phenomenal growth since the beginning 
of the 1980s, and although their dominance is set to decline (to about a third of 
the total European revenues), they will still grow significantly over the next 
ten years. 
The Multiplexed Analogue Component (MAC) system has been introduced as 
a replacement for the older PAL system.  There are two European variations of 
the system, D-MAC and 02-MAC (which uses half the bandwidth of D-MAC, 
with some sacrifice of picture quality).  Note that, although D- and D2-MAC 
have some digital characteristics (notably digital sound and digital data), they 
do not offer digital TV, as the signal is still transmitted using FM.  No pure 
digital TV is yet available via satellite. 
Although pure digital TV (such as High Defmition TV (HDTV)) via satellite 
is likely to be commercially available by 2000, it is debatable what impact it 
will have; since most TV transmissions are either to cable heads (for 
distribution via. cable) or direct to home, existing standards (PAL, D-MAC) 
will be preserved for a significant time to come, and it is likely that initial 
users of digital1V will be limited to "occasional" users, such as satellite news 
gathering (SNG), video conferencing, distance learning and business 
television. 
Digital radio broadcasting, using the Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) 
standard, is likely to suffer from the same problem of  existing standards. 
Thus the digitisation of  television and radio broadcasting is unlikely to have a 
significant effect on the pressure on the RF spectrum over the next ten years. 
Data; business services have been available since the early 1980s, using Very 
Small Aperture Terminals (VSATs) for both one way and two way data 
communications.  Although the resources dedicated to business services is a 
small proportion of the total at the moment, this sector is set .to see the greatest 
growth over the next ten years. 
Broadband services, currently under development, are an important target as 
regards integration with terrestrial networks.  They will allow the integration 
of telephony, TV and data into a single, digital service, thus achieving the 
emerging target of multi-service support by a single transponder. 
Broadband services will require support for the A  TM and SDH protocols, 
which will require significant development in the areas of modulation and 
coding. 
The evolution of these satellite services has been supported by a number of 
technological developments: 
•  Earth stations have undergone a lot of developments, particularly the RF 
portion.  However, in bands above Ku band, there has been very little 
development, which clearly needs to be redressed if the higher frequency 
bands are to be exploited in the future 
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•  Circuit Multiplication Equipment (CME), which allows a greater number of 
circuits to be carried within the same bandwidth by means of compression 
techniques 
•  Access Schemes, which allow multiple users to access the same satellite 
transponder 
•  Satellites. in particular the development of co-ordination and networking 
techniques for constellations of LEO/MEO satellites. 
FUTURE TRENDS 
There are a number of technological trends which will have an influence on the orbit 
and frequency resources, principally in the following areas: 
•  digital signal processing (DSP) makes efficient use of the RF spectrum 
allocated, thus making available significantly greater potential bandwidth at a 
stroke 
•  the use ofLEOIMEO satellites will greatly reduce the pressure on the orbits 
resource, but will only serve to increase pressure on the RF spectrum 
•  new modulation techniques currently under development will considerably 
improve specbal efficiency, in tenns of  the bandwidth required to carry a 
certain throughput of data 
•  on-board processing (OBP) will allow satellites to exist in a higher 
interferaace environment, so that they can be placed in closer orbits (allowing 
GEO saldlites, for example, to be placed closer than 2· apart), thus increasing 
the po1eotial number of  satellites and therefore the pressure on the RF 
spectrum 
•  inter-satellite links (ISLs) will allow communication between satellites, 
thereby reducing the number of  satellites necessary and so easing the pressure 
on the RF spectrum.  ISLs, which will also rely on developments in OBP, are 
likely to have most impact on LEO and MEO satellites. 
The main technological development is, of  course, digitisation of transmission for RF 
services (e.g.: DAB, GSM and digital HD1V) leading to a convergence of 
telecommunications, broadcasting and other services.  Such convergence would be 
supported by means of broadband A  TM/SDH protocols, though the full bandwidth 
required to support ATM will not be available for at least ten years. 
This convergence calls into question the concepts of separate service categories 
applied in current regulatory frameworks.  Often technology evolution and market-led 
developments combine to demolish these artificial barriers, the classic example being 
the use of the FSS bands for DTH satellite TV broadcasting and the consequent 
convergence of  the FSS and BSS service types. 
There are some limitations to this convergence.  Satellite transponders that come into 
service over the next ten years will offer increasing OBP capabilities, so that 
increasingly complex personal telephony and business/data services can be supported 
with ease.  However, the use of such sophisticated transponders is not justified for 
TV  -DTH and DBS services, and so they are likely to remain separate, leading (in the 
short/medium lenD only) to specialised transponders; some specialised for TV, others 
for integrated (broadband) services.  In the longer term, with increased market 
penetration of digital1V services and their consequent _integration with personal 
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telephony and business/data services, the use of sophisticated transponders for 1V 
will become justified since the TV signal will require only a fraction of the 
(integrated) bandwidth. 
Therefore, the convergence of  TV and, to a lesser extent (due to the lower capital 
investment in equipment) radio with other satellite services is likely to be well behind 
the technical capability, and is not likely in the next ten years. 
SUMMARY 
It can be seen that there is increasing pressure on both orbit and frequency resources. 
Although exploitation of  LEOIMEO orbits will decrease the orbital slot pressure, the 
problem of scarcity of  RF spectrum is not going to go away; it can, however, be eased 
by suitable application of technology: 
•  DSP techniques will allow efficient use of the RF spectrum allocated 
•  digital compression will increase the number of  circuits that can be carried 
within a certain physical bandwidth 
•  new modulation techniques will further increase the spectral efficiency, 
making broadband technologies such as ATM and SDH feasible. 
Against such technological developments are the growing importance and acceptance 
of  standards, which is likely to slow down the introduction of innovative technology. 
The convergence of  satellite services, using broadband technologies and the 
digitisation of  TV and radio, may eventually greatly simplify the Radio Regulations 
by removing the distinctions between services.  However, this is a long term aim, 
since it is Unlikely that broadcast 1V will converge in the next ten years.  Until it 
does, the best that can be hoped for is the convergence into two types of  service; TV 
and the rest The one exception to this is the "occasional" user of  TV, such as  SNG, 
which will go digital in the short tenn (since there is no existing standards base which 
must be supported), and so can converge with the other digital services. 
Increasing pressure on the orbit and frequency resources, then, is being addressed by a 
number of technological means both in isolation and in concert.  Most of these 
technologies are expected to be in operational use in the late 1990s-2000. 
prj.179-EC DGXIII  Preface  6 
• • 
81/- History •  Development of SateiiHe Technologies  Bl/16 Sep 93 
1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1  OVERVIEW 
This document is intended as a briefing note on the history and development of  satellite 
technologies, and places particular emphasis on the impact of these technologies on the 
key physical resources used in satellite communications; the orbital slots into which 
satellites are placed, and the RF frequencies (and associated bandwidths) by means of 
which they communicate.  However, it is important to note the link between the two, 
since a communications satellite is inextricably linked with a set of RF frequencies. 
The International Telecommunications Union's (ITU's) method of allocation of  orbits 
and RF frequencies is discussed.  The importance of the nu-organised World 
Administrative Radio Conferences (W  ARCs) is also addressed; in particular, the most 
recent of these, W ARC '92, is discussed, notably with respect to the allocation of 
bandwidth for networks of  low earth orbit (LEO) personal communications satellites. 
The key technologies and the trends in those technologies (both current and future) are 
discussed, focusing on satellite orbits, signal processing techniques, intelligent satellites 
and broadband services.  The effects of  these technologies on the orbit and frequency 
resources are also assessed. 
1.2  PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The p~se  of this document is to provide background material on !}le history and 
development of  satellite technologies for non-technical readers, their impact on frequency 
and orbit resources, the allocation of  those resources, and to identify key technological 
and application trends. 
This document does not form a comprehensive description of  the applications of  satellite 
communications; nor does it attempt to specify how the EC could influence the allocation 
of the key resources; nor does it attempt to model the development of satellite 
communications or predict trends: the document's function is to report these trends. 
1.3  RELATED DOCUMENTS 
There are no related documents, other than the reference material outlined in the 
bibliography contained in this document. 
1.4  STRUCTURE 
This document is divided into five main sections, a summary of the document contents, a 
glossary of terms and a bibliography.  The main sections are as follows: 
•  INTRODUCTION, providing a brief overview of the document and its subjec~ 
describing its purpose and scope, listing related documents and providing a 
glossary of terms 
•  HISTORY, providing the historical context for the remainder of the document 
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•  RESOURCES, defining the frequency and orbit resources of satellite 
communications, with a brief description of the market allocation 
•  TECHNOLOGIES, describing the current trends in the technologies used in 
satellite communications and the services they support 
•  FUTURE TRENDS, identifying the key future trends in applications and 
technologies brought out from the previous sections and assessing their impact on 
the frequency and orbit resources. 
1.5  GLOSSARY 














Advanced Communications Technology Satellite, NASA's 
experimental satellite for the development of GSS transponders, 
OBP and DSP techniques. 
A technique whereby multiple users can access the same 
communications channel, by transmitting whenever the channel 
is clear, listening for collisions and re-transmitting (after a 
random period) when a collision is detected. 
Atlantic Ocean Region, one of  the three worldwide 
telecommunications regions defmed by the ITU. 
The point in an elliptical orbit at which a satellite is farthest away 
from the earth. 
One of  the ftrst major networks, developed by the Advanced  • 
Research Projects Agency of  the US Department of  Defense and 
which links may computers (particularly in research institutes 
and universities) from Hawaii to Sweden. 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode, a broadband 
networking/switching technology, usually layered on top of  SOH. 
A measure of the total transmission capacity of a device; in this 
case, a measure of the total RF capacity of a transponder. 
Binary PSK, an RF modulation technique in which a two-symbol 
alphabet is used, thus achieving lower susceptibility to 
interference than alphabets with more symbols, such as QPSK, 
but at the expense of lower data transfer rates. 
High bandwidth, high data rate. 
British Satellite Broadcasting. 
Broadcast Satellite Service, a type of transponder reserved for the 
broadcast of signals to multiple users. 
Code Division Multiple Access, a multiple access method using 
spread spectrum techniques. 
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CES  Coastal Earth Station, an earth station on the coast through which 
signals to/from an SES are transmitted to/received from a 
satellite.  This term is extensively used by lnmarsat. 
CME  Circuit Multiplication Equipment, which allows a greater number 
of  circuits to be carried within the same bandwidth by means of 
compression techniques. 
CME  Circuit Multiplication Equipment  Techniques, such as 
compression, which increase the apparent number of channels 
supported by the same bandwidth. 
DAB  Digital Audio Broadcasting, a system for the transmission of very 
high quality audio signals using spread spectrum techniques. 
DAMA  Demand Assigned Multiple Access, an access technique where 
bandwidth is assigned to a user, for access by, for example, 
IDMA or FDMA techniques, when the user demands it.  The 
assignment is requested on a single channel, using a technique 
such as Aloha, and is assigned for a fiXed period. 
DBS  DiJect Broadcast by Satellite, the broadcast of  data (using a BSS 
tnmsponder) directly to multiple users, rather than via a central 
terminal for distribution via cable.  Used for satellite television. 
See also Dnl. 
Downlink  1be  communications link through which RF signals are 
transmitted to an eanh station from the satellite.  _.,._. 
• 
DRS  Data Relay System, ESA's proposed DRSS. 
DRSS  Data Relay System Satellite, a system of  GEO satellites whose 
purpose is to relay signals from other satellites in, for example, 
LEOIMEO orbits, or from space vehicles such as ESA'  s Hennes 
or Ariane, or NASA's space shuttle. 
DRTS  Data Relay & Tracking System, Japan's proposed DRSS. 
DSI  Digital Speech Interpolation, a speech compression technique in 
which the redundancy (the gaps) is removed from speech 
channels. 
DSP  Digital Signal Processing, digital RF modulation techniques 
which replace analogue techniques, such as BPSK, QPSK and 
FSK, and allow much greater bandwidth efficiency. 
DTH  Direct To Home, the transmission of TV signals directly from the 
satellite to a tenninal at the home of the viewer, rather than to a 
central tenninal for distribution via cable.  This term is used, 
rather than DBS, when an FSS transponder is used (as is the case 
on the Astra satellite), rather than a BSS transponder. 
Earth Station  The piece of equipment by means of which a user carries out 
communication with the satellite. 
ESA  European Space Agency. 
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ETSI  European Technical Standards Institute. 
FCM  Fade Countermeasures, techniques for combating the effects of 
rain fade at higher RF frequencies. 
FDDI  Fiber Distributed Data Interface, a networking standard based on 
fiber optics. 
FDMA  Frequency Division Multiple Access, a satellite access technique 
in which multiple users access a single satellite transponder by 
each accessing it at a different frequency (within the bandwidth 
of the transponder). 
FLMPTS  Future Land Mobile Public Telephone System, a terrestrial 
mobile communications system that will not be fully defined 
until the year 2000, and which is in direct competition with 
satellite mobile telephone systems using LEO satellites. 
FM  Frequency Modulation, a modulation technique in which data is 
transmitted ,by modulating the frequency of  the carrier  . 
.I 
Footprint  The area of  the earth's surface that a satellite's transmissions can 
reach, as defmed by its orbit, the transponder power used and the 
antenna direction (and any shaping resulting from the use of an 
. ,  advanced antenna)  . 
FSK  Frequency Shift Keying, an RF modulation technique in which 
i 
symbols are used to represent the data being transmitted, with 
each symbol being represented by a frequency shifL 
FSS  Ftxed Satellite Service, a type of  transponder reserved for point 
to point communication between ftx~  earth stations. 
GEO  Geostationary Orbit, an orbit with an altitude of  35786 km, in 
which a satellite appears to be stationary over a single equatorial 
point on the earth's surface. 
GSS  GenCral Satellite Service, a newly defmed type of transponder, 
initially for experimental use on NASA's ACTS satellite, which 
offers integrated multiple services. 
HDTV  High Definition Television, an emerging set of television 
standards. 
HEO  Highly Elliptical Orbit, an elliptical orbit, such as the molnya 
orbit, whose apogee is 46300 krn and whose perigee is 1000 km. 
IDR  lntennediate Data Rate, a satellite access technique in which 
multiple users access a single satellite transponder using digital 
carriers separated by frequency division. 
t 
IFRB  International Frequencies Registration Board, part of the ITU, 
responsible for the allocation of orbits and frequencies to 
satellites. 
I 
IOL  Inter Orbit Link, a communications channel between satellites in 
different orbits, for example LEO to DRSS/GEO. 
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Internet Protocol, the network layer protocol originally developed 
in the early 1980s for use on  the Arpanet, and since adopted by 
many other networks and network standards (including FDDI). 
Integrated Services Digital Network, a networking technique 
which unifies data and voice communication into a single 
medium. 
Inter-Satellite Link, a technique using either RF or lasers for 
communication between satellites. 
International Telecommunications Union, the UN agency 
responsible for the worldwide regulation of  satellite 
communications. 
Low Earth Orbit, a satellite orbit between 500 and 1500 km. 
Line of  Sight, which needs to be maintained between a satellite 
and an eanhbound terminal if  communication is to be carried out. 
Multiplexed Analogue Components, a family of  TV signal 
transmission standards which includes C-MAC, D-MAC and 02-
MAC (a half-bandwidth version of  D-MAC, requiring some 
sacrifice in picture quality but more suitable for existing cable 
systems, particularly in France and Gennany). 
Multi-Beam Antenna, an advanced antenna iD which the beam is 
split into several sub-beams, each covering a specific 
geographical area and accessible separately by using a different 
frequency.  ' 
Mid Earth Orbit, an orbi.t higher than LEO, but not as high as 
GEO. 
Mobile Satellite Service, a type of transponder reserved for 
mobile communications. 
~·National  Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
On Board Processing, an emerging technology in which much of 
the routing of data takes place on board the satellite, rather than 
being carried on the earth.  · 
Personal Communication Network, usually a personal telephony 
network. 
The point in an elliptical orbit at which a satellite is closest to the 
earth. 
Phase Shift Keying, an RF modulation technique in which 
symbols are used to represent the data being transmitted, with 
each symbol being represented by a phase shift. 
Public Telecommunications Operator.  A PTf  that only deals in 
telecommunications.  There might be more than one PTO in a 
country. as is the case in the UK. 
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Post, Telegraph and Telephone, the national, normally state-
owned organisations that, until recently, controlled all satellite 
communications. 
Quadraphase PSK, an RF modulation technique in which a four-
symbol alphabet is used, thus allowing greater data transfer rates 
than alphabets with fewer symbols, such as BPSK, but at the 
expense of greater susceptibility to interference. 
Radiocommunications Agency, the UK licensing authority for 
the operation of telecommunications equipment and services 
(including satellite-based systems) within the UK. 
Radio Frequency. 
Single Channel Per Carrier, a technique whereby multiple users 
can share a transponder by each being allocated a separate 
channel within the total bandwidth. 
Synchronous Digital Hierarchy, a high speed networking 
architecture. 
Ship Earth Station, an earth station aboard a ship.  This term is 
extensively used by lnmarsat. 
Satellite Multi Servi~  a type of transponder, with very limited 
availability, capable of  handling multiple services. 
Satellite News Gathering, the use of  satellites for the 
transmission of news pictures from a camera to (for example) the 
home studio. 
Synchronous Optical NETwork, the American equivalent to the 
international SDH. 
A technique for the trans~ission of  signals by spreading them 
over the entire bandwidth of the receiver/transponder, with the 
signal only recoverable by means of a key, identifying those parts 
of the total bandwidth which make up the signal.  _ 
Specialised Satellite Service Operator, a type of UK licence 
granted for the operation of  satellite services.  Now largely 
bypassed by deregulation. 
Trelliss Coded Modulation, an RF modulation technique which 
offers superior spectral efficiency to mobile systems. 
Time Division Multiple Access, a satelJite access technique in 
which multiple users access a single satellite transponder by each 
accessing it at a different time. 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System, NASA's 
implementation of a DRSS. 
An earth station. 
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TES  Telephony Earth Station, an earth station used for telephony, 
Used as a product name by Hughes. 
Transponder  The piece of  satellite equipment which receives signals from an 
earth station on the uplink, amplifaes them, changes their 
frequency (norma11y a downshift) and re-transmits them on the 
downlink. 
Uplink  The communications link through which RF signals are 
transmitted to the satellite from an earth station. 
VR  Virtual Reality, which can be described as being inside a 
computer genereated world.  Once there, a user interacts with 
objects and/or other users, the lattec by means of broadband 
networks. 
VSAT  Very Small Aperture Terminal, a terminal which uses a  small 
(say lm) dish. 
WARC  World Administrative Radio Conference, the ITO-organised 
forum at which decisions about the allocations of the ·RF 
spectrum are made. 
WA  TIC  World Administrative Telephone and Telegraph Conference, the 
ITO-organised forum at which decisions about international 
terrestrial telecommunications are made. 
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2  HISTORY 
2.1  OVERVIEW 
A number of technological terms and abbreviations are used in this section, which are 
briefly explained in the glossary (§ 1.5) and more fully explained and analysed in later 
sections. 
2.1.1  Primitive Era 
Communication via satellite was frrst achieved in 1958, with a satellite called Score.  This 
satellite is best described as a delayed repeater, a voice message being received by the 
satellite from the earth and stored on tape for re-transmission.  President Eisenhower was 
the frrst person to use this technique, for a worldwide Christmas greeting. 
In 1960 Echo I was launched.  This was a 30 metre diameter passive reflector used to test 
propagation and transmission techniques.  However, such passive satellites had no 
commercial future because of the very higb powers needed and the low capacity 
achievable. 
Telstar, the fli'St true active communication satellite, was launched in 1962.  It was able to 
receive a signal transmitted to it in the 6 GHz band for downconversion, amplification 
and re-transmission in the 4 GHz band.  Soon after this satellite, Relay and then a further 
Telstar were launched.  All of these satellites were placed in low or medium altitude 
elliptical orbits, so that they were only visible across the Atlantic Ocean for less than one 
hour during each pass. 
The breakthrough in satellite communications came in July 1963, when Syncom n 
became the first satellite in near geostationary orbit (Syncom I having failed before it 
reached its orbital position).  Since its orbit had a 33 degree inclination, Syncom n  was 
not truly geostationary.  However, Syncom m  achieved a true geostationary orbit in 
August 1964. 
These early satellites paved the way for the subsequent fully commercial satellites. 
2.1.2  International Global Era 
1964-1970s 
Intelsat, the International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation, was set up by the 
world's Post, Telegraph and Telephone administrations (PTfs) in order to facilitate the 
commercial exploitation of space in a co-operative manner.  It is important to note the 
PITs' domination of the organisation, since this has, for many years, affected both the 
services offered by lntelsat and who they are available to. 
Soon after the formation of Intelsat, in 1965, the frrst commercial satellite, Early Bird 
(later renamed Intelsat I) was launched to form the initial space segment for lntelsat.  This 
satellite could support 240 telephone circuits, tripling the trans-Atlantic telephony 
capacity and made possible the first trans-Atlantic transmission of live television signals. 
At that time, satellite communications was PTT-dominated, with earth stations requiring 
30m dishes forming gateways into the P'ITs' networks.  Intelsat dominated the 
geosynchronous satellites.  Their satellites were above the major oceans only, and were 
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low power, with a global beam coverage (the beam covering the whole of the earth's 
hemisphere visible from the satellite's orbit, rather than with beams focused on the 
intended areas of communication, such as continental land masses).  They also operated 
only inC band (radio frequency (RF) bands are described in §3.2). 
The lntelsat satellites offered multiple telephony channels, accessed by means of 
frequency division multiple access (FDMA) techniques, and TV frequency modulation 
(FM) transmission. 
Since that time, Intelsat satellites have gone through a number of  generations (the latest 
being Intelsat VII), expanding from 240 telephony circuits or one TV channel on Intelsat I 
to some 30000 digital 64 kb/s bearer circuits plus a number of  TV channels on lntelsat -
VI. 
The commercial and regulatory challenges facing lntelsat will have an effect on the 
technical and operational characteristics of Intelsat services.  The economic harm co-
ordination procedures have been effectively abandoned for non-public switched services. 
Further deregulation and competition from other satellites ·win raise traffic.  The main 
economic impact on Intelsat will be to reduce the non-public switched traffic on Intelsat 
Current predictions are that lntelsat will run out of Atlantic Ocean region (AOR) 
bandwidth by 2003, even if  all orbital slots were used.  This may lead to separate (and 
different) satellites for public switched and other services (though this situation may be 
eased by expansion of Ka band services). 
There will be S VIs in orbit soon and there are 7 VWVII-As on order.  A single Ku-band 
only satellite was launched in 1992.  A least two more (probably Vll-As) will be ordered. 
The technical developments (described in more detail in §4 and §5) likely to affect 
lntelsat are: bandwidth efficient modulation, channel coding and processing, additional 
frequency bands, more frequency reuse, more orbital slots, greater use of time division 
multiple access (TDMA), greater effective power, on-board processing (OBP), inter-
satellite links (ISLs) and beam hopping.(Jefferis, 1992) 
2.1.3  Domestic Era 
1970s-1980 
Just after Early Bird (lntelsat I) was launched, Russia launched their fust communications 
satellite in the Molnya series, so establishing the first regional satellite communications 
system.  This was followed by the Russian Stationsar system and the Indonesian Palapa 
system, followed by domestic systems, of which the Canadian Anik was the ftrS~ 
followed shortly by numerous US systems and others in various parts of the world.  All of 
these systems owned their own satellites, and were quite independent of  Intelsat. 
During this period, Intelsat earth stations became smaller (1 0-13m), with networks being 
closed (private).  Country transmission distribution was the norm, with data being 
transmitted within a country by the relevant P1T.  It became possible to lease a 
transponder from Intelsat, thus allowing greater flexibility.  Further, the global beam 
coverage of transponders was replaced by shaped beams, and the use of dual-polarisation 
allowed frequency re-use, thus doubling the previous transmission capacity. 
The principal services available were l/2 transponder TV (FM) and single channel per 
carrier (SCPC) telephony, though some data services were starting. 






2.1 .4  Business 
Early 1980s 
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Earth stations further reduced in size, to 3m.  Again, networks remained closed, though 
usage was expanded to include 1DMA and FDMA access techniques.  IDMA was 
introduced into the international network. 
For the frrst time, earth stations were allowed to be placed on customer's premises, rather 
than customers being required to access the services via the PlT, using the PTT'  s earth 
station. 
Additional regional systems came into being, including the European Eutelsat systems 
and the Middle Eastern Arabsat, which owned their own satellites. 
The use of  Ku band (RF bands are described in §3.2) frequencies, together with split 
beams, allowed the use of  smaller dishes, down to 3m in size.  Such stations could be 
located on users' premises, thus eliminating the terrstriallinks associated with previous 
systems, and allowing closed networks to be set up outside the control of PITs. The 
extension into Ku band did bring with it more problems, such as higher rain fade. 
2. 1.5  Television 
1980s 
Eutelsat and Intelsat transponders became taken up with lV, principally with distribution 
to cable heads, with distribution to consumers being via cable systems.  However, Astra 
in Europe launched a 1V-Direct To Home (TV-Dlll) service from ftxed satellite service 
(FSS) ~nders,  using 60cm dishes. 
Direct Broadcast by Satellite (DBS) services using broadcast satellite service (BSS) 
transponders were launched by British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB), TV-SAT and IDFI. 
BSB's service, which was later to be taken over and terminated by a competitor using the 
Astra satellite, used a 30cm squarial (sqwue aerial). 
The Multiplexed Analogue Component (MAC) system was introduced, and heralded as a 
replacement for the older PAL system.  There are two European variations of this system, 
called D-MAC and 02-MAC (which uses half the bandwidth of  0-MAC, with come 
sacrifice of  picture quality).  The EEC was later to try to make all TV-01H services 
MAC; so far, this has failed. 
Note that, although 0- and 02-MAC have some digital characteristics (notably digital 
sound and digital data), they do not offer digital TV, as the signal is still transmitted using 
FM.  No pure digital TV is yet available via satellite, all current transmissions are 27 
MHz wide.  Further, although pure digital TV (such as High Definition 1V (H01V)) via 
satellite is likely to be commercially available by 2000, it is debatable what impact it will 
have; since most TV transmissions are either to cable heads (for distribution via cable) or 
direct to home, existing standards (PAL, D-MAC) will be preserved for a significant time 
to come, and it is likely that initial users of  digital TV will be limited to "occasional" 
users, such as satellite news gathering (SNG), video conferencing, distance learning and 
business television (Rogers, 1992). 
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During this period, international services became more digital, using Intermediate Data 
Rate (IDR) and TDMA techniques for access by multiple users simultaneously.  IDR uses 
separate digital channels sharing a transponder by frequency division, whilst IDMA 
requires users to each access the transponder at a different, pre-assigned time.  Like IDR, 
IDMA uses a digital baseband. 
The 3m size of  earth stations failed in Europe, due to the strict regulatory environment. 
Meanwhile, dish sizes for very small aperture terminal (VSA  T) services were falling in 
the USA, and most were in the range 1-3m. 
Deregulation began in Europe with the issuing of  Special Satellite Service Operator 
(SSSO) licences in the UK to six operators, plus BT and Mercury.  These licences 
allowed the holders to transmit data.  However, the passing of time has seen significant 
deregulation, and an ssso licence is now largely irrelevant, and there are now 15 
European satellite service operators, including Eutelsat and lntelsaL  Figure 2-1, below, 
indicates the revenue split between these operators, which, in 1991, amounted to a total of 
600 MECU. According to a report by CIT Research, it is anticipated that this will rise to 
approximately 1340 MECU over the next ten years. 
zoo 
150 
a 100  I&J 
~ 
so 
Eutelsat  lntelsat  SES  The rest 
Fi~ure  2-1: European Satellite Operator Revenues 
(1991) 
The division of this revenue into the various service types is addressed in section 2.2, 
below. 
At this time. transponder access was opened up to any signatory in Europe.  The PITs 
(Eutelsat) did introduce the Satellite Multi-Service (SMS) satellite system, but basically 
as a way to offer leased lines where ground circuits were not available, and with no 
serious promotion to attract users, no useful discounts for off-peak hour use, no real 
encouragement for potential users to join in large scale experiments in the way some 
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computer frrms will give computers to laboratories as contributions to joint research 
projects (Hine, 1989). 
VSAT services, using 1-2m dishes, started in Europe.  Despite regulatory problems, 
VSATs are gradually becoming established.  VSATs are mainly used for business 
services, particularly data and private telephony (since regulatory restrictions have largely 
forbidden connection with the public networks).  Experience has shown that VSA  T use in 
Europe follows that in the US, with a suitable lag, with the result that the use of VSA  Ts in 
the US is widely seen as a useful predictor for Europe.  Further, the regulatory situation in 
Europe is highly fluid, with a quickening pace of liberalisation in many countries 
allowing a greater range of services to be realis~cally envisaged. 
Eastern Gennany is expected to account for more than half of  all installed VSAT 
networks in Europe by the year 2000.  Renault installed a VSAT network in eastern 
Gennany and found it to be so successful that they are now planning to link all of their 
dealers in Europe with a satellite system carrying data and business television. 
At present, Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland 
refuse to licence private VSAT networks.  The situation is changing and Spain, Italy and 
Greece are expected to liberalise shortly.  Today, it is estimated that there are 65-70 
operational networks in Europe comprising 2,500 interactive tenninals.  This is expected 
to grow to 130,000 in the next ten years (Newn;~an, 1992). 
Digital operation, using Digital Signal Pr(!)CesSing (DSP) techniques, were fU'St used for 
satellite communications during this period. 
2.1.7  Mobiles 
Late 1980s-1990s 
The International Maritime Satellite Organisation, lnmarsat, introduced the global 
maritime system in 1984, which initially used dedicated Marecs satellites and special 
payloads added to some of the lntelsat V satellites to provide voice and data 
communications with ships using FM. The services were expanded to serve aircraft 
during the mid-1980s, offering 9.6 kbls voice and data, and a service was launched for 
land mobiles in the 1990s.  A new service, Inmarsat's Standard C service, offering a low 
bit rate (600- 1200 bls) was introduced for messaging applications.  Inmarsat have 
recently launched the Standard M service, offering speech at 4.8 kb/s and data using a 
briefcase-sized telephony earth station. 
lnmarsat became operational in 1982 and attracted 1,500 customers in its frrst y~. This 
grew to 18,000 in 1991 and is expected to reach lm by the turn of the century.  Until 
1989, Inmarsat operated only analogue telephone and telex services (lnmarsat-A), but 
then introduced the fully digital Inmarsat-C and Aeronautical services.  Over the next  . 
couple of years, the digital replacement for lnmarsat-A (lnmarsat-B) and the cheaper and 
smaller lnmarsat-M services will be introduced.  lnmarsat has now embarked on Project 
21, aimed at introducing a lower cost, hand portable, service. This service, the Inmarsat-P 
service, will compete with the Motorola Iridium and TRW Odyssey services, and is 
discussed further in §2.1.8  . 
The services will be provided by means of Inmarsat'  s own satellites.  Communication 
with Ship Earth Stations (SESs) is via spot beams, offering global coverage, using L band 
(RF bands are described in §3.2).  Communication with the Coastal Earth Stations (CESs) 
uses C band. 
Inmarsat contracted for its 3rd generation of spacecraft in January 1991.  The satellites are 
under construction with first launch scheduled for 1994.  The prime contractor is GE-
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Astro with the payload from Matra-Marconi.  The main design innovations are spot beam 
reconfigurability and reconfigurable channelisation. 
There are three new capabilities being built in to the payload: C band-C band 
communication for administration, L band-L band communication for single hop mobile 
communications (for search and rescue), and an L-band navigation channel for new 
radiodetennination services. 
2.1.8  PCNs and LEO/MEO 
1990s 
There is also an increasing R&D trend away from Geostationary (GEO) satellites towards 
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites and eventually to Mid Earth Orbit (MEO) satellites, 
using constellations of satellites and techniques such as inter-satellite communication to 
provide the same services as GEO satellites more cheaply and with greater capacity (for 
reasons discussed in §3.1.1).  This trend will inevitably be followed by commercial 
systems. 
Such LEO I MEO satellites particularly lend themselves to services such as personal 
telephony (PCNs) and store-and-forward messaging systems.  Services such as TV-DTii 
and broadcast I interactive data are clearly better provided by GEO satellites, with their 
. larger, static footprint  · 
There are a number of proposals for both worldwide and regional personal 
communications system using the US bands and LEOs.  The so-called "big LEOs" are 
m~y  US-proposed (Iridium, Odyssey, Globalcomm etc) whilst a number of  "little 
LEOs," offering low-rate data, have been proposed by various organisations to operate at 
140  I 150 MHz. 
According to the original proposal, Iridium is a worldwide, digital, satellite-based, 
·cellular, personal communications system primarily intended to provide commercial, 
low-density, mobile service via portable, naobile, or transportable user units, employing 
low-proflle antennas, to millions of users throughout the world.  Calls can be made and 
received anywhere in the world with a personal, portable unit.  Sixty-six small (320 Kg), 
smart satellites are intemetted to fonn the network's backbone.  Small, battery-powered, 
cellular-telephone-like user units communicate directly with the satellites.  Gateways 
(eanh stations) interface from the satellites to the terrestrial networks. 
The L-Band links are dictated by the available technology that can provide link closure 
between the small satellites and the ponable user units.  The L-Band network employes a 
37-hexagonal cell pattern from each satellite.  The cells are designed for independent 
operation and each employs a different amount of power to close the links. 
This reuse pattern offers part of the spectral efficiency realized with Iridium -
worldwide, the same channel can be reused over 200 times.  The modulation form is 
QPSK and the L-Band multiplexing scheme is a combination of  IDMA and FDMA. 
Over an area the size of the United States' 48 contiguous states, forty cells are formed 
with an average of 2 KHz of spectrum needed per usable channel (Leopold, 1990). 
Further, in response to Iridium, Inmarsat has proposed the Standard P system for personal 
communication via satellite, with an in-service date of 2000.  This system will use either 
MEO or GEO satellites. 
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Such new "Satellite PCN'' systems may offer synergy with the terrestrial mobile systems, 
such as: 
•  Pan-European digital cellular radio system (GSM) 
•  UK Personal Communication Network (PCN) 
•  Cf2 and DECf cordless telephone 
•  ERMES paging network 
•  Digital pan-European PMR trunking 
•  Standard C 
•  Prodat and EutelTRACS, satellite-based pan-European mobile messaging systems 
•  EMS. 
Although at frrst sight it would appear that all of  theSe systems are in competition, in truth 
each has special features which makes it distinct from the others so that they should be 
viewed as complementary.  Together, they.provide an integrated, global, mobile PCN, 
offering a wide range of services from store and forward messaging to personal 
telephony, at a range of  costs that can be related to the flexibility of the system. 
The synergy with these systems will certainly inftuence the development of these third 
generation systems.  The LEO satellites will be very complex, requiring on-board 
proCessing (OBP), inter-satellite links (ISLs) and a much increased spectral efficiency. 
The latter will be achieved by the use of OSP and code division multiple acess (COMA) 
techniques.  Although one can  ·never be absolutely certain that a system will work until it 
flies, there is little doubt of the potential success of  LEO systems.  The development of 
suitable COMA multiple access schemes may be key. 
2.1.9  Intelligent Satellites 
1990s-2000 
Recent developments in satellite technology indicate a trend to OBP, which will greatly 
enhance the capacity for and the sophistication of the services offered.  This will be 
accompanied by the use of DSP techniqu~ in space, as well as on-board switching and 
ISLs. 
These technological advances will significantly change the network concepts, merging 
fiXed and mobile services into one, supporting multi-rate digital communication systems 
and carrying out the switching on the satellite.  Further, the interference affecting the 
signals will become much less of a problem as a result of the use of OBP and COMA 
techniques. 
2.2  SERVICES 
As the satellites have developed, so too has the range of services supported.  Initially, 
these were limited to trunk telephony, linking P1Ts, and live TV links.  This has been 
expanded to cover a wide range, including: 
•  personal telephony 
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•  Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSA  T).  Currently there are approximately 17 
000 terminals installed; according to a report by CIT Research, this is predicted to 
rise to  130 000 over the next ten years 
• 
• 
Satellite News Gathering (SNG) 
TV-Direct To Home (TV-DTii) 
•  mobile data 
•  broadband data. 
CIT Research has recently published figures for the revenues generated by satellite 
commmunications in Europe.  The total revenue in 1991 was 600 MECU, which is 
predicted to rise to 1340 MECU over the next ten years.  The split between the various 
services is illustrated in Figure 2-2; note the anticipated decline in the dominance of  TV, 
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Fip~re  2-2: Revenue Distribution 
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All of these satellite services, in total, are only a tiny fraction of the telecommunications 
market, which is dominated by terrestrial telecommunications.  Public 
Telecommunications Operator (PTO) revenue from Eutelsat is less than 1% of total PTO 
revenue.  Satellite communications revenues in Europe will rise to no more than 2-3% of 
the total by the year 2000.  Even in the USA, where use of satellite communications is far 
more established, satellite communications revenues are only 3.5% of the total (Milman, 
1991). 
Satellite communications services all make use of satellite transponders, which are of one 
of the following (W  ARC-defined) types: 
•  Fixed Satellite Services (FSS) 
•  ?\1obile Satellite Services (MSS) 
•  Broadcast Satellite Services (BSS). 
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While it had been intended at a global level that a service such as TV-DTI-1 would use a 
BSS transponder, this is not, however, a cast-iron rule; for example, the FSS transponders 
on the Astra satellite are used for TV-DTII services.  Such practices give rise to potential 
interference problems, as described in a later section.  Strictly speaking, it may be argued 
that this use of an FSS transponder is prohibited by the provisions of the I1U Convention 
and the I11J Radio Regulations, whereby  DTII reception of FSS services would be said 
to consitute "unauthorised interception of radiocommunications not intended for the use 
of the general public"; but the distinction between BSS and FSS has become blurred, and 
the two can be said to be converging (Raison, 1992).  Indeed, there can be little doubt but 
that a DTII facility such as the Astra system intends direct reception. 
These services all fall into one of  three classes: 
•  point-to-point, used, for example, in personal telephony 
•  point-to-multipoint, used for TV and multimedia services, such as education and 
training 
•  multipoint-to-point, used in data collection. 
2.3  REGULATION 
2.3.1  (jl~l 
The regulation of the use of  satellite communications obviously needs to be undertaken 
on a worldwide basis, and this is done by the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU).  The I1U has 164 member states and was founded in 1865; consequently, it has 
been involved in the regulation of telecommunications since its earliest days. 
The InJ became an agency of the United Nations in 1947, with the following stated 
objectives: 
•  to maintain and extend international co-operation for the improvement and 
rational use of telecommunications 
•  to promote the development of technical facilities and their most efficient 
operation, and to improve the efficiency of telecommunications and increase their 
usefulness 
•  to harmonise the actions of nations in attaining these common goals. 
The structure of the ITU was changed on 1st March 1993, in order to reflect the needs of 
the modem, more commercially-oriented environment  This includes allowing 
commercial membership.  However, the role of such an intergovernmental organisation in 
a  global business that is overwhelmingly a private sector business has been questioned by 
senior industry figures. 
The new structure of the ITU is shown in Figure 2-3, below. 
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Fjp~re 2-3:  ITU Structure 
Of  the various entities making up the nu,  a number are of  particular relevance to this 
report: 




W  ARC, the World Administrative Radio Conference, which allocates 
bands of  RF frequencies to services, including satellite services 
W A  ITC, the World Administrative Telephone and Telegraphy 
Conference. 
W ARCs are now held every two years.  The most recent W ARC conference, 
W ARC 92, held in February 1992 in Torremolinos, will be discussed later in this 
document 
The Telecommunications Development Bureau (BOT), which is made up of 
development conferences and the activities of the bureau itself.  Emphasis is 
placed on presenting to developing countries the range of policy and structural 
options that would lead to greater resources for telecommunications development. 
TheStandardisation Bureau studies technical, operating and tariff questions and 
issues recommendations on them, with a view to standardising 
telecommunications on a worldwide basis. 
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The Radiocommunication Bureau has integrated the CCIR activities relating to the 
efficient management of the radio-frequency spectrum in terrestrial and space 
radiocommunications, along with the activities of the International Frequency 
Registration Board (IFRB).  The IFRB continues to exist as an independent entity 
within the Radiocommunication Bureau, though it has become a part-time body. 
The IFRB allocates frequencies, within the W  ARC-defined bands, to particular 
services.  Technically, IFRB adjudicates on new frequency allocations to decide if 
they confonn to ITU regulations.  The IFRB has divided the world into three 




Europe, Middle East, Africa, USSR, Mongolia 
North/South America, Greenland 
India, Iran, SE Asia, Australasia, Japan, China, Pacific. 
The IFRB is also responsible for the daily management of the frequency spectrum, 
as applied to satellite communications and the various services to be provided 
worldwide.  Every country submits applications for frequency allocations, which 
are checked by the IFRB to see if  they confonn to regional agreements as. well as 
the ITU regulations; as part of  this work, the IFRB co-ordinates information about 
current interference problems. 
Finally, the IFRB, on behalf of  the mJ, is responsible for the allocation of orbits 
to satellites.  For example, the geosynchronous orbit (GEO) is clearly a limited 
resource, since satellites must,·with current technology, be spaced at least 2· apart 
in order to limit interference, and so the co-ordinated allocation of  orbits is vital. 
Over the next ten years, technological advances are likely to allow the closer 
placement of  satellites in the geosynchronous orbit, thus increasing the overall 
capacity.  However, it is difficult to be precise about how close they might be 
placed, and this is not felt to be a vital point, due to the decreasing dominance of 
the GEO orbit and the rise of the low- and mid-earth orbits (LEO I MEO). 
Note that although the W  ARC allocates generic bands, users still need licences to operate 
in these bands from the countries that they wish to operate to and from; for example, in 
the USA, licences must be obtained from the_FCC, and in the UK from the 
Radiocommunications Agency (RA).  The FCC has recently allocated US mobile satellite 
service ("MSS") spectrum consistent with W  ARC 92;  and is presently deciding a 
licensing regime for ubig LEOs". 
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Figure 2-4. ITU Regions 
2.3.2  Regional/National 
In many parts of the world, including Europe, a major barrier to development of  satellite 
services has been the local regulatory environment  A restrictive regul~tory environment 
has been maintained by governments both for their own purposes (gov~rnments like to 
have con~l  over cross-border telecommunications) and under pressure from the P1Ts  ~,. 
(cross-border traffic is historically the most profitable).  It appears that this restraint is 
now being relaxed, particularly throughout Europe, so that the level of use of the 
technology may be set to escalate rapidly. 
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3  RESOURCES 
The principal components of a satellite communications system are: 
•  the satellite, consisting of the platform and a number of transponders 
•  the earth stations, which transmit to the satellite via the uplink and receive from 
the satellite via the downlink. 
Note that the downlink frequency is normally lower than the uplink frequency. 
There are a number of physical resources which limit the worldwide capacity for satellite 
communications.  These are: 
•  the satellites, the potential orbits for which are clearly limited (since, using current 
technology, GEO satellites must be separated by a minimum of 2· if  interference 
is to be minimised, thus giving a potential of 360./2. = 180 slots), together with 
the number and types of transponder carried by each 
•  the frequencies used to communicate with the satellites, the available range of 
which is limited by technology (the techniques for exploiting higher and higher 
frequencies require constant development) and physics (only certain frequency 
ranges penetrate the earth's ionosphere; these are described in §3.2) . 
.  .  .  .  .  : 
These resources and the factors affecting their availability are discussed in the following 
sections. 
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3.1  SATELLITE RESOURCES 
3.1.1  Orbit Resources 
The orbits used by communications satellites are illustrated in Figure 3-1, below, and are 





Low Earth (LEO) 
Fieure 3-1:  Satellite Orbits 
Geostationary 
(GEO) 
The geostationary orbit (GEO), in which a satellite has a 24 hour period (so that it 
remains over the same equatorial point on the earth's surface), has an altitude of  35786 
km.  This is the most common orbit for telecommunications satellites, since it provides 
continuous coverage of  a particular geographical area.  However, it is impossible to cover 
the high latitudes from this orbit. 
The molnya orbit, an example of a highly elliptical orbit (HEO), allows the high latitudes 
to be covered.  It is an eccentric orbit, with an apogee of 40000 km and a perigee of 1000 
km.  Satellites placed in this orbit have an 8- 12 hour period, so that .three satellites 
suitably phased (in the same orbit) can provide 24 hour coverage for the high latitudes. 
This orbit was extensively used by the old Soviet Union, to allow coverage of the extreme 
north of the country, by the Molnya series satellites. 
HEOs are actively under study in Europe; Archimedes is an ESA programme concerning 
the use of HEOs to provide voice communications in Europe. To date; feasibility studies 
have been conducted and these indicate technical and economic viability.  By using HEO 
orbits an LOS path between the user and the satellite can be maintained even at northerly 
latitudes.  BAe has led all of the key studies and has recently been concerned with the 
extension of the service from mobile telephony to include satellite sound broadcasting 
(Stuart, 1992). 
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A variant of the molnya orbit is the tundra orbit, with an apogee of 46300 km and a 
perigee of 25250 km.  However, this orbit is rarely used. 
The low earth orbits (LEOs), with an altitude of between 500 and 1500 km, are used by 
telecommunications satellites for specific purposes, such as navigation, store and forward, 
and increasingly for personal communications (for example, the Iridium system for 
personal telephony).  Satellites placed in these orbits have a short period, and, if they are 
placed at an angle to the earth's equator, will be visible from any point on the earth's 
surface for a short time. 
An additional orbit type, the mid earth orbit (MEO), is likely to find similar uses to the 
LEO orbit in the near future.  Comparing satellites in LEO/MEO orbits with those in 
GEO orbits, we find that: 
•  LEO/MEO satellites are smaller and cheaper (for example, because lower RF 
power is needed, since they are closer to the earth) they are cheaper to launch (a 
lower orbit requires less energy to reach, plus multiple satellites _can be launched 
at once because they are smaller) and launch insurance is cheaper.  However, there 
are a lot of them  - more in LEO than in MEO 
•  Because GEO satellites are mature, they are lower risk, and fewer satellites are 
required to provide the same coverage. 
The GEO orbit is now e~tremely  crowded, with 2• spaclng between satellites.  The I1U 
have a well-established procedure for allocating GEO orbit position which requires co-
operation between parties, so that, for example, a European lobby could effectively kill 
any pf9posal  ..  However, it is fair to say that orbits have never really been looked at as a 
resource, despite several suggestions to this effect, probably because there has never been 
a shortag~  before.  · ·  · 
There are no mechanisms as yet for the allocation of  orbits for LEO and MEO satellites. 
It is unlikely that·progress on this point will be made before the next WARC  co~erence. 
Although Appendices 28 and 29 of the nu  Radio Regulations allow reasonable 
interference planning at the moment, there are potential problems in TV  -Direct to Home 
·(TV  -DTII) services using FiXed Satellite Services (FSS) satellites, such as Astra.  The 
expansion into LEO and MEO orbits will require new interference planning which is not 
currently in place, for example, within and between orbits (such as between systems of 
LEO satellites, or between LEO and GEO satellites). 
3.1.2  Transponder Resources 
The traditional satellite transponder is a conceptually simple device.  It takes a signal 
received from the uplink, amplifies it, changes the frequency (normally a downshift) and 
re-transmits it on the downlink. 
However, developments in technology are gradually changing this picture.  For example, 
greater numbers of users can be accommodated through the use of spot beams.  Spot 
beams replace a transponder's wide footprint on the earth's surface with a number of 
much smaller spots, which together cover the same area of the earth as the single 
transponder.  A transponder therefore becomes a collection of a number of receivers and a 
number of transmitters, rather than one of  each.  In this way, different uoups of users can 
use the same frequencies (frequency reuse), provided they are in different spots, thus 
increasing the overall capacity of the system and the overall spectral efficiency. 
Other developments in satellite technology include on-board processing (OBP), which 
clearly will be needed in order to implement, amongst other services, spot beams (since 
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users can move between spots, any data for specific users must be routed to a particular 
spot); and the replacement of RF modulation techniques with digital signal processing 
(DSP).  OBP allows flexible routing between spot beams and the regeneration of digital 
signals (analgous to the amplification and removal of  intereference in analogue signals) 
on the satellite., whilst DSP will be used on board satellites for networking, modems and 
codecs, and for on-board switches. 
3.2  FREQUENCY RESOURCES 
3.2.1  Bands 
3.2.1.1  Description 
Satellite communications uses the microwave frequencies, from 0.9 GHz upwards. 
However, not all frequencies above 0.9 GHz are available, since the earth's ionosphere is 
impenetrable at many frequencies.  There are, however, a number of windows, and these 
windows (bands) are named and divided between civil-and military satellite 
communications. 
The frequency bands cUrrently used in civil satellite communications are as follows (the 
use of  each is addressed later, and is summarised in tenus of  service type in Appendix B, 
and in tenns of  application in Appendix C): 
Name  Frequency 
Lband  l-2GHz 
Sband  2-4GHz 
Cband  . 4-60Hz 
Kuband  10- 140Hz 
Ka band  20.:.30GHz 
The capacity of  each of these bands can generally be said to be increasing, since it 
depends principally on technological developments. 
The C, Ku and Ka bands are intended for general telecommunications applications (FSS), 
although BSS transponders also use the Ku band and are dedicated to broadcast 
applications. 
MSS services use the L and S. bands, though S-hand is also used for telemetric control of 
the satellite itself.  The communication characteristics in these bands are not well known 
over all elevation angles, which is clearly a consideration for LEO and MEO satellites. 
Further, there has been no analysis of the wideband perfonnance characteristics, which is 
needed for COMA and Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB). 
Consideration needs to be given to the extension of the bands within these areas and on 
new bands above Ka band.  This is the subject of current research, as described in §4.2. 
Note that exploitation of higher frequencies has always been limited by technology, so 
that it has always been the lower frequencies that have been exploited ftrst.  Good 
knowledge of propagation up to 30/40 GHz is now available; fade countermeasures are 
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currently being researched and should be operational by the mid 1990s.  Little data is 
available on the use of Ka bands for mobiles; again, this is the subject of research and 
experimentation. 
In this context, NASA is developing the Advanced Communications Technology Satellite 
(ACfS), which is expected to offer multiple communications services via a single 
platform.  At W ARC '92, the US instigated the defmition of the General Satellite Service 
(GSS), to match the characteristics of ACTS, with uplink frequencies of29.5-30 GHz, 
and downlink frequencies of 19.7-20.2 GHz. 
As is described in a following section, the lower frequencies are more subject to terrestrial 
interference, whilst the higher frequencies are more subject to atmospheric interferenCe. 
For this reason, the choice of band to be used in a panicular geographical area depends on 
the physical characteristics of that area.  Consequently, many models of satellite 
communication are not generally applicable. 
3.2.1.2  Allocation 
The allocation of  frequency bands to services is carried out by the various W  ARCs.  The 
most recent of these was W ARC '92, held in Torremolinos, Spain, where it was felt that 
the key challenge was to protect existing services, whilst enabling new technologies to 






the allocation of  spectrum to mobile satellite services, particularly for the new 
LEO/MEO satellite systems such as Motorola's proposed Iridium mobile 
telephony system, which is to use 66 LEO satellites to provide worldwide 
coverage, and similar systems planned by a number of organisations, including 
Loral, Qualcomm, TRW and Irunarsat. 
· Frequencies in the band 1.5 - 2.5 GHz were allocated for use by these new 
LEO/MEO systems, with some bands not being available before 2005.  Limited 
spectrum in the band 1.61-1.6265 GHz was made available for systems that are 
intended to enter service during the 1990s, such as Iridium.  Since this could cause 
interference with the Russian Glasnoss satellite navigation system, it is likely that 
such systems will be required to use lower power than desirable.  The desire of 
other nations to develop other systems could also cause problems.  European 
nations and Japan were unenthusiastic about the US proposal, since they have no 
large, sparsely populated regions that could not be served by conventional mobile 
cellular phones. 
the "earmarking", rather than allocation,,of spectrum for the Future Land Mobile 
Public Telephone System (FLMPTS) above 1.9 GHz.  This eannarking does not 
preclude the use of the spectrum by other technologies, should they need it This 
approach was taken because of the speculative nature of FLMPTS, whose system 
specifications are not likely to be fully developed before the year 2000 
satellite sound broadcasti·ng (by systems such as DAB) received new allocations 
the definition of GSS, as described above  . 
Modulation 
Clearly, if the signal is to carry data, it must be modulated.  The two principal methods 
currently in use are Phase Shift Keying (PSK) and Frequency Shift Keying (FSK).  Since 
FSK is rather less power efficient, PSK is used, in one of two variants: 
•  Binary PSK (BPSK) 
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•  Quadraphase PSK (QPSK). 
Although PSK variants with more phase states exist, they are more prone to degradation, 
and so far have not been used. 
BPSK has a two symbol alphabet (using one bit per phase symbol) where both symbols 
have the same frequency, but have a relative phase shift of 180 degrees with respect to 
each other.  Because it spreads the transmitted energy over a wider bandwidth, BPSK 
offers the best resilience to phase noise, but it is not as spectrally efficient as the larger 
symbol alphabet schemes such as QPSK. 
QPSK uses two bits per symbol and has four phase states.  It offers double the bandwidth 
efficiency of  BPSK, but is more sensitive to phase variations and additive noise. 
Consequently, it is more difficult and expensive to implement successfully, though it is 
still used extensively.  · 
Within Europe, Eutelsat have. nominated a small number of  transponders as Satellite 
Multi Service (SMS) transponders, which can be accesSed using either BPSK or QPSK. 
Aside from these restrictions, there are a number of  technical reasons, relating to power, 
interference and intennodulation, that mean that not all transponders are  ~uitable for 
access using BPSK or QPSK. . 
Mobile systems require more spectrally efficient modulation schemes and, despite the 
greater use of  linear amplifiers in mobiles, also require modulation schemes that will not 
regenerate the sidebands to cause adjacent chanocl interference when used with non-
linear amplifiers.  Such schemes as 0-QPSK and MSK are in use, as well as 7C/4 shifted 
PSK. 
More spectrally-efficient modulation schemes, such as multi-bit QI\M, are needed for  ~ 
broadband transmission (for eJCample, SDH over ATM) that have not yet been developed 
for use with satellite systems. ·  · 
For mobile systems, the greater SPecttal efficiency needed. will come rrOm using Trellis-
coded modulation (TCM). 
Modems are increasingly being implemented using digital signal processing (DSP) 
techniques, which allow better perfonnance and a degree of  flexibility in changes 
between schemes. 
3.2.3  Interference 
There are three primary sources of  interference which affect the RF signals to and from 
the satellite:  · 
•  Cosmic noise, the general background RF noise of the universe, which reduces the 
signal-to-noise ratio of the signal 
•  Terrestrial RF noise, which is entirely the result of human activities.  The 
principal sources are: 
terrestrial radio transmissions, sharing the frequency bands used by 
communications satellites 
electric motors, such as those in various domestic appliances 
sparks, as used in car engines 
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direct RF emissions, such as those from the cathode ray tubes of 
televisions. 
Thus it is clear that terrestrial RF noise is likely to be worst near cities.  For this 
reason, the lower frequency bands (L-band and below), which are particularly 
susceptible to terrestrial RF noise, can be difficult to use in areas of high 
population density. 
The use of C-hand in the UK is a problem due to the large number of  closely 
packed C-hand terrestrial radio links and satellite uplinks; in the USA, where C-
hand is widely used, they are not so closely packed, and radio relays use higher 
frequencies. 
•  Atmospheric effects, principally caused by water vapour (including cloud) and 
rain.  This can result in: 
attenuation of the signal 
refraction 
depolarisation. 
There are ·~ther atmospheric affects, including those caused by airborne dust from 
volcanic eruptions, dust storms etc.  However, these have been found to have a 
relatively minor affect on the signal. 
The higher frequency bands are more susceptible to the effects of rain and water 
vapour, so that, for example, Ka band may not be appropriate for use in areas of 
h~vy  and prolonged rain.  Fade countermeasures (FCMs) are currently being 
researched, and should be operational by the middle of the I990s in order to 
combat rain fade at the higher Ka band frequencies. 
It is therefore clear that the choice of frequency band to be used in a particular 
geographical area is principally dependent on the characteristics of that area; specifically, 
its population density and its rainfall/cloud coyer.  The choice of band is the result of 
trade-offs between these factors, within the constraints of the W  ARC-allocated bands as 
regards the services that may be offered within those bands. 
For example, in Japan,-"'hic.h endures periods of heavy rainfall and cloud cover, Ka band 
is widely used.  C-hand services are used for communications with remote islands.  Ka-
band services are integrated to improve the terrestrial networks, for example to provide 
capacity for sudden increases in demand.  Ten of the 14 Ka-band transponders are used to 
link 62 zone centres in Japan; each zone centre is equipped with one earth station to carry 
overflow calls.  Ka band is used· because Japan's many small islands results in tightly 
packed radio systems, which need to use Ka band in order to avoid interference.  For this 
reason, the Japanese pioneer the use of higher frequencies; the fact is, we must address 
the rain fade problems by means of developments in FCM. 
prj.179-EC DGXIII  Resources  35 81/- History a Development of Satellite Technologies  81/16 Sep 93 
4  TECHNOLOGIES 
4.1  SERVICES 
4.1.1  Teleohony 
Telephony by satellite suggests high cost eanh stations and high cost satellite bandwidth. 
However, there are a number of factors which belie this impression: 
•  Increased use of  digital signal processing (DSP) techniques and VLSI 
implementation reduce the cost of  the eanh stations 
•  Digital compression techniques reduce the bandwidth required from what was 
once 64 kb/s to (currently) 16 kbls, with a potential reduction to 2.4 kb/s for 
mobiles 
•  Digital speech interpOlation (DSI) further reduces the bandwidth required for the 
transmission of  speech by removing the redundancy, the gaps, from the speech. 
Taken together, these factors have the potential to make satellite ielephony a viable 
option; the proposed LEO/MEO personal telephony networks, such as Motorola's 
Iridium, will all use a handheld earth Station, much as today'  s terrestrial cellular telephone 
networks do, and promise to be only slightly more expensive to use.  This is in contrast to 
the current networks, including those provided bylnmarsat and the newly launched 
Telephony Earth Station (TES) from Hughes, which are expensive to use and require a 
much bulkier earth station (nonnally a VSA  11, so that their mobility is limited. 
The well-developed terrestrial telephony infrastructure in developed countries clearly 
limits the potential of  satellite telephony, so that its principal application in those 
countries is in rural development  Another potential use of  satellite telephony is in links 
with areas where the terrestrial infrastmcture is far less developed, such as links with 
Eastern Europe.  However, these limited u..ces meant that Europe and Japan, with their 
limited rural development opportunities, were opposed to the allocation of bands to 
LEOIMEO satellite telephony systems at W ARC '92. 
4.1.2  TV 
Currently, the TV signals carried by satellite use FM transmission, with a bandwidth of 
27 MHz.  The most significant advance that is likely to take place is the change to digital 
TV, which will allow a major bandwidth saving.  It is widely seen that a digital TV 
transmission system, using compression, provides best performance in terms of transmit 
power, bandwidth and robustness (Fischer & Grassman, 1992).  Th~  digital TV system 
could be based on a true digital standard, such as those emerging for High Defmition 1V 
(HDTV), or a partially digital standard, such as the MAC suite.  In any case, broadcast 
quality TV will require approximately 30 Mb/s. 
There are three main approaches to compression: standard compression (e.g. MPEG, 
H26l) without special transport, standard MPEG with satellite-specific transport and 
error concealment, modified MPEG with custom transport and error concealment 
(Zdepski, Raychaudhuri, & Schiff, 1992). 
Such advances could potentially release a great deal of spare capacity, thus increasing the 
total capacity available (in terms of the total number of channels) at a stroke and possibly 
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causing a transponder glut.  This is particularly the case because, as described in section 
2.2, TV is currently such a major user of worldwide satellite bandwidth, and is likely to 
remain so. 
However, most TV transmissions are either DTii or intended for cable heads, so that 
existing standards (for example, PAL and MAC) will be preserved, since it is unlikely 
that home viewers will readily change their equipment.  Hence the impact of TV 
compression may be limited.  Nevertheless, casual users of TV, for example, satellite 
news gathering (SNG), teleconferencing, business TV etc, can make use of digital 
compression techniques. 
4.1.3  MuHI-Media 
Multi-media services, combining video, text, sound and still pictures and aimed at the 
education market, is an example of  a multi-service requirement.  Clearly, it will require 
broader bandwidth; broadband services are addressed in a following sub-section. 
4.1.4  Data 
Data services have been available since the beginning of the 1980s, by means of, amongst 
others, VSAT technology.  It is lilcely that these services will gradually be subsumed into 
broadband services, as discussed in a. later section.  · 
4.1.5  Broadband 
The integration of telephony, 1V  and data into broadband digital services, thus achieving 
the emerging target of  multi-service support by a single transponder, is also an important 
target as regards integration with teuestrial networks.  · 
The various broadband technologies are compired in Table 4-1.  Such technologies offer 
an immense amount of bandwidth, so that it is difficult to imagine there ever being a 
widespread demand.  However, experience has shown that applications always arrive to 
fill the bandwidth available, and one application that will require vast amounts of 
bandwidth is virtual reality (VR); by theyear 2000, VR will no longer be a news story in 
its own right - it will be well on the way to becoming just another computer technique. 
Many VR applications will be heavily communications dependent, with all that entails for 
demand for broadband services.  For example, networked VR means that children in one 
place can be taught, person to person, by a specialist teacher in a totally different place. 
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Service  Main Strengths  Main Weaknesses 
ATM virtual  Provides variable-rate circuits for high  Handles data only (or anything else, 
private lines  speed data (45, 155 or 622 Mbls)  such as telephony or TV, provided it is 
presented as data); not optimised for 
cormectionless links; initial services 
offer private connectivity only 
ISDN  Standard interfaces; E.164 addressing  Relatively low speed; bandJes 
cormection-oriented links only; 
requires time for call selllp 
Broadband ISDN  High speed links available; variable  Handles data only; not optimised f<r 
(BISON)  rate circuits; E.164 addressing  cormectionless links 
Frame relay  Fewer access liDes needed; lower cost  Long time from ordering to becoming 
virtual private  per packet  available; low speed; prone to packet 
lines  loss and delay; handles data only; 
private connections only 
Fiber Dktrlbuted  Coonectionless service;~  at  Internet Protocol (IP) address 
Data Interface  100 Mbls; relatively low~  based  limitations; limited geographical 
(FDDI)  on estabHsbed standard; ring design  coverage; bandies data only; delay 
offers route protection  under beavy network load 
FDDill  Offm botb coonectionless links for  Standard is incomplete 




Provides CODDeCtionless liDks;  Handles data only 
Multimegabit Data  relatively low cost; global connectivity  l 
Service (SMDS)  at speeds up 10 155 Mbls; ccrrr 
E.l64 addressin_g 
IEEE802.6  Offm both coonectionless links for  Not widely available in the US 
MetropoUtan Area  data and connection-oriented links for 
Networks  isochronous traffic; CCI1T E.164 
addressing and IP addressing; route 
protection by folded bus 
Private lines (DS-0,  No packet los.c;; no packet switching  High cost; long provisioning time; 
Tl, TJ)  delay; handles isochronous traffic;  private networking only 
reliable 
Switched circuits  DiaJ-ip links on demand; lower cost;  No global cormectivity; point-to-point 
(DS-0, Tl, TJ)  no packet loss; no packet switching  coMections only; connection setup 
delay; handles isochronous traffic  takes seconds 
SDH  Offers bandwidth from 155 Mb/s to  Relatively high cost; fvted rate circuits 
622Mbls  are not well suited to handling bursty 
data transmi.~ions 
Table 4-1:  Hieh Speed Services 
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The emerging Asynchronous Transfer Mode (A 1M) services, aimed at high speed 
networking, will form the underlying infrastructure for broadband satellite 
communications.  Further, the key players in terrestrial telecommunications and 
networking have now formed the ATM Forum, with the aim of driving A  TM through to 
the desktop, thus forming a continuous broadband, multi-service networking technology 
right from international trunks through to office systems.  Thus it is apparent that the 
integration of satellites into broadband networks will require support for ATM. 
The one exception to this global picture is Japan, where the N-Star system of satellites, to 
be launched in 1995, will support broadband ISDN (B-ISDN) directly, rather than ATM 
or B-lSD  N layered on top of ATM.  N-Star will offer data transmission rates of  up to 1.56 
Mbps. 
There is a growing tendency for A  TM services to be layered on Synchronous Digital 
Hierarchy (SDH - the international equivalent of the USA's Sonet standard) transmission 
systems.  ATM maps easily on to SDH, which has the advantage of  scalability, from a 
speed of  51.84 Mb/s through to 2.4 Gb/s using multiple optical fibres. 
It is clear, then, that broadband, multi-service support by satellites is going to require 
support for A  TM and SOH.  However, neither of these have ·yet been demonstrated; in 
particular, SDH will require the development of new modulation and coding techniques, 
and possibly wider bandwidth transponders than currently exist, whilst A  TM will require 
demonstration over a satellite (and will potentially need even higher bandwidth 
transponders), with the consequent transmission delays.  Gateways for A  TM are also  .. 
likely to prove difficult  §4.2.2 addresses the technological advances necessary for SDH I 
ATMsupport 
4.2  SERVICE SUPPORT 
4.2.1  Earth Stations 
The RF portion of  earth stations has undergone a lot of  developments for all bands up to 
Ku band; there has been very little development above this· band.  This clearly needs to be 
redressed if the higher frequency bands are to be of use in the future. 
There is a lack of off-the-shelf equipment above Ku-band and in Ka-band in particular. 
The ESA Olympus Ka-band experiments have improved the situation in Europe slightly 
but the lack of Ka-band work in the US (where there is no lack of Ku-band capacity) 
means that there has been no commercial pressure to bring Ka-band equipment to the 
market.  Europe currently has something of a lead in Ka-band technology because ESA 
has been exploring Ka-band from the technological side: Italy, in particular, has been 
looking in this direction and IT  ALSA T carries Ka-band packages.  Also in Europe, the 
pressure from HDTV for wider-band transponders has increased interest in Ka-band 
because there is simply not enough Ku-band spectrum available. 
In terms of transponders, the effect of these trends will be higher bandwidth.  There is a 
whole generation of 36/40MHz transponders in operation which were optimised for FM 
television even though many of them are not carrying TV at present.  Now 54n2MHz 
transponders are in widespread operation and the next generation will be in the region of 
140MHz to accomodate SOH.  This would apparently mean an explosion in frequency 
spectrum requirements, but it must be remembered that it is accompanied by 
improvements in Circuit Multiplication Equipment (CME) technology which is pushing . 
in the other direction. 
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Above Ka-band the picture is very different.  The Japanese have been experimenting at 
40/50 GHz but most usage in these bands is military (imaging and so on rather than 
communications), not civil.  It is possible that the changing requirements of the military 
mean that some of this spectrum will be released in the future but this is far from certain. 
Further, if the full potential of  mobiles and PCNs is to be realised, then significant 
advances in the necessary eanh stations are required, particularly in the areas of 
modulation and COMA multiple access schemes.  Most mobile services are in the US-
bands but other (higher frequency) bands could be exploited in the future.  MSS bands, 
for example, are already allocated in the Ka-band but no development has yet taken 
place.  In the UK, the British National Space Centre (BNSC) has just awarded a study 
contract to begin research into exploiting mobile Ka-band services. 
4.2.2  Circuit MuHiplication Equipment 
Circuit Multiplication Equipment (CME) allows a greater number of  circuits to be carried 
within the same bandwidth by means of comple$Sion techniques.  For example, speech 
circuits, which once required 64 kb/s were compressed to 32, then 16 kb/s, thus allowing 
4 circuits in the same bandwidth.  Further reductions are in the pipeline and additional 
technologies-such-as Digital Speech Interpolation (DSI), which removes redundancy 
(i.e.: gaps in speech) from channels-allow still more voice, data or image circuits to be 
carried over the same channels. 
Similar improvements are coming in the compression of video.  The CCITI  standard is 
64 kbls, though 365 kbls and 2 Mb/s are industry standards, with 30 Mb/s for broadcast 
quality.  As the bandwidth requirement goes up, so does the corresponding codec 
expense. However, digital compressed TV, as outlined in a previous section, will need 
significantly lower bandwidth. 
- . 
The use of  CME allows the bandwidth requirements of  an application to be much 
reduced, potentially giving rise to a transponder glut.  To balance this, though, lower 
bandwidth also means lower prices and therefore a greater demand for services. 
Some advances in transponder technology will be required to take full advantage of  CME 
techniques, though this is by no means true of  all of  them.  However, DSP, which is 
probably the most significant advance, will require new transponders. 
4.2.2.1  Components 
The techniques of  CME involve two types of  equipment: the coding of the (voice, image 
or data traffic) into a digital stream and the modulation of  the digital stream into radio (or 
other analogue) signals.  The primary trend to note here in the satellite field is the 
integration of these components.  In the past, coding and modulation were separate 
disciplines which resulted in the development of discrete components whereas they are 
now being integrated with much better results. 
4.2.2.2  Modulation 
Modulation, necessary if an RF signal is to carry data, is moving away from the 
traditional techniques and towards digital techniques.  The PSK implementation in FSS 
modems will have a DSP implementation.  Now. as described in an earlier section, the 
broadband developments will require the development of SOH/  A  TM modems, requiring 
the use of higher level QAM modulation. 
The use of 155Mb/s SDH has been studied extensively for satellite communications and 
16-QAM is emerging as the current leading modulation technique.  Current proposed 
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implementations still need a lot of power however.  Intelsat have a major research 
programme under way in this field.  A 16-QAM SOH channel might just fit into an 
existing 72MHz transponder but it is unlikely that such transponders could provide 
enough power.  This is not a great technical problem, and it is only a matter of time (say, 
5 years) before more powerful wideband transponders make this practical.  Higher speed 
services-such as A  TM at around 300Mb/s-are much further away in tenns of practical 
implementation because new modulation techniques will need to be developed. 
The growing importance of mobiles will require the use of suitable modulation 
techniques, including 0-QPSK, MSK, 7t/4 shifted PSK, linear modulation schemes and 
Trellis coding.  The continual changes in technology in this area are steadily reducing the 
bandwidth requirements for MSS but the shortage of  frequency resources is more acute. 
The requirements for MSS coding (see §4.2.2.3) are quite different to the well-developed 
techniques for FSS coding so much work remains to be done in this field.  To take the 
example of  voice modulation, a CCI1T standard for good quality voice at 8Kb/s is 
already on the horizon but this is only appropriate to FSS.  Lower rate systems, such as 
adequate quality 2.4Kbls voice, suffer from delay problems when dealing with GEO 
services and Doppler problems when dealing with LEO services.  At the time of  writing, 
4Kb/s (6Kbls with channel coding) voice is probably the lowest practical rate for MSS. 
As has been already emphasised, spectral efficiency is now very important, significantly 
influencing the choice of modulation techniques. 
4.2.2.3  Coding 
A channel coding scheme modifies the digital data stream that is to be modulated in order 
to improve the quality .of the channel In general, it does this by adding redundant 
infonnation to the  ·bit stream to allow the receiver to recover from errors in the digital 
channel 
A number of  cbannel coding schemes have been defined.  For FSS, coding has been 
standardised (around convolutional codes such as the Vitterbi code) and has reached the 
point where cbips to carry out the encoding and decoding are readily available off-the-
shelf.  For MSS. the types of  errors encountered-burst rather than random errors-mean 
that these codes are not appropriate.  There are basically two ways to handle burst errors: 
•  by interleaving the channel to spread burst errors (so that they approximate 
random errors) and then applying a convolutional code, or 
•  by using block codes (such as Reed-Solomon codes) designed to recover burst 
errors. 
The latter method is gaining favour and in the last year or so the flfSt commercial R-S 
coders with usoft decision" implementations have appeared on the market.· These can 
provide a significant gain. 
It is very important that any coding gain translates into an improvement in other system 
parameters; for example~ smaller dishe~, le.~ interference, less power. 
4.2.2.4  Modems 
Modem technology is undergoing significant transition at present.  In the past, analogue 
modulators were combined with digital coders to provide the CME.  Now, the use of DSP 
for modulation in software and the integration of (and sharing of information between) 
coding and modulation equipment heralds major improvements in modem technology. 
Furthermore~ since the DSP modulation and coding implementations are now in software, 
they are more flexible and effective than traditional analogue techniques.  It is difficult to 
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see, at present, how Europe will catcch up in the field of DSP implementations.  Both the 
US and Japan are very advanced in this field and the Japanese have recently done a lot 
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4.2.3  Access Schemes 
The highly developed access schemes, FDMA and IDM~  were originally developed for 
FSS services. 
For VSATs, a number of  access schemes have been developed, such-as Aloha, RA 
Schemes and various modified Aloha schemes.  These fJISt-generation schemes will need 
to be replaced with more sophisticated second-generation, multi-service schemes which 
have yet to be developed. This is because the rust-generation schemes were designed for 
low-rate data services but the requirements are now changing towards integrated voice, 
data and image services.  These multi-service systems-such as multimedia systems-
have very different design requirements from the "traditionaln single service 
communications links implemented via VSATs. 
The current access techniques for mobiles are FDMA and 1DMA. However, for a 
number of  reasons including bandwidth efficiency and resilience, COMA may be 
required for new systems and will require further development.  In fact, CDMA is in the 
acendant at present because of  its better theoretical spectral utilisation-note that this is 
theoretical and it is not obvious at present that it will be possible to obtain such 
utilisations in practice.  It is reasonable to assume that some sort of hybrid FDffD/CD 
multiple access sheme will emerge to get better utilisation in practice. 
4.2.4  Satellites 
The major area of  development in satellites is likely to be the co-ordination and 
networking of LEO and MEO satellite constellations.  Clearly, this will require significant 
developments in ISLs and OBP.  NASA's Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System 
(fDRSS), a network of  GEO satellites which allow ground stations to communicate with 
LEO satellites, manned space vehicles etc., has allowed significant technological 
advances to be made in ISLs.  Similarly, ESA Olympus, an experimental Data Relay 
Satellite (DRS), is intended to demonstrate ISL communication with the Eureca LEO 
platform, using Ka band. 
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ISLs are interesting in the context of this study because they significantly simplify the 
number of MSS orbital slots required and the terrestrial networking needed to support 
them.  For FSS they are much less important.  A number of  lntelsat studies have shown 
that the expense of ISLs is not economic for FSS services.  Originally, optical (very 
wideband) ISLs were considered for GEO satellites.  This is feasible because GEOs are 
outside the atmosphere.  For LEO/MEO satellites operating inside the Earth's 
atmosphere, lower bandwidth millimetre wave ISLs will be used. 
Optical ISL technology is well advanced, but expensive.  Integrated optics will reduce 
costs, but still the acquisition and tracking systems have larger mass and volume than 
competing systems.  It is believed, therefore, that millimetre wave ISLs are the answer, 
and these should be operational sooner rather than later. 
For FSS systems, the major areas of  development are likely to be in OBP (in order to 
improve services) and multi-beam antennas (MBAs), which allow multiple spots to be 
covered through a single antenna. This allows for frequency re-use (in separate, 
unadjacent spot beams) and thus reduces the demand for frequency resources.  Antenna 
technology is allowing a move to larger reflectors, and therefore smaller spots which 
multiply the frequency re-use factor. 
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5  FUTURE TRENDS 
There are a number of technological trends which will have an influence on the orbit and 
frequency resources, principally in the areas of signal processing techniques, the use of 
different orbit types, and OBP.  In addition, changes in the regulatory environment will 
have a profound effect on demand and therefore the resources themselves.  These trends 
are discussed in the following sections. 
5.1  SIGNAL PROCESSING 
The principal technological trend in the field of signal processing is the move from RF 
techniques to DSP.  Until now, the advances in signal processing have been in the RF 
interface, in order to accommodate services, but DSP (both in earth stations and on-board 
the satellite) will have a profound effect on the orbit and frequency resources. 
DSP will allow such compression in all services, especially in video, that no larger 
satellites will be required, and perhaps no additional bandwidth, so that, although a 
shortage of Ku-band capacity in Europe is currently predicted, it is anticipated that digital 
compression technology will lead to a TV transponder glut 
5.2  ORBITS 
There is a trend away from more traditional GEO satellites to networks of  LEOJMEO 
satellites.  The industry is at a major crossroads in making this change; it has an effect in 
worldwide mobile communications (the difficulties here are in getting the necessary  ¥ 
frequency resources allocated worldwide), and raises a number of  questions: 
•  how will orbits be allocated? 
•  how will they be managed? 
•  how will interference (between satellites, between networks of satelliteS-and 
between orbits eg GEO and LEO) be minimised, monitored and managed? 
Note that sound broadcasting, using Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) will use 
LEO/MEO orbits, as well as personal communications satellites, for which the avoidance 
of  the transmission delay on speech circuits is a key advantage of LEO. 
A comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of LEO and GEO satellite 
communications systems raises the following points; 
ForGEO: 
•  Mature architecture; familiarity of manufacturers and investors; fewer satellites 
Against GEO: 
•  Long transmission delay; poorer spectrum efficiency; no high latitude coverage; 
inferior positioning performance; huge satellites; large, complex conventional 
antennae 
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For LEO: 
•  Shorter distance, lower power; smaller cells, more frequency reuse, more 
channels; improved redundancy; cheaper launch insurance; phased array antennae; 
worldwide coverage 
Against LEO: 
•  Complex, unproved architecture; complicated networking; greater risks, 
development schedule and budget; multiple launches required; higher break-even 
point. 
5.3  OBP 
On board processing ttansfonns a satellite from an essentially passive system to a 
switchboard in the sky.  This is a key technological trend, since it will revolutionise 
networking, by: 





allowing smaller, cheaper earth stations 
giving an improved interface 
allowing satellites to be placed in closer orbits 
•  improving connectivity in LEOIMEO orbits. 
OBP satellites will fly in experimental stages in the mid-to-end 1990s. 
Hardwardfirmware developments are mosdy complete but software/reliability studies are 
lagging and will constrain their use in operational systems.  Expectations are that the first 
operatioual OBP satellites will fly around the year 2000, and by 2005 will be having a 
major impacL 
5.4  SPACECRAFT 
New developments in ion engines and in the use of new electric power systems will 
increase the efficiency and lifetime of satellites.  New research will lead to the mini 
satellites necessary for the LEO constellations for mobile and personal communications 
around the mid to late 1990s. 
Launchers are still a problem, and apart from Ariane, ASAP and Pegasus, we do not have 
low cost launchers.  Multiple launch schemes for LEO satellites are currently under 
investigation and are expected to .be available by the mid 1990s. 
5.5  DEREGULATION 
Deregulation of satellite communications, freeing it from P1T dominance, will, of course, 
increase the availability of satellite services and therefore the demand, since experience in 
the US has shown that, once access to satellite services becomes freely available 
throughout the geographical area of interest, users see it as a realistic alternative to 
terrestrial communications.  · 
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This increase in demand is in addition to that arising from the technological advances 
previously noted. 







the management of  both orbits and frequencies (bandwidth) becomes significantly 
more difficult, as there are many more players 
who regulates certain services - for example, mobile via satellite? 
should Eutelsat become a commercial organisation? 
should satellites be designed to give preferential coverage - for example, of 
Eastern Europe? 
what should ETSI's role be in standardisation and type approval? 
SERVICES 
The wide expansion of  services, as outlined in section 4 of this document, is made 
possible by DSP technology, freeing bandwidth and increasing spectral efficiency.  The 
key step is in the integration of  services using broadband technologies.  However, future 
broadband services will need further reductions in costs before they become viable, and 
they are highly dependent on the development of  key broadband technologies, 
particularly an SDH/  A  TM modem for satellites. 
It is likely that education, particularly multi-media, Will play a much larger role in the 
future of satellite communications than hitheno. 
Th~re  are a number of  services which will directly benefit from these technological 
advances; in particular, SatcDite News Gathering (SNG), private data networks and digital 
compressed TV (though, as previously discussed, the requirement to maintain existing 
standards, such as PAL and D-MAC, will limit the penetration of  the latter). It is 
important to note that the level of  demand for these services is related to trends outside 
satellite communications: for example, the increased number of  TV channels in Europe 
means more demand for SNG, whilst a trend to distributed offices and telecommuting 
means more demand for private networks. 
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APPENDIX A  TECHNOLOGY AVAILABILITY 
Diagram A-1, on the following page, illustrates the trends in technology availability, by 
plotting against time the availability of research systems, pilot commercial systems and 
fully commercial systems in the key technologies identified in this document: 
•  Digital Signal Processing (DSP), except for 1V 
•  DSP for TV 
•  Inter-Satellite Links (ISL.s) 
•  On Board Processing (OBP) 
•  Modulation and coding techniques for broadband applications (A  TM/SDH) 
•  Multiple access techniques, using COMA, for_ networks (constellations) of low 
earth orbit (LEO) satellites 
•  -Deployable antennas, for which the scale of development refers to the size of 
deployable antennas (which is inversely proportional to the spot size achievable 
and therefore the level of  frequency re-use). 
As can be seen from the diagram, most of these technologies are expected to be in full 
commercial operation by the year 2000.  The remaining technologies (OBP, ISLs and 
modulation & coding techniques) will not be in full commercial operation until 2005. 
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APPENDIX B-SPECmUM USAGE 
Diagram B-1 summarises the applications of the L, S, C, Ku and Ka bands.  The possible 
· uses considered are: 
•  telemeuic control of the satellite itself 
•  mobile satellite services (MSS) 
•  ftxed satellite services (FSS) 
•  broadcast satellite services (BSS). 
Specific applications within these service types are addressed in Appendix C. 
Ka 
8aDd  c 
s 
L 
Tele.  MSS  FSS  BSS 
Diawm  B-1; Band Uses 
Diagram B-2 shows how the FSS and BSS bands, which are of  most interest in the 
context of this report, are allocated. 
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and  Allocation  rectlon  u  .. 
s  BSS  eo- Commercial 
2.690- 3.«)() 
3.400-4.200  c  FSS  OoMI  Commercial 
4.200-4.500 
4.500-4.800  FSS  OoMI  Commercial 
4.800-5.725 
5.725- 7.075  FSS  Up  Commercial 
7.075- 7.250 
7.250-7.750  X  FSS  OcNr'l  Military 
7.750- 7.900 
7.900- 8.400  FSS  Up  Military 
Ku  FSS  Up1)own  Commercial 
ass  OoMI  Commercial 
FSS  Up1)own  ConvnerciaJ 
FSS  Up  Commercial 
FSS  Up  Commercial 
FSS  Up  Commercial 
17.300- 18.1  K  FSS  Up  Commercial 
18.100-20  FSS  OoMI  Commercial 
20.200- 21  FSS  OoMI  Mifitary 
21.200-27. 
27.500-30.  FSS  Up  Commercial 
FSS  Mi6ta 
Diagram B-2. Spectrum Usage 
The more detailed breakdown of  the spectrum usage aepends on the country in question, 
because so much of the spectrum allocation is still handled at a national level.  Diagram 
B-3 shows the C to Ka-band breakdown for the UK. 
Diagram B-3.  Spectrum Categories for the UK 
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APPENDIX C  APPLICATION SUMMARY TABLES 
The following tables summarise the application demand for frequency (F) and bandwidth 
(B) in the US, Ku and Ka bands.  Table C-1 applies to 1993, whilst Table C-2 applies to 
2003.  The demand for these resources for the following services is addressed in these 
tables: 
•  ftxed telephony 
•  broadcast 1V 
•  other TV (SNG, teleconferencing etc.) 
•  business I VSAT 
•  aeronautical and maritime mobile 
•  land mobile 
•  mobile telephony (PCN)  . 
The following key should be used in conjunction with these tables: 
- Not Applicable 
F  Frequency 
B  Bandwidth 
+  Increasing demand 
- Decreasing, or no, 
demand 
=  Static demand 




Fixed  Broadcast  Other  TV  Business I 




Table B-1: 1993 Demand 
Faxed  Broadcast  Other TV  Business I  Mobile: 





Table B-2: 2003 Demand 















GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT AND SPECTRUM RESOURCES 
11IE WAY FORWARD FOR REGULATION 
- Report to Participants -
\Vorkshop Friday 8 October 1993 
KPrtiG European Business Centre, Brussels 
Appendix 3 
The workshop comprised an interim presentation of results to date of a study on geostationary 
orbit and  spectrum resources commissioned by the EC, at which comments from  participants 
were invited.  There follows a summary oftbe main points raised during the above workshop. 
The points are itemised under the headings used during the day. 
Shortcomings 
•  There are complexities associated with identifying the degree of scarcity that 
exists in the FSS,  these difficulties sbould be addressed  at some stage in the 
future. 
•  Polarisation and geographic discrimination are issues that need to be considered 
when looking at the issue of  scarcity. 
•  80% of satellites in the United States serve the US domestic market and 60% of 
European satellites are International in nature. 
•  The issue of scarcity and the regulations affecting the allocations of frequency 
resources and the access to the orbit is a world-wide issue, not confined to any 
particular  ITU  region.  Because  many  satellites  serve  several  regions 
simultaneously,  this  problem cannot  be entirely solved  in  one region  without 
affecting the other regions.  Nonetheless, significant improvements are possible 
if effective reforms are implemented within particular regions. 
•  The  curr~nt system  of allocation  in  the  unplanned  bands  and  the  current 
operational  characteristics of satellites represent a very delicate balance.  It  is 
very difficult to change the current regime without making the situation worse. 
It would be necessary to take very detailed technical advice before any changes 
were proposed. 
•  Both the W  ARC 77 and 88 plans (PiaMed BSS and PlaMed FSS,  respectively) 
were  cited  as  examples  of misconceived  modification  to  existing  regulations, 
although the intent of these plans was to improve the situation. 
Satellites: Final kP/LfJiJtv1cmgement Consulting  . 
•  In the 77 plan the rules of allotment provided five channels per country in  the 
Ku-band  (downlinks in the II.  7 - 12.5 GHz band) for domestic coverage, with 
orbital locations spaced every 6  o.  This took up significant amounts of resource 
without  each  country  requiring sucb  resource.  In  the  88  plan  there was  an 
attempt to introduce more flexibility by making the orbital location somewhat 
flexible.  The idea was that allotments might be moved around, but in practice, 
as a result of  ongoing modificatioos, nobody knows at any given time what is the 
exact state in terms of implemelllation of the plan.  This makes it very difficult 
to implement the 88 plan in practice.  -
•  It was agreed that fixing the tedmical parameters for use of orbit and frequency 
resource is very inefficient. 
•  There was agreement with the general view that the use of the plans is difficult 
in practice. 
•  It was pointed out that both plans were nationally orientated and this represents 
a significant problem when it comes to assessing the economic efficiency of the 
use of orbit and frequency resources.  The national orientation of the plans is 
somewhat inevitable given that the nu  is an ensemble of countries under the 
auspices of the  United  Nations,  which  has  around  180  members.  A  major 
principle is that any country is as entided as any other to orbital spectrum.  This 
applies equally to, for example, an African state or a European state.  It is a 
political requirement that countries should have equal rights to the geostationary 
orbit and  frequency  resource.  1bis is a significant problem for  introducing 
market orientation. 
•  It was pointed out that the 88 plan for FSS was very nationally orientated and 
that this did not match the ability to develop services on a European basis, or the 
logic of pan-European services. 
•  The provision of set bands was asserted to be more efficient from the point of 
view of  the use of  orbit and frequency resources.  This contention was disputed 
to an extent by a counter-assertion that allocation of such set bands did not very 
significantly improve efficiency of  use of  orbit/frequency resources.  In addition, 
it will be difficult to locate bands for pan-European use (eg.  VSA T uplinks). 
•  It  was  stated that the ITU  was not one regulator  but,  rather,  the sum of 180 
country regulators.  The system whilst equitable leads  to  many  countries not 
using vested rights.  A major point is that the intent behind the planned bands is 
being flouted by countries using their allobnents for non-national uses. 
•  The regulatory shortcomings identified in the KPMG presentation were generally 
recognised.  It was pointed out however that if  one should go outside the GSOSR 
then at least some of the problem might be relieved  (eg.  LEOs).  It was further 
pointed out that it would be necessary for any regulatory regime to cope with the 
provision of satellite services from other than the GSOSR.  Technologies that 
would  permit  the  provision  of services  from  locations  closer  to  the earth's 
surface are being developed under the ESA 's Archimedes project. 









•  It was pointed out that the interference calculations being used by operators were 
very pessimistic and therefore contributed to the problem of artificial scarcity. 
•  It was felt that it might be possible to use the existing plans to pool resource for 
a combination of countries.  In this way it would be possible for Europe to pool 
its  allotments.  It  was  pointed out that the ability to do this  was  analysed  in 
scenario 2. 
•  It was pointed out that a threat from substitute services existed.  It was asserted 
that satellites were often more expensive than terrestrial alternatives.  Another 
alternative view was that until more efficient regulation was introduced into the 
satellite area the potential for  providing services more efficiently could  not be 
tested fully. 
•  A final suggestion in this part of the debate was that allocation tables should be 
redesigned around systems rather than services. 
•  KPMG  concluded  that inefficiencies  with  the current allocation system  arose 
mostly because of its nationalistic and bureaucratic nature.  These shortcomings 
could mostly disappear with an appropriately regulated market orientated system. 
The Scenarios 
•  .  - ·The KPMG scenarios included a distinction between deregulation at ITU Region 
1 level and at the European (only) level. 
•  A question  was  asked  whether  our scenarios. were formalising  the  Tongasat 
situation.  The reply was  that Tongasat was an  example of organisations and 
countries exploiting the existing regulations.  Our proposal was not therefore for 
the formalisation of Tongasat per se but more for creating a rational framework 
within which leasing or sale of LDC rights could take place. 
•  The  Tongasat  example  illustrates  that  quasi  market  forces  are  starting  to 
circumvent the intent behind existing administrative procedures. 
The 1\lodel 
•  There was a number of questions concerning the internal workings of  the model. 
It was pointed out that these would be explained more fully  in the main report. 
There was  however explanation of the key principles of the model  and  it  was 
pointed out that the model was based on sound and rigorous economic theory and 
practice. 
•  The model assumes that the distribution of footprints among satellites in the sky 
does  not change over time. 
Satellites: Final kJ?lfbJManagement Consutting 
•  Regulation should be able to respond to changes in demand.  It should not stifle 
adjustment. 
•  It  was asked  who would  be the winners and  who the losers under a scenario 
which led to the consolidation of satellite operators. 
•  There was  discussion about an appropriate cost function.  It was  agreed  that 
significant economies of scale accrued  for  a  company  to  operate up to  five 
satellites and  then smaller economies accrued up to nine or ten satellites per 
operator.  It was pointed out that this pattern of the economies of scale was 
included in our cost function. 
lnsti  tutional Change 
•  It  is  key  to  determine  whether  any  alternative supranational  allocation  and 
assignment regimes must inherently cover the whole world or  just regions or sub-
regions.  One view is  that anything below a worldwide regime would create 
problems.  Any system within a region or sub-region could be exploited by 
organisations from outside of that region or sub-region. 
•  An alternative view was that pooling of  national alloonents in the planned bands 
would be a way of  moving towards a more economically efficient usage of  orbit 
and frequency resources. 
•  It was argued that a regional or sub-regional coordinator allocating orbit and 
frequency resources would be a very large and bureaucratic organisation. 
•  It was pointed out that the ERO detailed spectrum investigation could harmonise 
frequencies in Europe.  It should be possible to have two or three key European 
orbital positions instead of  twenty national orbital positions.  This could become 
logical if individual countries were to delegate their rights over the access to the 
orbit and frequency resources. 
•  It was argued that pooling would not be possible outside the planned bands.  It 
was  argued  that  coordination would  have to take place with  too  many other 
networks to be feasible. 
•  A question was asked as to whether Germany could give up its rights over the 
Copernicus assignment to another organisation such as Eutelsat.  It was pointed 
out that it could not transfer the rights it has for the Copernicus satellite but it 
could reach an agreement with another organisation such as Eutelsat for it to use 
the resources for other purposes.  It was pointed out however that the alternative 
use ought to  be in  conformity with the technical specifications of the original 
assignment. 
•  A view emerged  that in  the planned bands the pooling of resources was  not a 
problem as  long  as  the  individual  countries  retained  underlying  international 
rights of use. 









•  It was pointed out that  in  Germany  it will  be possible for  any organisation to 
apply for access to GSOSR.  The German authorities intend levying a fee for this 
service.  It  will  be  the  German  authorities  that  interface  with  ITU  but  the 
coordination work would have to be undertaken by the applicants. 
•  There was debate as to the ability to auction resources to private organisatio!}S. 
• 
It  was suggested that if an auction was for the right of access rather than the 
ownership of resource then this would be consistent with the current regulations. 
It was pointed out that if any sub-region or region auctioned the right to use any 
combination of orbit and frequency resource the resultant user would still have 
to be coordinated along traditional ITU regulatory lines. 
There was  discussion  whether  it  might be made  contingent  by  a sub-region 
·  coordinator that the right to supply a service to their area was dependent upon 
proceeding through the auction procedure.  This was accepted as a possibility. 
•  Planned bands were favoured by less developed countries to ensure that they had 
equitable rights to the geostationary and spectrum resources. 
Terms and Conditions Changes 
•  Due ·diligence ("use it or lose it") would have to be applied on a world-wide 
basis in order for it to be most effective.  If  due diligence was only applied at 
a European level  by a European coordinator it could be more difficult for the 
Europeans  to  implement  new  systems than  for  others.  It  was  pointed  out, 
however, that as most Region 1 satellites operated within the European area then 
the  problem of coordination  could  be reduced  by  changing  conditions  at  a 
· European level.  It would not be possible to eliminate the problem of tying up 
orbit and frequency resources for up to a nine year period when dealing with 
organisations  outside  the  jurisdiction  of the  sub-regional  coordinator,  but 
coordinations with the organisations within its jurisdiction could be significantly 
speeded up.  An acknowledged  risk is that a local due diligence would drive 
operators  to  seek  licences  to  operate from  countries  outside the  sub-region. 
Hence it would be important to develop measures geared to addressing this risk. 
•  Transparency of parameters and consistency of criteria would be of paramount 
importance in the application of due diligence procedures. 
•  Auto-compatibility  was  a concept  explained to  represent  the principle of not 
imposing  constraints  on  other  networks  that  those  networks  would  not  be 
prepared  to  accept themselves.  It  was pointed out that  this  technical  method 
would be consistent with the economic principles underlying the modelling and 
scenario development. 
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Competition Policy 
•  It was asserted that Eutelsat Article 16 has never been applied as a tool to deny 
access  to  other  users.  It  was  also  pointed  out  that  at  least  the  procedural 
requirement to coordinate with Eutelsat persists in the current environment. 
Technical Policy 
•  It  was  felt  that  reform  of the planned bands  would  significantly  improve the 
ability of operators to provide space segment.  It would be possible for fewer 
satellites to use more frequency so as to provide more capacity from any given 
location, therefore improving the efficiency of  operation and the efficiency of use 
of geostationary orbit and frequency resources. 
•  Military bands were of  marginal interest as they were generally either in too low 
or too high frequency bands. 
•  The issue of  scarcity is not uniform across the spectrum.  There are certain parts 
of the spectrum which are particularly scarce.  An example was given of the 
bands for feeder links to serve mobile which were very difficult to find. 
•  Digitisation will help to remove problems of scarcity but not to the extent of a 
five-fold improvement. 
KPMG Conclusiom 
•  There seemed  to  be broad  agreement  at tbe meeting  that  greatest  efficiency 
would  be achieved  by  reforming  the  method  of allocating  and  assigning 
geostationary orbit and frequency resources at the world-wide scale.  There also 
seems to be consensus however that getting agreement on such change would 
politically be very difficult.  There was no opinion expressed as to  whether it 
was worth attempting to gain reform at the world-wide level.  It was pointed out, 
however, that it would be necessary to give less developed countries an incentive 
to  reform  existing regulations.  Such  an  incentive might  be  the  potential  of 
realising some revenue by formal ising a method for leasing rights to access their 
allotments.  It might be by promoting the fact that changes in regulations would 
be very likely to reduce the cost and therefore the price of provision of satellite 
services.  This would potentially lead to the greater accessibility of  telephony and 
broadcasting and other satellite services in less developed countries.  This would 
be  a  potentially  very  cost  effective  method  of  introducing  advanced 
communications  into these countries. 
•  Some  participants  felt  that  pooling  in  the  planned  bands  offered  significant 
potential  for  improving  the  efficiency  with  which  resources  were  allocated. 
Other participants however felt that the difficulties of coordinating under existing 
regulations  with  organisations  outside  the  jurisdiction  of the  sub-region  or 
regional body would significantly reduce and potentially undermine any benefits 






that  might accrue.  With  regard  to other regulatory changes  there was  some 
agreement  that  the  introduction  of due  diligence  procedures  did  hold  out a 
potential  for  improving efficiency of use of geostationary orbit and frequency 
resources.  There was again, however, a dispute as to whether this would have 
to  be applied on a world-wide scale or whether it could also yield benefits if 
applied at a regional or sub-regional level. 
•  There was consensus that releasing resources tied up in the planned bands would 
yield practical benefits to operators in the industry. 
•  The needs and positions of  developing countries need to be taken into account. 
•  It is  the rights to usage of the resources with which we are concerned, rather 
than the resources per se. 
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ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES TO BE FOLLOWED IN 
REGULATING THE SATELLITE INDUSTRY 
Appendix 4 
This section describes the broad principles that might be adopted in developing the regulation of 
the GSOSR  resource along  economic lines  rather than the existing administrative regulation. 
These address the main shortcomings of the current system that were described in Section 2. 
They are also the key principles underlying the development of the regulatory options described 
in Section 5 and  form  the basis for  the fundamental  relationships  incorporated  in the model, 
described in the Phase 1 Working Paper and in Section 6.  These key principles were developed 
in consultation with the external economics advisers to the study. 
In an ideal world, if all these principles applied and market forces were allowed free reign, this 
would lead to the position that economists refer to as "Pareto optimality".  At this point there is 
no possible trade that would not make at least one party worse off than the current (equilibrium) 
position.  This is a minimum condition for maximising welfare. 
"Recognise and use competition and competitive markets as the cheapest, most efficient, least 
arbitrary and bureaucratic, and most decentralised information system." 
The importance of information to the implementation of competitive markets was highlighted 
above.  In  a  competitive  market,  all  the  information  available  on  a  particular  product  is 
summarised  in its  price.  In general  the  closer you  get to a competitive market,  the more 
accurately prices reflect the information available and the more efficient it becomes.  This .is in 
contrast to  efforts by  regulatory authorities  to  "second guess"  the market,  as  in the case  of 
estimating the auction value of bandwidth or spectrum without actually holding an auction. 
"Allow supply and demand to determine price and quantity." 
This is the key requirement for the functioning of a proper market in any commodity and could 
be viewed as the defining characteristic of a market.  In terms of GSOSR, this requires the free 
interaction of  the demand for transponders by service providers and the provision of  transponder 
capacity by operators. 
The current framework for allocating GSOSR resources is far removed from the market solution. 
To the extent that there is scarcity in GSOSR, this suggests that price and/or quantity are unable 
to shift sufficiently to adjust to  market  conditions.  This is  further supported  by reports  that 
transponder prices are significantly affected by the influence of the Tos as shareholders in the 
satellite operators, service providers and competitors.  · 
"Recognise scarcity as a result of  a controlled price or a .fixed supply relative to the free market 
solutions." 
Scarcity/surplus are not absolute factors inherent in the products being considered (in this case, 
GSOSR).  The extent to which there is scarcity can only be measured relative to the market (or 
equilibrium) solution.  The existence of scarcity or surplus is a sign that markets are not allowed 
to operate freely or are adjusting to new conditions.  Scarcity depends on a number of factors. 









In the satellite industry, price, technology and  regulation all significantly restrict supply.  For 
example: 
•  the price of an operating licence is currently effectively zero.  This has resulted 
in artificially high demand for slots and the "paper satellite" problem, as there 
is no "opportunity cost" to holding a licence and not doing anything with it.  If 
operators  paid  the  full  market  value  for  the  licences,  they  would  be  under 
pressure from their shareholders or financiers to earn a return on the resource, 
either by using it or selling it on, 
•  while satellite technology is evolving rapidly, the long lead times, high start up 
cost  and  low operating cost of space segment mean that  it  is  introduced only 
gradually.  The  lag  in  the  implementation  of new  technology  can  create 
temporary scarcities, 
•  the current regulatory framework allocates blocks of  spectrum to specific services 
(eg BSS).  This creates artificial scarcity by removing these blocks from other 
uses and reserving them for services for which there is insufficient demand.  The 
various regulatory frameworks for competing terrestrial services can also give 
them a competitive advantage vis a vis the satellite alternative. 
If prices were freely allowed to adjust to shifts in market conditions, scarcity would become at 
best a transitory occurrence.  The market would shift-to a new equilibrium at which there was 
no excess supply or demand. 
•Optimally, pricing should be based on marginal cost tmd price elasticity of  demand of  different 
user groups. • 
This states that the equilibrium price in a free market will depend on (for the supply side) the 
sensitivity of  costs and therefore profits, and (for the demand side) on the sensitivity of demand 
to changes in price, that is, on consumers' willingness to pay. 
The marginal cost to a supplier is the cost of providing an additional unit of the product,  for 
example, an additional transponder.  If  this is lower tban the market price, the supplier therefore 
has  an  incentive to  sell  more in  order to  increase profits.  Conversely,  if the marginal  cost 
exceeds the price there is an incentive to cut back on supply. 
In the case of demand, the price elasticity measures the sensitivity of consumers to shifts in the 
price.  If  demand is elastic, then a small change in price can have a large impact on the quantity 
demanded.  Demand for many satellite applications (eg telephony) is likely to be elastic, because 
there are normally better terrestrial substitutes.  A small  increase in the price of the satellite 
service relative to the terrestrial competition will therefore lead to a large shift in demand away 
from the satellite option.  Where demand  is  inelastic (eg in VSAT or SNG services for which 
terrestrial alternatives are poor substitutes, or for services where the satellite cost is a very small 
part of the  total)  then  shifts  in  the  price  will  have  little  impact  on  the  quantity  demanded. 
Elasticity can also differ between user groups.  For example, business users are likely to be less 
sensitive than domestic customers to the price of a satellite mobile telephone. 
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The interaction of these two factors helps to determine the equilibrium price and quantity at 
which demand meets supply. 
"Recognise the existence and role of  economic rents· 
Economic rent arises not from the replacement cost of the resource but the value of its use in 
relation to alternatives.  Users of satellite facilities buy a service package which includes: 
•  the  cost  of the  physical  resource,  including  R&D,  manufacture,  launch, 
maintenance and marketing, 
•  the right for it to be in a particular orbit, 
•  the right to use particular frequencies. 
The value they attach to the package depends on the price and availability of alternatives.  The 
price of these alternatives depends on: 
•  the cost of alternative physical resources, especially optical fibre cables, 
•  the cost of wayleaves and other rights to use particular physical routes, 
•  the regulatory structure and what it allows profits to be. 
The relative -cost of cable versus satellite as  a physical  resource has varied  over the years. 
Currently cables  are cheaper  for most of the distances  found  in Europe  and  hence  are the 
preferred choice for TOs.  Satellites may have a cost advantage on certain intercontinental routes. 
Quality differences  can  be important.  Geostationary satellites have disadvantages for voice 
telephony even over long distances because of speech delay, although low earth orbit (LEO) 
satellites are substantially free of this.  Satellites are a relatively flexible resource capable of 
being brought into operation or redeployed  without the need for time-consuming  and  costly 
expenditure on terrestrial  infrastructure.  In  some  parts  of the  world  (eg  Eastern  Europe, 
Southeast Asia) this  makes them a viable commercial  alternative.  Satellites may have other 
niches where they are cost-effective against fibre cables, for example in point to multipoint data 
distribution and SNG. 
The existence of specific technical advantages is  not on its own sufficient to ensure that they 
sustain high satellite prices but they will tend to do so in conditions where competition between 
satellite operators is imperfect. 
In some cases satellite operators may be able to offer a range of  competitive services to business 
users because of  effective differences in regulations governing leased line and satellite use.  Some 
of these services would not be viable if users were allowed the unrestricted use of leased lines 
at cost-based tariffs.  Value added by the satellite operator offering a better network management 
service than the P1T will assist viability. 
A potential value for GSOSR is created if regulation allows profit margins on international tariffs 
to  be high  and  access to the physical cable resources is  restricted.  If international tariffs are 
driven down toward cost and free access to terrestrial· (including undersea) cables is allowed, the 








most that GSOSR should be worth is the difference between the physical resource cost of  satellite 
and terrestrial resources.  If  satellites are more expensive in these circumstances, no operator will 
be willing to pay anything at all for GSOSR because there is a cheaper alternative. 
Economic  rents  exist  in  other  parts  of the communications  industry.  American  cable  TV 
operators have at times been valued  at a considerable premium to the value of their physical 
assets because of the value of their local infrastructure in a monopolistic environment.  Profit 
regulation is being tightened up to reflect this.  The high price paid for some mobile licences, 
notably in Greece, reflects an expectation that restricted market entry and weak regulation will 
allow high profits to be made. 
For a cetain set of  applications, it may be that satellites have such a large cost advantage against 
alternative means of provision that they must create a shortage in GSOSR.  Perhaps the best 
indicator that this might be the case is the demand from Third World countries, where ground 
infrastructure could be unduly  costly to construct and  maintain.  The rapidly expanding  TV 
markets of Asia and the Pacific region could also lead to such a demand. 
Spectrum is essential for mobile communications and there is ample evidence that customers are 
prepared to pay a premium for mobility, in a market that ranges from the level of the domestic 
cordless phone upwards through cellular systems to the global roaming systems being devised for 
the top slice of the market by Motorola, Inmarsat and others. 
It is factors like these which create economic rents.  They also provide a basis for charging .more 
than the administrative cost of the resour~  to: 
•  allocate spectrum efficiently, 
•  increase the efficiency of its use . 
"The economically appropriate technology should be used-no gold-platingfor technology's sake 
alone."  · 
From an economics point of view the optimum technology is the one that generates the most 
output from a given set of inputs.  The adoption of this technology is a natural result of free 
markets - a company using less efficient old technology will lose its customers to one using the 
latest equipment that is  able to set a lower price.  The phenomenon of •gold-plating·, where 
companies use equipment with capabilities beyond market requirements, is common in industries 
that are insulated from  market prices.  This occurs, for  example with the US  utilities,  where 
price is related to  return on capital, and with some TOs,  where management is dominated by 
engineers and there is little or no competition.  The use of the wrong level of technology  and 
q·tality levels, driven beyond  what  consumers would  be happy to pay  for  in  the case of,  for 
example, water and some US utilities, or falling below what the market would like to buy if they 
were allowed to such as in Eastern Europe or Greece, is inefficient from an economic point of 
view. 
Any technology that uses more inputs (including financial) than necessary to satisfy demand  is 
economically  inefficient.  However,  in  the satellite industry high  start-up costs  and  long  lead 
times, as well as techniques to extend the lifetimes of  satellites, mean that there is a considerable 
lag  before  new  technology  becomes  widely  adopted.  The lack  of exposure  to  the  market 
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the FCC had to urge the industry to adopt 2° spacing as a response to scarcity in orbit resources. 
"The use ofpropeny rights is vital for a  functioning market in transponders. orbit and spectrum. • 
The property rights that are inherent in the enjoyment of rights to exploit GSOSR are important 
in defining the scope of the market.  The less flexible the licence and the narrower the rights 
allowed to the licensee, the less likely it will be that the optimal market solution will be reached. 
Property rights are also necessary to ensure "fair play", ie, that all users and potential users play 
by common rules.  These can be enforced by recourse to some higher authority.  The fact that 
the ITU  members generally abide by the Radio Regulations is vital to international frequency 
coordination.  Even though the ITU lacks enforcement powers, until now at least rational self-
interest (in mutual non-interference) has dictated mutual respect for assigned rights. 
At national level, it is essential that special or exclusive rights to enjoy GSOSR assignments be 
abolished,  such  that  national  PrOs and  other dominant  incumbent space segment providers 
become subject to the same licensing regime as any other player; and that appropriate licence 
selection procedures be elaborated based on objective,. transparent, non-discriminatory criteria. 
At present, the presumptive eligibility of  favoured national players to provide space segment -
in their own right or via the ISOs - severely distorts the European market for space segment 
provision by creating a class of specially privileged rights holders.  It is necessary that the 
playing field be levelled to assure equal opportunities to qualify for access to GSOSR.  Otherwise 
the market for space segment provision in Europe will remain fundamentally distorted. 
Another fundamental issue in terms of creating a market in GSOSR concerns the tradeability of 
licences.  Allowing licences to be freely tradeable (or what is effectively the same thing, allowing 
the companies holding them to be freely bought and sold) would allow any company that thinks 
it can make a better profit to buy either the licence itself or the current operator/space segment 
provider.  This  knowledge  puts  pressure  on  the  incumbent  to  operate  efficiently.  When 
assignments are enjoyed by major players, such as the dominant European PrOs, tradability of 
licences  is essential because it would be irrational (not to mention politically problematical) to 
purchase a PTO in order to obtain a relatively marginal asset. 
Other areas where definition of property rights is important in relation to the market for space 
segment provision are: 
•  scope of licence:  should  the  licence provide broad  rights  to  use  a particular 
orbit/frequency to provide any service, or should it specify the particular uses to 
which the resource can be put?  The former is more flexible and therefore likely 
to lead to more efficient resource utilisation- a company providing a service for 
which  there  is  little demand  can either switch  services or (providing there is 
tradeability) have  its rights bought out by another company providing a more 
appropriate service, 
•  duration of the licence: a very short duration licence bestows limited property 
rights on the holder.  This can inhibit investment, particularly towards the end 
of the  licence  period.  The longer  the  duration,  the greater  the  incentive  to 
invest, in the knowledge that there will be sufficient time to earn a return.  The 













most  efficient solution would  be to  give licences  in  perpetuity  (which  is  not 
inconsistent  with  the  current  model  typical  of most  EC  member  states). 
However, it is often argued that because the GSOSR is a limited resource there 
are moral difficulties in giving away the rights to exploit it forever.  There is a 
close parallel with land, which is also in fixed supply and where the owner has 
property rights in perpetuity. 
"Recognise the unavoidable existence of  imperfect competition in telecommunications,  whether 
land or satellite-based" 
Telecommunications  is  an  industry characterised  by significant economies  of scale,  creating 
barriers to  entry through the existence of fixed  costs.  Marginal  costs tend  to  fall  as  output 
expands, so that they are generally below average costs.  Under such conditions there is  no 
market solution where setting price equal to marginal costs creates an optimal solution from a 
welfare point of  view.  All operators have to sell at prices in excess of marginal cost if they are 
to cover their costs, including the cost of capital. 
The industry would be a natural monopoly if it were not for the existence of  moderating factors: 
•  technological change makes existing assets obsolescent and creates openings for 
new entrants, 
•  most fmns operate with less than perfect levels of competence, 
•  no finn has perfect lcnowledge of  the future, creating planning opportunities for 
others. 
Any equilibrium that  exists depends on the balance of these forces,  barriers to  entry and the 
extent to which regulation creates or removes other opportunities. 
Imperfect competition creates the opportunity for firms to make more than 'normal' profits by 
restricting  output  and  raising  prices  but  it  does  not  ensure  that  they  can.  Some 
telecommunications operators make low profits because political pressures keep the tariffs down. 
Others,  especially  in  the  international  area,  have  been  able  to  exploit  their  position  very 
successfully. 
One consequence of these factors  is  that  market  prices  may  be poor  representations of the 
economic cost of alternatives  and  may  lead  to  wasteful  resource allocation  if used  for  this 
purpose. 
A second consequence is that, since marginal costs cannot be used as market prices, there is a 
need to find the 'second best' prices which maximise public welfare within the constraint that the 
industry must make adequate profits.  This applies to GSOSR and other satellite resources as 
much as it does to general TO services. 
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·The sum of  producer and consumer surplus is a generally accepted measure of  overall social 
welfare.· 
Consumer  surplus  refers  to  the  economic  benefit  which  accrues  to  consumers  from  the 
opportunity to acquire goods at prices lower than they would  be prepared to  pay.  This arises 
because individual tastes differ.  Just as at any particular price a number of consumers are not 
willing to buy the product, there are also consumers that would still buy if it were a higher price. 
The difference between what the consumer would be prepared to pay and what they actually do 
pay is therefore a measure of their "profit"; and this can be used to measure the welfare benefit 
to consumers. 
Producer surplus  measures the benefit which  producers secure when  market conditions allow 
them to sell their output at prices higher than the minimum they would require as an incentive 
to supply.  This occurs in cases where the price is higher than the average cost of production. 
This situation is generally associated with markets where there is limited competition, as is the 
case  in  many  telecommunications  sub-sectors  including  satellite communications.  Producer 
surplus is  therefore equivalent to  "excess"  or "supernormal"  profit and  measures  the welfare 
benefit to suppliers. 
The total  of consumer and  producer surplus  is therefore a measure of the welfare benefit to 
society as a whole.  This is the measure that we have adopted in the modelling work.  It should 
be noted that this measure can be weighted to reflect society's views on political issues, such as 
income·distribution or the relative importance of consumer and producer welfare benefits. 
•Where possible all externalities should be inte17Uillsed in the price systent. • 
Externalities can be viewed as spillover effects from the production of  a good or service that have 
an impact on other firms or consumers.  A typical example is pollution, where a manufacturer 
maximising its own profit causes harm to others through reducing the quality of  the air or water. 
In  the  satellite  industry,  interference  is  an  externality.  This  is  addressed  through  the 
administrative mechanism of  the Radio Regulations.  Another example is the spillover from R&D 
carried out in the satellite industry into other industries.  For example, other high technology 
industries may benefit from improvements in miniaturisation arising from satellite R&D, without 
contributing to the costs of that R&D.  Economic theory says the externality will be internalised 
where possible by creating a market whereby one side compensates the other.  The final outcome 
will depend on who has the associated property rights.  Under the current system, the existing 
operators (even of "paper satellites") have the right not to be interfered with by new entrants. 
Introducing a market with appropriate property rights would mean that new entrants could either 
design their systems so as not to interfere or could compensate  incumbents~ 
Similar market mechanisms have begun to be introduced in the area of pollution.  Countries are 
beginning to adopt the "polluter pays"  principle and the US  bas introduced tradeable pollution 
rights. 
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"Eliminate asymmetric or imperfea information to the extent possible. " 
Markets work best when information on prices, quality, etc, is widely available to all potential 
consumers.  Asymmetries arise when one party has access to information that the other party 
does  not.  Imperfect and  incomplete information arises when no panies have all the necessary 
information to reach the equilibrium trade.  Where there is asymmetric or imperfect information, 
the market fails to function properly.  A typical example of  this is the market for used cars.  The 
seller knows whether the car has been treated well or whether it is a •temon·, but the buyer does 
not.  As a result, prices of all used cars, both good and bad, are substantially lower than new, 
with the reduction far more than would be expected to arise from purely physical depreciation. 
This is also the case where competitors have to provide information to operators such as Eutelsat 
(with  anti-competitive  covenants)  on  their  future  planned  filings,  but  the  reverse  flow  of 
information is not required. 
In the satellite market, the limited number of  trades, the rapid pace of  technological change, and 
the presence of large monopolistic companies (such as the TOs and the ISOs) all serve to limit 
the free availability of information.  At the very least they attach a high cost to obtaining it.  The 
lack of information creates uncertainty and risk, which has a cost which will be reflected in the 
cost of capital and through that into market prices; it also worsens investment decisions. 
An example of  the distortions caused by information asymmetries is the reported problem that 
Eutelsat experienced with its Signatories when it  informed potential purchasers of  its transponder 
prices.  As purchasers have to go through a Signatory in order to buy transponder capacity, this 
provided them with information on the Signatories' markups which might have assisted in the 
negotiations.. The Signatories in this case were acting to preserve the information imperfection 
to enable them to price substantially above cost. 
"Use  economic  notions  of sunk  costs and opportunity  costs. rother  than  accounting  costs. 
Likewise for economic vs accounting profits. • 
Accounting  definit~ons. of costs  and  profits  generally_. c:liffer  substantially  from  economic 
definitions.  This  is understandable given  that they have different objectives.  In particular, 
economic theory places considerable weight on the concept of  the "opportunity cost•. This is the 
cost or value of the  next best alternative,  as being the opportunity that the agent foregoes  in 
undertaking a particular option.  Economic profits, which exclude return to capital, are usually 
lower  than  accounting  profits,  which  are  calculated  by  deducting  costs  (excluding  interest 
payments) from sales. 
The "paper satellites" phenomenon can be used to illustrate this.  As. assignments are typically 
free, the cost of having a slot and not doing anything with it is zero.  There is therefore a strong 
incentive to hold licences, either for future use or to limit competition.  If, however, licences 
were valued at their market rates (which would depend on the expected returns from the use of 
the resource), the opportunity cost of holding the licence and not doing anything with it would 
be much  higher.  This could  be measured either in terms of the return that the company could 
have made if it had invested the money elsewhere or in terms of the financing cost of borrowing 
the money to buy the licence. 
In terms of profits, economic theory includes the notion of "normal" profit which is the level at 
which  no  new firms are attracted into the industry and  no existing firms  leave it.  This would 
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correspond to  the total  market  return on  the capital  employed  in  the business.  As  indicated 
above,  where competition is restricted, firms can make more than normal  profit over the long 
term  without  it  being eroded  by  competition from  new entrants.  This situation exists  in  the 
satellite industry where there are considerable barriers to entry, few firms and the presence of 
large monopoly TOs. 
,. Operational and a/locative efficiency should be encouraged. • 
Efficiency has two aspects: 
•  operational, or 'X' efficiency, defined as minimising the cost of a given output, 
•  allocative efficiency, whereby resources are allocated between alternative uses 
in the most efficient way. 
Operational Erfidency 
In economics, efficiency is defmed in absolute terms, either minimising the cost of producing a 
given output or (what is essentiaJly the same thing but measured in physical terms) maximising 
the production from a given set of inputs.  Not using the resource at all (eg, "paper satellites") 
is generally likely to be inefficient.  However there may be situations when it is better to hold 
on to the resource now in anticipation of more efficient uses in the future.  The decision to do 
this  would  weigh  the opportunity cost of not using the resource against the potential future 
returns. 
The economically efficient position depends on ~e  technology available.  The high initial capital 
costs,  rapid  pace of technological  change and  barriers to entry suggest that an economically 
efficient use of the GSOSR resource is extremely unlikely in practice.  The implication for the 
regulatory regime is that it should provide incentives to utilise GSOSR efficiently.  One way of 
doing this is to ensure that operators face the true opportunity cost of the resource.  However, 
an  alternative that  is often  used  is  to  use  licence  conditions  to  impose  technically  efficient 
solutions, ie, limiting the amount of GSOSR used.  This has been used in the US, for example: 
•  the adoption of 2° spacing, 
•  limiting cellular licences to 2 x 25 MHz and HDTV to the existing UHF bands 
which  were  opposed  by  the  industry  but  ultimately  stimulated  appropriate 
technical change. 
These need not necessarily be the economically efficient solutions, however.  A solution that uses 
the least amount of spectrum to provide a service may actually require more of other resources 
and cost more than one that uses a different combination of resources including more GSOSR. 
Allocative Erficiency 
Under  conditions  of perfect  condition  market  prices  equal  marginal  cost; which  maximises 
welfare  ~ecause otherwise: 
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•  for goods priced below marginal  cost, marginal demand  is  being satisfied  at a 
cost greater than the goods are worth to the marginal buyer, 
•  for goods priced above marginal cost, users who are prepared to pay more than 
the marginal production cost but less than the market price are being denied the 
product. 
In such a case aggregate welfare would be improved by producing less of the underpriced goods 
and using the resources to produce more of  the overpriced goods, prices being adjusted to market 
clearing levels in both cases. 
Under imperfect competition arising from scale economies this position cannot be reached but 
there will be a second best set of  prices which maximise welfare subject to an adequate level of 
profits being made. 
"If monopoly or anticompetitive situations and behaviour exist, follow  modem principles of 
economic regulation. " 
This  principle basically  means  that  to the  extent competition  is  limited,  then  regulation  is 
necessary and the regulatory framework should attempt to replicate the pressures of  competition. 
The shift in many government policies towards an increased role for the private sector in recent 
years has been accompanied by developments in regulatory economics to provide appropriate 
tools for regulators to deal with public and private sector monopolies.  These include: 
•  price caps, which generally limit the percentage by which the company can raise 
prices  to  the  rate  of  inflation,  less  an  amount  to  stimulate  efficiency 
improvements.  Price caps are administratively and theoretically superior to the. 
rate of  return regulatory criteria that are still common in the US and elsewhere; 
•  non-linear tariffs allowing,  for example, discounts for  bulk purchases  and  in 
general  more  accurately  reflecting  the underlying  cost  realities  such  as  the 




pressure for cost-based pricing; 
limitation of monopoly rights to "essential" areas; 
Ramsey  pricing,  which  relates  tariffs  to  demand  elasticities,  that  is,  to  the 
willingness to pay of various user groups. 
Price caps in particular are becoming increasingly used to regulate large, privatised utilities, for 
example in the regulation of BT in the UK. 
"Let  the  Coase  Theorem  work  -allow optimising  arrangements to  evolve freely  rather than 
imposing them or attempting to anticipate them. • 
The Coase Theorem  basically  says  that  if property  rights  are  well  defined  and  the  costs  of 
reaching an agreement are relatively low, then an optimal (efficient) market solution will develop, 
that is, the market will find a way without outside regulatory ·intervention.  Coase argued strongly 
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for  deregulation  of the  radio  spectrum  on  these  grounds.  Even  in  the  highly  regulated, 
anticompetitive satellite industry, quasi-markets are developing.  These attempt to find  a way 
around the artificial barriers to entry and trading imposed by competition.  Levin" highlighted 
a number of such developments.  Examples from Levin's article and  elsewhere include: 
•  leasing of transponder capacity by Intelsat, Hughes and PaJapa of Indonesia; 
•  RCA-GTE paying $2 m a year to Telesat Canada for use of  transponder capacity 
on ANIK-C until required in Canada; 
•  a proposed joint venture between Pacific Satellite Inc. (PSI) and the government 
of  Papua New Guinea (PNG) that would allow PSI to use PNG orbit assignments 
in  return for providing free domestic  circuits.  This is  similar to the current 
controversy over Tongasat; 
•  SES/Astra's use of FSS spectrum to provide DTH services. 
"Give  due  consideration  to  the  concepts  of public  good,  common  property  resources  and 
intellectual property. • 
It is often claimed that the nature of  the G~OSR  resource should preclude it from the free market 
solution, as this would not be an equitable allocation of  welfare.  This is usually used to support 
arguments for administrative planning type regulation and argue against competitive solutions. 
In particular, it is argued that the GSOSR is a public good, and that its global nature means that 
it should be treated as a common property resource and under these conditions market solutions 
may not maximise social wei~. These concepts can be described as follows: 
•  a public good is defined as one where consumption by one individual does not 
reduce  its  availability to others,  for  example,  street  lighting,  a  lighthouse, 
defence,  radio  or TV broadcasts.  The problem  arises  because  individual 
consumers have an incentive to understate the price they would be prepared to 
pay for the product in the belief that  someone else will  pay.  It is therefore 
argued that regulation is required to reach the optimum provision of the good, 
•  a common property resaurce is one which is not owned by an individual, for 
example, fisheries.  This can lead to problems of  over exploitation as individual 
users have little incentive to  utilise it  efficiently.  It is  therefore argued that 
regulation  is  required  to  prevent  over-exploitation  of the  resource.  This 
argument can be used to defend the position of LDCs, which argue that without 
regulation, by the time they are ready to make use of the GSOSR it wiJI  have 
been taken up by the developed countries.  However, this could be addressed by 
appropriate definition  of property  rights  and  introduction  of markets.  For 
example, the LDCs could sell or lease rights to their BSS allotments until they 
are ready to use them. 
Intellectual property rights are a particular issue in a rapidly changing industry which is at the 
forefront of new technology, such as satellites.  The introduction of Pioneers' preference in the 
US was justified by the need to stimulate innovation.  However, as indicated in Section 2, this 
15Emergent markets for orbit spectrum arrangements - H.  Levin, Telecommunications Policy 
1988. 






is primarily a result of  the regulatory procedures adopted in the US, and there are other methods 
available for protecting intellectual property. 
"Use criteria and procedures that are objective, transparent and non-discriminatory. • 
These principles apply  to any  regulatory situation.  The more  objective and  transparent the 
regulation, the less uncertainty the players face and the more likely they are to reach the optimal 
solution.  It is therefore important to minimise the level of regulatory risk to companies in the 
industry. 
It should be noted that there may be situations where discrimination is necessary.  For example 
in  UK telecommunications  the old  monopoly  TO  (B1) is  price  controlled  while  the  newer 
competitor (Mercury) is not in order to provide an incentive for the new entrant.  At present, 
however, in the satellite industry the regulations tend to discriminate in favour of the incumbent 
monopoly or quasi-monopoly organisations. 
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Appendix S 
Modelling Theory 
The  exposition of the  basic  assumptions,  the  modelling  of the deregulation  and  the  outside 
parameters is done in a non-technical manner because of the readership of  this report. Details on 
the technical aspects of the model are available on request from KPMG Management Consulting 
in London. It should be noted that the model and the results have been checked, approved and 
fully agreed upon by two of the leading expens in the field:  Europe based Professor Damien 
Neven (Lausanne University) and US based Professor Marcellus Snow (Hawaii University). 
Basic assumptions of the modelling structure 
The model  assumes that there is one service offered at a single common price. The price and 
quantity (number of transponder equivalents) of the service made avaDable is determined as if 
the  whole  industry  was  operated  by  a single firm.  In  that way  the benefits  (profits)  for  all 
participants are maximised.  This implies that price exceeds marginal cost, and  in the satellite 
industry average cost also. 
We provide here a brief non-technical summary of  all the assumptions made in the final version 
of the model used: 
Determination of  price and quantity 
The  model  assumes  that there  is  one service offered  at a single co.moon  price,  following  , 
consultation with our economic advisers. Altering this assumption would complicate the results 
and presentation considerably without adding to the basic insights of  the analysis. The rationale 
for  this assumption  is  that  on the  supply  side transponders  can  be treated  as  homogeneous. 
Demand is of  course for different uses and our aggregate demand estimates take into account the 
varying demand  types.  For the purpose of the  modelling exercise however,  the demand  for 
different types of ser\rices is assumed to have similar characteristics and it is therefore  possible 
to consider total demand for transponder equivalents in the satellite industry. 
The price and  quantity (number of transponder  equivalents) of the service  made  available  is 
determined  as  if the whole  industry  was  operated  by  a single firm.  In that  way  the benefits 
(profits) for all participants are maximised. This implies that price exceeds marginal cost, and 
in the sat  en ite industry average cost also. 
Average cost pricing 
A number of  operators, notably Intel sat and Eutelsat, are forced to price in a way that guarantees 
a given return to capital.  In economic modelling terms this would be approximated by assuming 
that these operators are setting price per transponder equal to the average cost per transponder, 
so that turnover just covers costs and profits (economic) are zero. 
Our model  however is analysing the industry  in terms of final  services offered.  This  includes 
purely commercial operators (eg. Astra) and the PTfs (who are the major buyers of the Eutelsat 
and  Intelsat).  Very  few,  if any,  of these  final  service  providers  are  subject  to  any  of the 






constraints faced by Eutelsat and  lntelsat. We therefore maintain the assumption that the whole 
industry sets price as if it was a single firm, trying to maximise profits rather than setting price 
at average cost. This of course implies that the profits that Eutelsat and lntelsat could be making 
if they were free to price like the other operators, are distributed amongst the other players in 
the industry and the final  service providers. 
Determination of  costs and number of  operators 
The satellite operating industry  in Europe and Region  1 is quite fragmented  and  we therefore 
assume that the costs of  operating the total number of  satellites is distributed amongst a relatively 
large number of  operators. This implies that the benefits of  economies of  scale are not exploited 
and operation is not carried at the minimum (average) cost possible. 
Utilisation 
We assume in the "Base Case" that all available ttansponders are fully utilised. The reason is that 
the model aims to assess regulatory changes rather than describe in detail short run fluctuations 
in demand.  We recognise however that utilisation  may  and  does  fall  short of 100%.  As  an 
indication of  the effects of  lower utilisation, we provide an estimate of  the prices per transponder 
that would prevail if utilisation was 80% in the "Base ease·. 
We also examine the full  effects of significant falls in the utilisation of new satellites launched 
when operators proceed with their plans (this is the "optimistic" scenario for Region 1 and the 
only scenario considered for Europe as the  •  Alternative Case").  In that case the number of 
satellites launched exceeds significantly the expected demand for their services and therefore the 
level of  utilisation can fall to nearly around SO%. In the alternative case the implications of  such 
a development for the profitability of the whole industry are examined. 
Technical parameters 
In order to calculate-·p.rices per transponder we assume that there ~e  two  "typical" satellites: 
• 
• 
the first type of  satellite has only Ku. transponders, assumed to be 15 per satellite 
(our 1992 data suggests that the actual number ofKu transponder equivalents per 
satellite is  around  17.  This figure is then reduced  by  10%  to  15,  in order to 
allow for the spare capacity necessary for security reasons ie. if a satellite fails), 
the second  type of satellite has  all  types of transponders  (ie  Ku,  C band  and 
others), a total of between 33 and 37 transponders per satellite. This is derived 
directly from the plans of the operators. 
This allows us to reflect the much higher price charged for Ku transponders relative to C band. 
Other assumptions made 
•  in order to reduce year to year fluctuations in the number of satellites launched 
we assume that the number of satellites launched every year is a 3-year moving 
average (MA).  This takes  into account therefore the possibility that a satellite 
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might be launched but not operated for some time and  the fact  that there are 
different launch dates, and 
•  the  number  of transponders  for  1993-96  depends  on  the  expected  demand  . 
growth. 
Modelling Deregulation 
Deregulation is modelled as a "move" of  the industry towards the fully competitive outcome. The 
fully competitive outcome implies a significantly lower price and significantly higher demand 
(and supply) of  transponders. In economic terms this is also the most efficient outcome, since the 
benefits for both producers and consumers are maximised. 
Formally deregulation  is  modelled as  a movement from  a monopolistic sbllcture, where the 
industry operates as if all satellites are operated by one finn, to an oligopolistic structure where 
the industry operates as if all satellites are operated by X firms, wbere X is larger than one (this 
is formally known in economic terms as an X player Coumot-Nash oligopoly). The demand and 
supply of transponders  under an oligopolistic structure would  normally  approach  the fully 
competitive outcome as X - ie the assumed number of  operators - increases (the price also falls 
and approaches the fully competitive price as the assumed number of  operators increase). 
As an indication, with a linear demand curve and linear cost curve, the number of  transponders 
demanded and supplied with a monopolistic industry structure is SO~  of  the number demanded 
and supplied under a fully  competitive structure. The number of transponders demanded and 
supplied with- an oligopolistic industry structure where X=2, is 66~  of  die number demanded  :1 
and supplied under a fully competitive structure. When X is 3, the oligopolistic outcome is 75% 
of the fully competitive one and  when X is 4,. the oligopolistic outcome  is 80~ of the fully 
competitive one. In our modelling of deregulation, the assumed number of players under each 
scenario is given below: 
SCENARIO 
1 (Market approach in Region 1) 
2 (Market approach in Europe) 
3 (Partial Markets) 
The "outside parameters" 





A number of parameters are taken as given from outside the model: 
•  costs, the  function  relating  the cost of operating satellites  to the  number of 
satellites per "producer" is  assumed to be cubic and  is derived from the latest 
Eutelsat data available on total  operating costs.  It  is then adjusted to take into 
account  the fact  that  there  is  at  least  another major operator in  the industry 
(Intelsat). The resulting relationship implies that the efficient number of  satellites 
to be operated (ie where the average cost is at a minimum) is 9, 
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•  elasticity or demand, we estimate a linear demand function.  In order to derive 
this function we assume that the elasticity of demand is between  1.1  and  1.2 in 
1992 (this is an average of independent forecasts available). We assume that the 
elasticity  is  marginally  higher  for  Europe,  to  reflect  the  more  significant 
competition  faced  by  satellite  operators  in  that  region.  We  also  assume  a 
relatively higher elasticity over the forecast period 1993-96 ~een  1.25 and 
1.4)  compared  to  1992,  assuming  that  competition  from  terrestrial  services 
intensifies, 
•  demand growth, the assumptions made about growth in demand for transponders 
are taken from independent estimates of the demand level and the market size in 
the year 2,000, by each service category. These are aggregated into demand for 
transponder equivalents and then adjusted for Region 1 and Europe, to reflect the 




number of satellites, the 1992 starting figure for number of existing satellites 
and the number of new satellites launched in 1992. These include all satellites 
known to be operational at the end of  1992.  Where the lifespan of a satellite was 
unknown  it was  assumed  to  be between  4 and  8.5 years  depending on the 
·operator (see Appendix 7 for the full list of  filings for region 1 satellites and the 
list of satellites included in the economic analysis), 
launch plans, the number of satellites/transponders planned to be launched by 
all  operators  every  year  •.  This  includes  all  satellites  (ordered  and  under 
construction). 
transponder types, the number of  Ku and total (ie including C-Band and other) 
transponders in 1992, 
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Glossary of Abbreviations 
















Advanced Communications Technology Satellite, NASA's experimental satellite 
for the development of GSS transponders, OBP and DSP techniques. 
A  technique  whereby  multiple  users  can  access  the  same  communications 
channel, by transmitting wherever the channel is clear, listening for collisions 
and re-transmitting (after a random period) when a collision is detected. 
Atlantic Ocean Region, one of the three worldwide telecommunications regions 
defined by the ITU. 
The point in an elliptical orbit at which a satellite is farthest away from the earth. 
One of the first major networks, developed by the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency of the US  Department of Defense and  which links  many  computers 
(particularly in research institutes and universities) from Hawaii to Sweden. 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode, a broadband networking/switching technology, 
usually layered on top of SOH. 
A measure of  the total transmission capacity of  a device; in this case, a measure 
of the total RF capacity of a transponder. 
Binary PSK,  an RF modulation technique in  which  a two-symbol  alphabet is 
used, thus achieving lower susceptibility to interference than alphabets with more 
symbols, such as QPSK, but at the expense of lower data transfer rates. 
High bandwidth, high data rate. 
British Satellite Broadcasting. 
Broadcast Satellite Service, a type of transponder reserved for the broadcast of 
signals to multiple users. 
Code Division Multiple Access, a multiple access method using spread spectrum 
techniques. 
Coastal Earth Station, an earth station on the coast through which signals to/from 
an SES are transmitted to/received from a satellite.  This term is extensively used 
by lnmarsat. 
Circuit Multiplication Equipment, which allows a greater number of circuits to 
be carried within the same bandwidth by means of compression techniques. I 














Circuit  Multiplication  Equipment.  Techniques,  such  as  compression,  which 
increase the apparent number of channels supported by the same bandwidth. 
Digital Audio Broadcasting, a system for the transmission of very high quality 
audio signals using spread spectrum techniques. 
Demand  Assigned  Multiple Access,  an  access technique  where  bandwidth  is 
assigned to a user, for access by,  for example, IDMA or FDMA techniques, 
when the user demands it.  The assignment is requested on a single channel, 
using a technique such as Aloha, and is assigned for a fixed period. 
Direct Broadcast by Satellite, the broadcast of  data (using a BSS  transponder) 
directly to multiple users, rather than via a central terminal for distribution via 
cable.  Used for satellite television.  See also DlH. 
The communications link through which RF signals are transmitted to em  earth 
station from the satellite. 
Data Relay System, ESA's proposed DRSS. 
Data Relay System Satellite, a system of GEO satellites whose purpose is to 
relay signals from other satellites in, for example, LEO/MEO orbits, or from 
space vehicles such as ESA's Hermes or Ariane, or NASA's space shuttle. 
Data Relay & Tracking System, Japan's proposed DRSS.  _ 
Digital  Speech  Interpolation,  a  speech  compression  technique  in  which  the 
redundancy (the gaps) is removed from speech channels. 
DSP  Digital  Signal  Processing,  digital  RF  modulation  techniques  which  replace 









Direct To Home, the transmission of TV signals directly from the satellite to a 
terminal  at  the home  of the  viewer,  rather  than  to  a  central  terminal  for 
distribution  via cable.  This term  is  used,  rather than  DBS,  when  an  FSS 
transponder is  used  (as  is  the case on the Astra satellite),  rather than a  BSS 
transponder. 
The piece of equipment by means of which  a user carries out communication 
with the satellite. 
European Space Agency. 
European Technical Standards Institute. 
Fade  Countermeasures,  techniques  for  combating  the  effects  of rain  fade  at 
















Fiber Distributed Data Interface, a networking standard based on fiber optics. 
Frequency  Division  Multiple  Access,  a  satellite  access  technique  is  which 
multiple users  access  a  single satellite transponder by each  accessing  it  at  a 
different frequency (within the bandwidth of the transponder). 
Future  Land  Mobile  Public  Telephone  System,  a  terrestrial  mobile 
communications system that will not be fully defined until the year 2000, and 
which is in direct competition with satellite mobile telephone systems using LEO 
satellites. 
Frequency Modulation, a modulation technique in which data is transmitted by 
modulating the frequency of the carrier. 
The area of the earth's surface that a  satellite's transmissions can  reach,  as 
defined by its orbit, the transponder power used and the antenna direction (and 
any shaping resulting from the use of an advanced antenna). 
Frequency Shift Keying, an RF modulation tecbnique in which symbols are used 
to represent the data being transmitted, with each symbol being represented by 
a frequency shift. 
Fixed  Satellite  Service,  a  type of transponder  reserved  for  point  to  point 
communication between fixed earth stations. 
Geostationary Orbit, an orbit with  an altitude of 3S786km,  in which a satellite 
appears to be stationary over a single equatorial point on the earth's surface. 
General  Satellite  SelVice,  a  newly  defined  type  of  transponder,  initially 
experimental use on NASA's ACfS satellite, which offers integrated multiple 
services. 
High Definition Television, an emerging set of television standards. 
Highly Elliptical Orbit, an elliptical orbit, such as molnya orbit, whose apogee 
is 46300km and  whose perigee is  IOOOkm. 
Intermediate Data  Rate,  a  satellite  access  technique  in  which  multiple  users 
access a single satellite transponder using digital carriers separated by frequency 
division. 
International Frequencies Registration Board, part oft,he ITU, responsible for the 
allocation of orbits and frequencies to satellites. 
Inter Orbit Link, a communications channel between satellites in different orbits, 

























Internet Protocol, the  network layer protocol originally developed  in the early 
1980s for use on the Arpanet, and  since adopted  by many other networks  and 
network standards (including FDDI). 
Integrated Services Digital Network, a networking technique which unifies data 
and  voice communication into a single medium. 
Inter-Satellite Link,  a technique using either RF or lasers  for  communication 
between satellites. 
International Telecommunications  Union,  the UN agency  responsible for  the 
worldwide regulation of satellite communications. 
Low Earth Orbit, a satellite orbit between 500 and  1500km. 
Line  of Sight,  which  needs  to  be  maintained  between  a  satellite  and  an 
earthbound terminal  if communication is to be carried out. 
Multiplexed Analogue Components, a family ofTV signal transmission standards 
which includes C-MAC, D-MAC and 02-MAC (a half bandwidth version of  D-
MAC; requiring some sacrifice in picture quality but more suitable for existing 
cable systems, particularly in France and Germany). 
·Multi-Beam Antenna, an advanced antenna in which the beam is split into several 
sub-beams, each covering a specific geographical area and accessible separately 
by using a different frequency.  -
Mid Earth Orbit, an orbit higher than LEO, but not as high as GEO. 
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
On Board Processing, an emerging technology in which much of the routing of 
data takes place on board the satellite, rather than being carried on the earth. 
Personal Communication Network, usually a personal telephony network. 
The point in an elliptical orbit at which a satellite is closest to the earth. 
Phase Shift Keying, an RF modulation technique in which symbols are used to 
represent the data being transmitted, with  each symbol being represented by a 
phase shift. 
Public  Telecommunications  Operator.  A  PTI  that  only  deals  in 
telecommunications.  There might be more than one PTO in a country, as is the 



















Post, Telegraph and Telephone, the national, normally state-owned organisations 
that, until recently, controlled all satellite communications. 
Quadraphase PSK, an RF modulation technique in which a four-symbol alphabet 
is  used,  thus  allowing  greater data  transfer rates  than  alphabets  with  fewer 
symbols,  such  as  BPSK,  but  at  the  expense  of greater  susceptibility  to 
interference. 
Radiocommunications Agency,  the UK licensing authority for the operation of 
telecommunications equipment and  services (including satellite-based systems) 
within the UK. 
Radio Frequency. 
Single Channel  Per Carrier,  a technique whereby  multiple users can share a 
transponder  by  each  being  allocated  a  separate  channel  within  the  total 
bandwidth. 
Synchronous Digital Hierarchy, a high speed networking architecture. 
Ship Earth Station, an earth station aboard a ship.  This term is extensively used 
by lnmarsat. 
Satellite Multi Service, a  type of transponder,  with  very limited availability, 
capable of  handling multiple services. 
Satellite News  Gathering,  the use  of satellites  for  the transmission of news 
pictures from a camera to (for example) the home studio. 
Synchronous Optical  NETwork, the American equivalent to the international 
SOH.  . 
A  technique for the transmission of signals by spreading them over the entire 
bandwidth of  the  r~eiverltransponder, with the signal only recoverable by means 
of  a key, identifying those parts of  the total bandwidth which make up the signal. 
Specialised Satellite Service Operator,  a  type of UK licence granted  for  the 
operation of satellite services.  Now largely bypassed by deregulation. 
Trellis Coded  Modulation, an  RF  modulation technique which offers superior 
spectral efficiency to mobile systems. 
Time Division Multiple Access, a satellite access  technique in  which multiple 
users access a single satellite transponder by each accessing it at a different time. 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System, NASA's implementation of a DRSS. 
An earth station. 
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TES  Telephony Eanh Station, an earth station used for telephony.  Used as a product 
name by Hughes. 
Transponder  The piece of satellite equipment which receives signals from an earth station on 
the uplink, amplifies them, changes their frequency (normally a downshift) and 
re-transmits them on the downlink. 
Uplink  The communications  link  through  which  RF  signals  are  transmitted  to  the 
satellite from an earth station. 
VR  Virtual  Reality, which can  be described as being inside a computer generated 
world.  Once there, a user interacts with objects and/or other users, the latter by 





Very Small Aperture Terminal, a terminal which uses a small (say  lm) dish. 
World  Administrative Radio Conference,  the  lTV-organised forum  at  which 
decisions about the allocations of the RF spectrum are made. 
World Administrative Telephone and Telegraph Conference, the ITU-organised 
forum at which decisions about international terrestrial telecommunications are 
made. }(_J)iLfbJManagement Consultilg 
Appendix 7 
Orbital Locations of Region  1 Geostationary Satellite Filings 
I  Name  I  Position °E  I 
EUTELSAT I-F2  1 
TELE-X  5 
EUTELSA  T II-F4  7 
EUTELSA  T II-F2  10 
EUTELSAT II-F1  13 
EUTELSA  T II-F6  13 
ITALSAT 2  13 
ITALSAT2  13.2 
AMOS  1 &2  15 
EUTELSA  T II-F3  16 
ASTRA lA  19.2  -
ASTRA lB  19.2 
ASTRA  lC  19.2 
ASTRA  1D  19.2 
EUTELSAT 1-FS  21.5 
GALS (3  at 23  °E)  23 
DFS KOPERNIKUS  I  23.5 
EUTELSAT 1-FI  25.5 
DFS KOPERNIKUS 2  28.5 
ARABSA.T  1-C  31 
TURKSAT -IB  31 
DFS KOPERNIKUS 3  33.5 
ST  A  TSIONAR-02 (RADUGA 22)  35 
EUTELSAT I-F4  36 
EUTELSAT II-F5  36 
STATSIONAR-12 (GORIZONT-12)  40 
















GALS  (2  AT 44  °E) 
STATSIONAR-09 (RADUGA  19) 
STATSIONAR-24 (RADUGA  1-1) 
TURKSAT -1C 
STATSIONAR-05 (GORIZONT-17) 
INTELSA  T 507 
INTELSA  T 604 
INTELSA  T 602 






ST  A  TSIONAR-03 (RADUGA-20) 
ST  ATSIONAR-06 (GORIZONT  -20) 
INSAT-28 
INTELSAT 501 
ST  A  TSIONAR-14 (GORIZONT -19) 
STATSIONAR-T (EKRAN-19) 
ASIASAT 1 
ST A  TSIONAR-15 (RADUGA 21) 
GMS-4 (HIMA W  ARI-4) 
STATSIONAR-07 (GORIZONT-18) 
SOVCANSTAR 
INTELSA T 511 
INMARSAT 2-F3 (PACIFIC OCEAN) 
STATSIONAR-10 (RADUGA-18) 
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EKRANI5  297 
USASAT 13E  302 
USASAT 130  304 
INMARSA  T 2-F4  306 
INTELSAT 513  307 
INTELSAT 506  310 
ORION F-2  313 
PANAMSAT (PAS-I)  315 
PANAMSAT (PAS-3)  317 
COLUMBIA (fDRSS ATLANTIC)  319 
INTELSA  T 504  319.5 
ORION F-1  "322.5 
INTELSAT 603  325.5 
MARCOPOLO 1  329 
STATSIONAR-05 (RADUGA-16)  329.1 
--
HISPASAT lA  330 
HISPASAT 1B  330 
HISPASAT 1C  330 
INTELSAT 601  332.5 
STATSIONAR-08 (RADUGA 23)  335 
INTELSA  T 605  335.5 
INTELSA  T 502  338.5 
INTELSAT K  338.5 
TV SAT 2  340.8 
EUROPESAJ' 1  341 
EUROPESAT 2 & 3  341 
OLYMPUS 1 (L-SA T)  341 
TDF-1  341.2 
TDF-2  341.2 
INTELSAT 515  342 
• 







INMARSA  T 2-F2 
SOVCANST  A.R 
STATSIONAR-04 (GORIZONT-20) 
STATIONAR-11 (GORIZONT- 15) 
TELECOM 2A 
TELECOM2B 
TELECOM lC 
INTELSAT 512 
MARCOPOL02 
Satellites: Final 
344.5 
346 
346 
349 
352 
355 
357 
359 
359.2 R
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